

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

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OF
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OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY,

SELECTED FROM THE WORKS OF

EMMANUEL KANT

Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin;
and Professor of Philosophy in the University
of Koenigsberg;

AND EXPOUNDED BY

JAMES SIGISMUND BECK

extraordinary Professor in the University
of Halle:

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY
AN AUDITOR OF THE LATTER.

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OF

CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

SELECTED FROM THE WORKS OF

IMMANUEL KANT

Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin
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AND RECOMMENDED BY

JAMES SIGISMUND REE

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TRANSLATED BY
AN AUSTRIAN

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BACO DE VERULAMIO.

Instauratio magna. Praefatio.

De nobis ipsis silemus: de re autem, quae agitur, petimus: ut homines eam non opinionem, sed opus esse cogitent; ac pro certo habeant, non sectae nos alicujus, aut placiti, sed utilitatis et amplitudinis humanae fundamenta moliri. Deinde ut suis commodis aequi — in commune consulant — & ipsi in partem veniant. Praeterea ut bene sperent, neque instaurationem nostram ut quiddam infinitum & ultra mortale fingant, & animo concipiant; quum revera sit infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus.

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782 8

De humanis legibus

De nobis ipse libere de se autem, quod
 est, petimus, ut homines cum non possint
 sed opus esse cogitent: ne pro certo habeamus, non
 leges nos esse, sed eas, aut easdem. Sed utilitas et
 commoditas hominum legum mentis nostri. De
 de ut hinc commodis caput, in dominum con-
 stant. Et ipse in partem veniat. Partem
 ut hinc legem legem humanam nobis et
 quidem iustitiam & uti morales legem,
 animo considerant; quoniam hinc in iustitia
 is hinc et terminus legum.

THE
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

The revolution, which critical philosophy has occasioned in the manner of thinking in Germany, being the most remarkable, and, in point of tendency and influence, on society, perhaps, at the same time, the most beneficial, that ever agitated the commonwealth of letters; and this philosophy having been hitherto but imperfectly represented in England; the translator thought his time could not well be better employed, nor his mite, towards the propagation of useful knowledge, more effectually contributed, than by endeavouring to transplant its genuine principles to his own native soil, where every branch

VIII TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

of learning, in general, has hitherto flourished, and where critical philosophy, without doubt, will also strike root: To undertake this so arduous task he was induced by the fortunate circumstance of his having studied several years under Kant's favourite and immediate disciple Professor Beck, whom this great man himself acknowledges to be of the very few, who have plunged into the depths, and caught the true spirit, of this philosophy.

From this course of studies, then, the translator has received a thorough conviction, that this science not only contains the most consequential and satisfactory reasoning, in all its parts, but that its drift and ultimate end are the moral perfection and happiness of mankind; for it extirpates the doctrines of materialism, fatalism, atheism, freethinking incredulity, fanaticism, and superstition, all of which may be universally pernicious to society; as well as of idealism and scepticism, which cannot be so easily communicated
to

to the public, and which are dangerous in the schools only.

Whoever has not totally neglected the improvement of his mind, and will reflect but a moment on the dignity and importance of these subjects, cannot fail to be inspired with the sentiments due to the able and worthy Kant, the generous benefactor of mankind and founder of this vast system (the harvest of some fifty years constant labour,) which not only leads to, but gains, the summit of all human culture, and, for this reason, must constitute a grand era both in the annals of science and in the progress of human understanding; in this philosophy too are contained arguments, the most cogent and conclusive, for a pure moral belief, so indispensable and consolatory to mankind, in the existence of God and immortality of the soul, arguments, which rest on the most solid basis, namely, the sublime formal principle of practical reason, or, in other words, the moral law itself. This is

a foundation very different indeed from the un-able hypotheses of former philosophers. More than this (rational belief) were it possible, would be inconsistent with the course of providence, which, for the best of purposes, has drawn an impenetrable veil between us and futurity, as Lord Kaimes very justly says, 'there is no bias in human nature more prevalent than an appetite to anticipate futurity, by being made acquainted beforehand with what will happen. That appetite was indulged without reserve in dark times; and hence omens, auguries, dreams, judicial astrology, oracles, and prophecies, without end. It shows strange weakness in the rational faculty, not to see, that such foreknowledge would be a gift more pernicious to man than Pandora's box: it would deprive him of every motive to action; and leave no place for sagacity, nor for contriving means to bring about a desired event. Life is an enchanted castle, that gives play to passions, and exercise to reason: remove the veil that
hides

hides futurity — behold the enchanted castle gone, and in its stead a barren and insipid prospect. Anxiety about futurity rouses our sagacity to prepare for what may happen; but an appetite to know what sagacity cannot discover, is a weakness in our nature inconsistent with every rational faculty. As foreknowledge of future events would therefore annihilate all activity; Providence is not less to be revered for the testimony of benevolence and goodness in what he has concealed from us, than in that which he has imparted.

The assertion of an illustrious author of our own nation, that ‘a little philosophy makes men atheists; but a great deal reconciles them to religion,’ will be found completely exemplified and confirmed in the wise and virtuous Kant, the most decided and zealous advocate for the cause of Christianity and its divine morality, whose sentiments on this head are couched in these words: ‘This law of all laws (love God above all and thy neighbour

bour as thyself) * represents, therefore, like all moral precept of the Gospel, the moral sentiment in its whole perfection, since it, as an ideal of sanctity, is not attainable by any creature, and notwithstanding is the prototype, which we ought to aspire to approximate and to equal in an uninterrupted, but infinite, progression.

The doctrine of Christianity, when it is even not yet considered as doctrine of religion, gives a conception of the chief good (of the kingdom of God), which alone satisfies the strictest demand of practical reason.

The Christian precept of morals is commonly holden, in regard of its purity, to have no preference to the moral conception of the Stoics, but the difference be-

* It is the practical love (as the pathological i. e. love from inclination is impossible) which is implied in this quintessence of all laws. To love God, in this sense, is, willingly to keep his commandments; and to love one's neighbour, to discharge, willingly, every duty to him.

twixt

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. . XIII

twixt them, however, is very obvious. The stoical system made the consciousness of the strength of mind the pivot, on which all moral sentiments must turn, and though its disciples, 'tis true, spoke of duties and perfectly determined them too, yet they placed the spring and the proper determinative of the will in an elevation of the cast of mind superior to the low springs of the senses, which have might through weakness of soul only. Virtue, then, was, with them, a certain heroism, rising above the animal nature of man, of the sage, who suffices for himself and propounds indeed duties to others, but is himself superior to them and not subject to temptation to transgress the moral law. They could not, however, have done all this, had they represented to themselves this law, in all the purity and severity, which does the precept of the Evangel. When I understand by an idea, a perfection, to which nothing can be given adequate in experience, the moral ideas are not, on that account, transcendent, i. e. such

XIV TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

such, of which we cannot even sufficiently determine the conception, or to which it is uncertain if an object correspond, as the ideas of speculative reason, but serve, as archetypes of practical reason, for the indispensable rule of moral conduct, and, at the same time, as a standard of comparison.

*When we view the Christian morality in its philosophical aspect, and compare it with the ideas of the Grecian school, it appears thus: the ideas of the Cynics, of the Epicureans, of the Stoics, of the Christians, are, the simplicity of nature, prudence, wisdom, and holiness. As to the manner of attaining them, the Greek philosophers are so distinguished from one another, that the Cynic found common sense sufficient thereto, the others the way of science only, both, then, the mere use of the natural powers. The Christian morality, since it arranges its precept (as it must be) so pure and unindulgent, deprives man of the confidence, at least in
this*

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. : xv

this life, of being fully adequate to it, but reestablishes it also thereby, that, when we act as well as in our power, we may hope, that what is not in it will otherwise stand us in stead, whether we know the mode or not. Aristotle and Plato differ but in respect of the origin of our moral conceptions.

With regard to the rendering of this work, the translator has but little to say, except that his endeavours have been chiefly directed towards preserving the intrinsic sense, true spirit, and solid argumentation of his author, and rather to convey these with accuracy and precision, than to attempt an elegance of style and harmony of period, of which such writings are little susceptible, and which, he may say, would be highly detrimental, nay, perhaps even degrading, to them.

The English language is allowed to exceed most others in Europe in simplicity, variety, richness, and elegance; whereas,
the

XVI TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

the German is one of the most copious, energetic, expressive, and, since the time of Kant, the translator ventures to affirm, better adapted to philosophising, than probably any other, whether ancient or modern, our own multiform tongue not excepted: Even Lord Monboddo himself might be pleased with the style of our philosopher of Königsberg (altho' but a modern) and certainly would not accuse him of composing vibrantes sententiolae; the translator must own, that he too thinks the grave and dignified march of the long Kantean periods well-suited to the majesty of philosophic argument, 'and, as the meaning, where the composition is in periods of long sentences, cannot be divided and taken separately, but must be apprehended altogether or not at all, it is evident that the sense in that way comes upon the mind more close and embodied, as it were, and consequently more forcibly than when broken down, and frittered into small pieces.' Again, since the German and English languages are
streams

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. XVII

streams flowing from the same fountain, that is, both being sister-dialects of the Teutonic, the study of the first must, consequently, in these points of view, be doubly interesting and instructive to the British philosopher.

A few expositions, which the translator, in the course of his reading, has excerpted from the inestimable, critical works themselves, will, perhaps, not be unacceptable to the learned; he must, however, once for all, previously apologize for having now and then made a little free with the language, and likewise crave to be indulged in the adoption of several scientific terms, first used by Kant in illustrating his new mental anatomy, but which, he trusts, will be found, by connoisseurs, to have been done, neither wantonly, nor incongruous to the genius of the English tongue; in short, this freedom was unavoidable, else the translation of this work would have been totally impracticable; in this office however

XVIII TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

he claims no other merit, than that of having strictly adhered, as far as in him lay, to his own vernacular idiom, and of having implicitly followed the footsteps of this excellent and matchless philosopher.

*Criticisms, of whatever nature, will be highly acceptable from men of real science, and shall be carefully attended to, should this publication have the good fortune to survive another edition; but judgments of ignorance, as well as remarks of dogmatists, or others, whose only erudition consists in logomachy or cavilling at expressions, will be held to be even beneath censure, and passed by in silence (*ne sutor ultra crepidam*). Should any one, however, not possessed of competent scientific knowledge, be vain and presumptuous enough to attempt to criticise this work, which so much transcends the comprehension of the vulgar, and which, though its results may be rendered perfectly intelligible and brought down*

down to any the meanest capacity, never can become popular, but must always remain the property of the schools, the translator takes the liberty to remind him of what the learned author of the *Origin and Progress of Language* says, speaking of vanity, than which nothing makes a man so contemptible in the eyes of men of sense, 'and they know, at the same time, that it is founded in ignorance; and that the only cure for it is good solid learning, (for a little superficial learning increases it,) in philosophy, history, and arts. By philosophy we learn what the powers of human nature are, and to what a height it may be exalted; but it will teach us, at the same time, that man can never rise to this highest elevation without philosophy. History will inform him to what perfection men have actually arrived in other ages and nations of the world, and that the manners and institutions alone of a well-regulated state have formed great men. But it will inform him likewise, that in a corrupt,

and degenerate nation, no man can rise above the manners of the age, except by the assistance of philosophy, to which alone we owe those shining lights which have illumined the darkest ages of the world, and cast a glory upon the most profligate and worthless times. It was to philosophy that the Romans owed, in their degenerate days, an Helvidius Priscus, a Thraseopetus, and the great and good Emperor Marcus Aurelius; and it was not the manners of the state, but philosophy, that formed Epaminondas, the greatest man perhaps that ever Greece produced?

The advantages which accrue from an accurate and profound philosophy are innumerable, and we may remark, in every art or profession, even those which most concern life or action, that a spirit of accuracy, however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them more subservient to the interests of society. And though a philosopher may
live

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. - XXI

live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art or calling, as Hume beautifully expresses: 'The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtilty, in the subdividing and balancing of power, the lawyer more method and finer principles in his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his discipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. The stability of modern governments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern philosophy, have improved, and probably will still improve, by similar gradations. Were there no other advantage to be reaped from these studies, beyond the gratification of an innocent curiosity, yet ought not even this to be despised; as being an accession to those few safe and harmless pleasures, which are bestowed on human race. The sweetest and most inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and

XXII TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

learning; and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way, or open up any new prospect, ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to mankind.

Kant, in his Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, owns, that he was first roused from his dogmatical lethargy, by the scepticism of David Hume, and then,*

** The resemblance, between the characters, dispositions, and pursuits, of these two great men, is so very striking, that the just tribute, which Doctor Adam Smith pays to the memory of his never to be forgotten friend, David Hume, is perfectly applicable to our deservedly esteemed philosopher, Kant: 'His constant pleasantry was the genuine effusion of good nature and good humour, tempered with delicacy and modesty, and without even the slightest tincture of malignity, so frequently the disagreeable source of what is called wit in other men. And that gaiety of temper, so agreeable in society, but which is so often accompanied with frivolous and superficial qualities, was in him certainly attended with the most severe application, the most extensive learning,*
the

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. XXIII

then, proceeding to speak of his own transcendental philosophy, expresses himself in this manner: These prolegomena will prove that this is a quite new science, of which nobody ever formed a prior idea, and for which no materials, that existed before, could be used, except what Hume may have suggested by his doubts, who, by the by, never even surmised any such possible, regular science, but, on the contrary, in order that his vessel might be

the greatest depth of thought, and a capacity in every respect the most comprehensive. Upon the whole, I have always considered him as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit.

From Hume's well-known liberality of sentiment and unbiassed investigation of truth, there can be no doubt, were he alive, but he would be glad to be convinced by, and cheerfully embrace, the Kantian philosophy, notwithstanding that, by it, his own arguments are completely overthrown. To all dogmatical philosophers, who reflect logically only, Hume's doubts must for ever remain irrefragable, and nothing but a transcendental philosophy can be adequate to the purpose of removing them.

XXIV TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

in safety, run her on the shore (of scepticism), where she might lie and rot, instead of which, 'tis my business to procure her a pilot who, furnished with a complete chart and compass, can, according to sure principles taken from the knowledge of the globe, safely direct her wherever he pleases.

Our author's uncommon reach of understanding, and how he was first led to this revolution of the mode of thinking, and consequently to the founding of this new science, will be set in the clearest light, by the acute manner, in which he not only puts, but answers, the following question: What is the reason, that, till now, no sure path could be found, which leads to this science (metaphysic)? Hitherto it has been supposed, that our cognition must conform itself to the objects; but every essay to make out any thing by conceptions concerning them a priori, whereby our cognition would be extended, was, under this persupposition, in vain.

Let

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. xxv

Let us, therefore, make the trial, whether we shall not succeed better in the problems of metaphysic, when we suppose that the objects must conform themselves to our cognition, and which will agree better with the desired possibility of a cognition of them *a priori*, that is to establish something about objects before they are given us. It is with this, as with the first thoughts of Copernicus who, not being able to satisfy himself concerning the illustration of the motions of the heavens, when he supposed, that the celestial bodies revolve about the spectator, tried, whether it would not succeed better, if he made the spectator move round, and, on the contrary, left the stars at rest. In short, this experiment succeeded with Kant, according to his wish, and he found, what everybody, cursory readers excepted, will also find, in the sequel, that we can have no cognition whatever of objects as things in themselves (*in se*), but so far only as they are objects of the sensible intuition, i. e. as *phaenomena*.

In

In the section of the critic of pure reason, where Plato's ideas are handled, philosophers are requested to take the word idea, in its primary signification, into their protection, in order that it may not hereafter be lost among other expressions, by which all sorts of representations are, in a careless disorder, commonly characterized, to the no small detriment of the science. We have a sufficient number of appellations which are properly suited to every mode of representation, without being under the necessity of encroaching upon the precincts of another. Here are their different degrees. The species is, representation, in general. Under this ranks the representation with consciousness, perception. A perception, which refers to the subject only, as the modification of his state, is a sensation, an objective perception is a cognition; this is either intuition or conception; the first has an im-*

** Kant's first great work, which contains his theoretical philosophy.*

mediate

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. XXVII

mediate reference to the object and is single; the second is mediate, by means of a certain criterion, which may be in common with several other things. The conception is either empirical or pure, and a pure conception, so far as it has its origin in the understanding only (not in the pure image of the sensitive faculty) is called a notion. A conception from notions, which surmounts the possibility of experience, is named an idea, or a conception of reason. It must be insupportable to one already accustomed to this distinction, to hear the representation of the red colour named idea; it cannot even be called notion (conception of understanding).

When a designation of the sense of pleasure or displeasure is named sensation, this word has a quite different meaning, from the representation of a thing (by the senses, as a receptibility belonging to the cognoscitive faculty) called sensation. For in the last case the representation is refer-

XXVIII TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

referred to the object, but in the first, to the subject only, and serves to no cognition whatever, not even to that, whereby the subject cognises himself. We understand, however, in the above explication, by the word sensation, an objective representation of the senses; and, in order to prevent misconstruction, we shall call that, which must always remain subjective only, and can absolutely constitute no representation of an object, by the usual name of feeling. The green colour of the meadow belongs to objective sensation, as perception of an object of sense; the agreeableness of it, however, to subjective sensation, by which no object is represented, i. e. to feeling, whereby the object is considered as object of complacency (which is no cognition of it).

Transcendental and transcendent are terms by no means synonymous! Not every cognition a priori, but only that, whereby we cognise that, and in what manner, certain representations (intuitions

or

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. xxix

or conceptions) are applied, or are possible, merely *a priori*, must be called transcendental (*i. e.* the possibility of cognition, or of its use *a priori*). The principles of pure understanding can only be of empirical, but not of transcendental, use, *i. e.* which extends beyond the bounds of experience. A principle, however, which destroys these bounds, or even authorizes to step over them, is named transcendent.

When understanding in general is represented as the faculty of rules, judgment * is likewise the faculty of subsuming under rules, *i. e.* of distinguishing whether something rank under a given rule (*casus datae legis*) or not.

* Please to remark, that judgement, thus written, is the faculty, but so, judgment, the act (*Urtheil, Beurtheilung*): attention to this small distinction may be of utility, when we come to the teleological judgment.

By

xxx TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

By the synthesis of apprehension, I understand the composition of the multiform in an empirical intuition, by which means, perception, i. e. empirical consciousness of it (as phaenomenon), is possible.

Imagination or phantasy is the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in the intuition. So far now as the imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes call it, the productive imagination, and thereby distinguish it from the reproductive, whose synthesis is subjected to empirical laws only, namely, to those of association, and which, therefore, contributes nothing to the explication of the possibility of cognition a priori, and, on that account, belongs not to transcendental philosophy, but to psychology.

Motion of an object in space belongs not to a pure science, consequently not to geometry; as it can be known by experience only, but not a priori, that something

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. XXXI

*thing is moveable. Motion, however, as describing a space, * is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the multifarious, in the external intuition in general, by productive imagination, and belongs not only*

* To those, unexercised in abstract thinking and not yet accustomed to esoteric writings, this exposition of pure motion will no doubt appear somewhat obscure, but it will surmount the reach of the vulgar and seem to them a mere gallimatia; Καλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ. Though the Kantian philosophy certainly contains nothing either mysterious, or visionary (like the Platonic philosophy of old), nor requires any the like ceremonies of initiation to which Pythagoras submitted among the Egyptian priests, for learning-sake; yet the translator wishes to inculcate on the young philosopher a probationary discipline of another kind, which develops and strengthens the mental powers and faculties, he means, the study of matheſis, and then transcendental philosophy, which conspire so much to sharpen reflexion, to accustom the understanding, in general, to order and precision, and in short to help the mind in elucidating such subjects as these, by their very nature, abstruse. (See Locke, on Mathematics, in his Treatise of the Conduct of the Understanding).

to

xxxii TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

to geometry, but to transcendental philosophy.

All conjunction is either composition or connection (nexus). The first is the synthesis of the multifarious, that do not necessarily belong to one another, as, e. g. the two triangles, into which a square is divided by the diagonal, do not in themselves belong of necessity to one another, and the synthesis of the multifarious is of the same nature, in every thing which can be considered mathematically, (which synthesis may be again divided into that of aggregation and of coalition, the first of which is directed towards extensive, and the other towards intensive, greatness). The second conjunction (nexus) is the synthesis of the multifarious, so far as they necessarily belong to one another, as, for instance, the accident to any one substance, or the effect to the cause, — consequently are also represented as heterogeneous, altho' conjoined a priori, which conjunction, as 'tis not voluntary,

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. XXXIII

I therefore name dynamical, since it concerns the conjunction of the existence of the multifarious, (which may be again divided into the physical of the phaenomena among one another, and into the metaphysical, its conjunction, in the cognitive faculty, a priori).

Maxim is the subjective principle of volition.

Sentiment (Gefinnung) is the internal (subjective) principle of the maxims, (it also, in a metaphorical sense, signifies feeling).

Scope (Endzweck) is that end which requires no other as condition of its possibility.

To the following scale of mental operations must, in nice philosophical investigations, be strictly attended. 1. To represent cannot be farther illustrated. 2. To perceive is, to represent something to one's self with consciousness. Every representation is not a perception, in order to become such, it must be accompanied with consciousness. The obscure representations,

c

XXXIV TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

tations, of which we are not immediately conscious to ourselves, but only mediately by their effects, are not perceptions. Many objects, in walking in the street, act upon our organs of sight and produce an alteration in the mind, consequently representations. But of a great number of these representations we are unconscious to ourselves. Apprehension is the beginning of perception. 3. To know (*noscere*) is, to perceive an object, in such a manner, as to be able to compare it with others, i. e. to perceive identity and difference or distinction. 4. To cognise (*erkennen*) is, to refer a perception to an object, by means of a conception. Knowing must also be attributed to animals, a dog has such a perception of his master, that he distinguishes it from all other representations. But understanding is required to cognise. A dog knows his master, but does not cognise him. 5. To understand is, to represent to ones self something which is sufficient to a conception. 6. To perspect (*einssehen*) is, to cognise
some-

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. xxxv

something from principles. 7. To comprehend is, to perspe& something sufficiently in a certain respect, or in all respects, men, however, are not capable of the last.

Propensity is properly the predisposition only to the desiring of an enjoyment which, when the subject has once experienced it, produces inclination thereto. Thus all rude and uncivilized nations have a propensity to intoxicating things; for though many of them are by no means acquainted with ebriety, and therefore have no desire whatever for things which occasion it, yet tis only necessary to allow them one trial of such in order to excite in them a desire thereto, which is scarcely possible to be afterwards eradicated. Instinct, which is a want that is felt to do, or to enjoy, something, of which one has yet no conception, (as art - instinct (Kunsttrieb) in animals, or the instinct to sex,) is still between propensity and inclination which presupposes an acquaintance with the object of de-

xxxvi TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

fire. After inclination, the next and last step of the appetitive faculty is passion (not affection, for this belongs to the sense of pleasure and displeasure,) which is an inclination that excludes the command over one's self.

Affections are specifically different from passions; those refer to feeling only; these belong to the faculty of appetite, and are inclinations which render all determinableness (Bestimbarkeit) of the arbitrament (Willkühr), by principles, difficult, or even impossible; the first are impetuous and unpremeditated, the last persevering and deliberated: indignation, as anger, is an affection; but as hatred (vengefulness), a passion; the latter can never and in no relation be named sublime, since the liberty of the mind, which is but impeded in affection, is even destroyed in passion.

Life is the faculty of a being to act according to the laws of the appetitive faculty; the faculty of appetite is its faculty

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. XXXVII

culty to be, by its representations, cause of the actuality of the objects of these representations. Pleasure (Lust) is the representation of the agreement of the object, or of the action, with the subjective conditions of life, i. e. with the faculty of the causality of a representation, in respect of the actuality of its object, (or the determining of the powers of the subject to bring it forward to action).

We have two terms, world and nature, which are sometimes confounded. The first signifies the mathematical whole of all phaenomena and the totality of their syntheses, as well in great, as in small, i. e. as well in their progress by composition, as by division. The very same world, however, is called nature, so far as it is considered as a dynamical whole, when one has not the aggregation in space or in time in view, in order to bring it to a quantum, but only the unity in the existence of the phaenomena. The condition of that, which happens, is named

xxxviii TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

the cause, and the unconditional causality of the cause in the phaenomenon, liberty, the conditional, on the other hand, is called, in the narrowest sense, cause natural. The conditional in the existence, in general, is named contingent, and the unconditional, necessary. The unconditional necessity of phaenomena may be called necessity of nature. Nature taken adjectively (formaliter) signifies the connexion of the designations of a thing, according to an internal principle of causality. By nature, substantively (materialiter), is, on the contrary, understood, the complex of the phaenomena, so far as these, by means of an internal principle of causality, are in thoro' connexion. One speaks, in the first sense, of the nature of fluid matter, of fire &c. and uses this word adjectively; on the other hand, when one speaks of the things of nature, one has that in thought, which subsists as a whole.

In modern writings I find, however, quite another use of the expression mundus

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. xxxix

mundus sensibilis et intelligibilis, which is totally different from the sense of the ancients, and whereby there is indeed no difficulty, but also nothing else but empty verbosity. Accordingly some have been pleased to name the complex of the phaenomena, so far as it is intuited i. e. apprehended immediately, the sensual world, but so far as its connection is thought according to universal laws of understanding, the intellectual world. The theoretic astronomy, which propounds the mere observation of the starry heavens, would represent the first, the contemplative, on the other hand, (explained according to the system of Copernicus, or even according to the laws of gravitation of Newton) the second, namely, a mundus intelligibilis. Such a perversion of words, however, is but a mere sophistical subterfuge, in order to avoid a difficult question, by accommodating its sense to one's own convenience. In point of phaenomena, understanding and reason may, by all means, be used; the question is, however, whe-

ther these be of any utility, when the object is not phaenomenon, (noumenon,) and it is taken in this sense, when it, in itself (in se), is thought as merely intelligibilis, i. e. as given to the understanding only, and not at all to the senses. The question is, therefore, whether, beside that empirical use of understanding, (even in Newtons representation of the structure of the world,) a transcendental too be possible which goes to the noumenon as an object? We have answered this question negatively. The expression intellectual world, which is customary with english and german authors, must not be used instead of mundus intelligibilis; for the cognitions only are intellectual, or sensual. But what can only be an object of the one or of the other mode of intuition, the objects, then, notwithstanding the harshness of the sound, must be named intelligibilis or sensibilis.

The theoretical use of reason was occupied about objects of the mere cognoscitive faculty, and a critic of it, with respect

spect to this use, concerned the pure cognitive faculty only, as this caused suspicion, which was afterwards confirmed, that it easily lost itself beyond its own boundaries, among unattainable objects, or even conceptions which contradict one another; it is not so with the practical use of reason; in this, reason is occupied about determinatives (*Bestimmungsgründe*) of the will, which is a faculty, of either producing objects that correspond to the representations, or determining one's self to the effecting of them (whether the physical faculty be sufficient or not) i. e. determining one's causality: for reason can at least be competent to the determination of the will, and has always so far objective reality, as volition only is in question. The first question here therefore is whether pure reason suffice of itself alone for the determination of the will, or whether it can as empirically conditional only be a determinative of it? Here now begins the conception of causality, namely, that of
liber-

liberty, which is justified by the critic of pure reason, tho' not capable of an empirical exhibition, and if we can at present discover grounds to prove, that this property belongs, in effect; to the human will (and to the will too of all rational beings,) 'twill thereby not only be shewn, that pure reason can be practical, but that it only, and not the empirically limited, is unconditionally practical. 'Tis the duty of the critic of practical reason, in general, to hinder the empirically conditional reason from pretending to give alone exclusively the determinative of the will. The use of pure reason, when it is put out of all doubt, that there is such a thing, is immanent only; the empirically conditional, which usurpes the sole dominion, is, on the other hand, transcendent, and discovers itself in requests and orders that extend entirely beyond its territory, which is quite the opposite*

* Kant's second great work, which contains his practical philosophy.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. XLIII

to what can be said of pure reason in the speculative use.

*The expression, postulate of pure practical reason, can easily occasion misconception, when the acceptation, which the postulates of pure mathematics have, and which bear apodictical certainty, is confounded therewith; but these postulate the possibility of an action, whose object is previously cognised a priori theoretically, with perfect certainty, as possible; this, however, postulates the possibility of an object (of God and of the immortality of the soul) even from apodictical, practical laws, therefore, only for the purpose of a practical reason; as this certainty of the postulated possibility is by no means theoretical; nor consequently apodictical, i. e. with regard to the cognised necessity of the object, but with regard to the subject, in consequence of its objective assumption which is necessary for practical laws, therefore necessary hypothesis only; I could find no other better expression for
this*

XLIV. TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

this subjective, but nevertheless true, and unconditional, necessity of reason.

In treating of the totality of conditions and of the unconditional, the common title of all conceptions of reason, we met with a term, which cannot be done without, and yet, on account of an ambiguity, which adheres to it thro' long abuse, cannot be used with certainty. Absolute is one of the few words, which, in its primitive signification, is suitable to a conception, to which no other word of the same language is precisely adequate, and whose loss, or what is the same, whose vague use, must be followed too by the loss of the conception itself, nay, of a conception, which, as it very much occupies reason, cannot be spared, without great detriment to all transcendental judgment. The word absolute is at present often used merely to shew, that something is valid of a thing considered in itself and therefore internal. Absolutely possible signifies in this sense, what is possible in itself (interne)

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. XLV

terne), which, in fact, is the least that can be said of an object. It is, on the contrary, sometimes used to show, that something is, in every respect (unlimitedly) valid, (e. g. the absolute sovereignty,) and absolutely possible would, in this sense, signify that which, in every view, in all respects, to all intents and purposes, is possible, which is again the most we can say of the possibility of a thing. These significations, 'tis true, coalesce sometimes. In this manner, for example, that, which is internally impossible, is too in all respects, consequently absolutely, impossible. But they are, in most cases, infinitely far removed from one another, and I can by no means infer, that, because something is in itself possible, it is on that account, even in all respects, consequently absolutely, possible. I shall afterwards point out, that the absolute necessity depends, by no means, in all cases, upon the internal, and therefore must not be considered as synonymous with this. That, whose opposite is internally impossible
whose

XLVI TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

whose opposite is also to all intents and purposes impossible, is consequently itself absolutely necessary; but I cannot invertedly infer, from what is absolutely necessary, that its opposite is internally impossible, i. e. the absolute necessity of things is an internal necessity; for this internal necessity is, in certain cases, a very void expression, with which we cannot conjoin the least conception; that of the necessity of a thing in every relation (to all that is possible,) on the other hand, bears quite peculiar designations. As the loss of a conception, of great application in speculative philosophy, can never be indifferent to the philosopher, I hope the determination and careful conservation of the term, to which the conception adheres, will likewise not be indifferent to him. I shall then use the word, absolute, in this enlarged signification, in contradistinction to that which is but comparatively, or in a particular respect, valid; for, this last is restricted to conditions, that, however, is valid without restriction.

The

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. XLVII

The teachers of jurisprudence, speaking of titles and pretensions, distinguish, in a process, the question, What is law (quid juris)? from that, which concerns the matter of fact (quid facti)? and as they require proofs of both, name the first, which is to prove the title, or the claim of law, the deduction. We use a number of empirical conceptions, without opposition, and hold ourselves intitled too, without deduction, to ascribe to them a sense and imaginary meaning; since we have experience always at hand to prove their objective reality. There are, however, usurped conceptions, as, perhaps, fortune, fate, which are received in common conversation with almost universal indulgence, but which are sometimes called in question, by the inquiry, quid juris? where one is not a little embarrassed on account of their deduction, as no distinct principle of law, either from experience or from reason, can be alleged, by which the title to their use would be perspicuous.

Among

XLVI TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

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Among

XLVIII TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

Among the different conceptions, however, which constitute the very variegated texture of human cognition, there are some, which are even destined for pure use a priori (totally independent of all experience) and this their title requires always a deduction; since proofs from experience are not sufficient for the legality of such a use, but it must still be known how these conceptions, which are taken from no experience, can refer to objects. The exposition of the manner, in which conceptions a priori refer to objects, I shall then name, their transcendental deduction, and distinguish it from the empirical deduction, which shews in what way a conception of them is acquired from experience and reflection, and therefore concerns not the legality, but the fact, whereby the possession arose. We have, now, conceptions, of that peculiar nature, that they refer a priori totally to objects, to wit, the categories, as pure intellectual conceptions; it would be entirely in vain to attempt

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. XLIX

an empirical deduction of them, because that, which distinguishes their nature, lies therein, that they refer to objects, without having borrowed any thing, for their representation, from experience; when therefore a deduction of them becomes necessary, it must always be transcendental.

Professor Beck, in shewing wherein the distinction betwixt transcendental philosophy and universal pure logic consists, in a work, which he published two years ago, named The only possible Station, from which Critical Philosophy must be judged, wherein he has discovered a profound and comprehensive knowledge of this science, and by which he has justly obtained a very distinguished rank among critical philosophers in Germany, says, that the manner in which we arrive at the conceptions, that we have of the different objects, does not concern this logic. That we represent objects to ourselves by conceptions, is a matter of fact of logic, and there the principle of contradiction is re-
d pre-

presented as the condition, under which, in general, something can be thought. This principle says, that no object can be represented by designations, which annul one another. This expresses nothing more, than cogitation itself, and 'tis no longer the business of universal logic to enquire further about the founding of it, for thinking is a matter of fact. It must, however, be allowed, that the appeal to a matter of fact cannot have the force of preventing all further investigation. But what else can it be, upon which the research of the agnition of a matter of fact can fall, than upon the dissection of a matter of fact itself? 'Twill be obvious that those, who erect elemental philosophy, whereby they believe to lay a foundation for the critic of pure reason, which its able author has omitted to do, neglect absolutely, thro' an extraordinary illusion, the true aim of this critic. This illusion I call extraordinary, because these men pretend to have a sufficient design. They wish, namely, to carry back the philosophy-

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 11

sophemes of critical philosophy to matter of fact, and there is, according to one, the position of contradiction, to another, that of consciousness, to a third, that of vivification, to a fourth, that of determinableness, to a fifth, the principle of egotism (Ichheit!) and God knows how many other such matters of fact, out of which all philosophy must spring; and these men, who seem to be so animated for the progress of the science, will not however take notice, that, before every allegation of a position as matter of fact, that, which is matter of fact itself, must first be dissected; but it is just this, which the critic*

* Criticisms of these different fancies are to be found in the *Annalen der Philosophie und des philosophischen Geistes*, published by Professor Jakob in Halle, one of the well-deserving pillars of critical philosophy, and who has the merit of being among the first, who adopted the critical method of philosophizing. These Annals, then, the transl: recommends as one of the best philosophical reviews in Germany, and, in his humble opinion, one of the most impartial.

of pure reason has for its object in its deduction of the Categories, tho' it has not thereby undertaken a dissection of a conception, which however we mention here, by the way only, and which will be hereafter fully explained.

Universal pure logic has cogitation for its object. This is its matter of fact. We have conceptions, by which we represent objects to ourselves. The dissection of the conception of this matter of fact, is quite different from the dissection of this matter of fact itself. Logic does the first only, it expounds the conception of a conception, treats in general of conceptions, according to extent and matter, of the perspicuity of conceptions, of the agnition, or of that act, by which an object is thought, as ranking under a certain conception, i. e. of judgments, finally of syllogisms or inferences of one judgment from another. This whole business is nothing but dissecting the conception of a matter of fact, and not the dissection of the matter of fact itself.

But

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 1111

But let us now conceive a science, which aspires to represent this matter of fact, as matter of fact itself. The object of which consists neither in expositions, nor in the unfolding of conceptions, nor in marking designations, by the addition of which, we think objects, by which the matter of fact of cogitation is, by no means, pretended to, but only in the exhibition of the primary engendering of conceptions. The original representing is the object of this science. This is transcendental philosophy. It appears that the idea of this never occurred to any philosopher prior to Kant, and even at present, tho' this great man has so happily executed it, yet experience teaches us how difficult it is to hit the true spirit of that which is named transcendental in the critic of pure reason; the expression, matter of fact, and the appeal to matters of fact of consciousness, are really not sufficient to this purpose. This object is of the greatest moment, and, in order to make it the more obvious, I beg leave

previously to ask every one, who is in the habit of being sincere towards himself, whether he has hitherto been much edified by the writings of the most celebrated philosophers of ancient and more modern times?

Whoever knows, from having used his own good sense, what is meant by understanding something, will be of the same mind with us, when we judge the mistake to be evident, that that, which is intelligible, has at all times been neglected, and that that, which is comprehensible only, has been sought after; it is this point exactly, which renders critical philosophy worthy of its name; its sole object is, to dissect the use of understanding itself, to make that visible, which is in itself intelligible, and to separate it from that, which is, by its nature, unintelligible, consequently, to discover the point, to which each train of thoughts, every procedure with mere conceptions, must be linked, when it can be named, philosophising; we
hereby

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. LV

hereby acknowledge our perfect conviction, when we judge, that the critic of pure reason has fully compassed this design; we are of opinion, however, that the method, which is adopted in it, is chiefly the cause, why this aim is reached with so much difficulty, even by its admirers, as it leads the reader, by degrees only, to this point already mentioned, which is the highest pitch of all use of understanding; we shall now reverse the method and exert ourselves to exhibit this, at once, to the reader; and when he arrives at this station, he will discover the critic in the clearest light.

It should seem, that critical philosophy has had the fate, which its author predicted, namely, that every thing would remain, for a considerable time, as it was before and would have the appearance as if nothing had happened; for, tho' this science should suddenly make a great figure and still continue to support it, yet every thing remains as it was, so

long as it has not succeeded in rendering the manner of thinking of philosophers, critical, for which indeed something more is required, than many are accustomed to imagine, who, while they heap subtleties upon subtleties and distinguish again the nicest distinctions, persuade themselves at last, that they have found a critical idealism of the second degree. That which is required is absolutely nothing but the knowledge of the original use of understanding in the Categories, on which all logical use of it must entirely rest, that is to say, all procedure with conceptions and the aspect of the categories as conceptions, when we are to understand ourselves therein.

When we reflect, however, on similar alterations in the way of thinking itself, which, as they are properly variations of the station, from which we consider things, become very slowly universal, chiefly when they are combined with sacrifices of an imaginary, profound wisdom,

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. LVII

wisdom, and when we recollect the contradiction which the system of Copernicus and the universal attraction of Newton experienced in the beginning, we shall likewise find the very slow, progressive change from the dogmatical, to the critical, mode of thinking, from the aspect of our cognition, as a cognition of things in themselves, to that of the cognition of the phaenomena, and not only in consideration of its propagation, but of its establishment too in every individual, a very common phaenomenon.

We may, however, look forward with perfect confidence and certainty, as well to the promulgation as to the establishment of this critical cast of mind, since the path is now so happily traced by the invaluable, classical works of this father of modern philosophy. When governments find it necessary to interfere with the affairs of the learned, it would be much more suitable to their sapient and parental care of sciences, as well as of man-

mankind, to favour the freedom of such a system as this, by which only the works of reason can be established upon a firm basis, than to support the risible despotism of the schools, who cry out, as if the public were in danger, when their cobwebs are torn, of which, however, the public had never taken notice, and whose loss it can, consequently, never feel.

Though this publication may seem abstract to common readers, and even unintelligible to those who are not accustomed to think on abstruse subjects, it aims at the approbation of the learned and wise; and the translator will not only consider his end fully attained, but his labour abundantly rewarded, if it shall be found to contribute (and he trusts it will in a considerable degree) to the instruction of mankind, and to the regeneration of philosophy in Great Britain.

THE PREFACE.

The following sheets contain the principles of critical philosophy, in as few words as possible. The epithet *critical* points at a philosophy which is not critical, and, at the same time, recalls the dubious state of that science itself, which is named philosophy, in general, and, in order to distinguish it from philosophical enquiries of every other species of knowledge, is also called *speculative*. When a mode of expounding penetrates not yet into the nature of the thing and is still hypothesis, 'tis then necessary to characterize it by a peculiar name; one speaks in this manner of the antiphlogistic chymistry; this denotation ceases, how soon soever a mode of expounding ceases to be hypothesis and is incorporated with the essence of the science itself.

For some years past, I've been fully convinced, that the *critical* philosophy is the only true philosophy, and the object of this book is to operate the same conviction in others

others and more especially to serve as a manual for a course of lectures. This assertion, that the *critical* philosophy is the only true philosophy, will, no doubt, at first sight, appear somewhat insulting to those, who are blinded by, and wedded to, old systems, but will, we hope, be fully justified in the course of the candid and attentive reader's progress in this science.

There are still some few dogmatical writers in Germany, whose dreams have only been disturbed by the critical mode of representation, but who are not yet entirely awakened; they do not, according to their own confession, disavow many improvements and advantage of this new method of philosophising, and are ready to adopt them in their systems, but others, they say, are too subtle for them to use; men of this temper of mind are fond of their own ease, but have nothing less at heart than the good of philosophy.

The mere repeating of the Kantian formulas, viz: *we cognise not the things in themselves; the difference of our judgments according to a regulative and a constitu-*

*stitutive principle; a practical is essentially different from a theoretical cognition; there is a moral, though there can be no theoretical, proof of the existence of God, does not denote the critical philosopher. That, however, which constitutes the critical philosopher and, according to my judgment, the only true philosopher, is the spirit of transcendental philosophy, and Kant's great merit, is that of having been the author of this; the object of this science is to shew the soil, in which all conceptions must have their root, unless they are to be universally void, i. e. that we are not to understand ourselves in them. But that which must above all things be remarked, is, that *transcendental philosophy* must not be apprehended by means of conceptions, but *originally*, as it is the foundation on which all conceptions bottom; it is here said of the *Categories*, that they are original modes of representation, and that the understanding conjoins originally in them, this assertion is also a *postulate*, whose sense can only be come at in the original conjunction of understanding itself.*

itself. Critical philosophy depends solely on the position: *we cognise not the things, as they are in themselves, but as they appear to us*; if nothing were intended to be expressed therein but that the objects are different from their representations, this discovery would not indeed merit much admiration; but this position says, that the conjunction, which we place in the things, e. g. in the position, an object *has* a greatness, rests on an original, intellectual conjunction (the original act of drawing of the imagination, named space). This introspection into the nature of the categories is of the greatest import. The categories of *nature* constitute the transcendental of all theoretical cognition. The category *liberty* is, in like manner, the basis of all moral cognition. The category the *formal conformity-to-end of nature* is, finally, a transcendental principle; on which all reflection and the procedure of judgment in experience rest, so far as it looks for rules, in order to be able to think objects. This conception of the transcendental of our cognition is, therefore, the prin-

principle of division of transcendental philosophy itself, and the present sketch of critical philosophy is also treated in three parts.*

I embrace the opportunity, which the preface affords me, to say a few words on the subject of the *method*, according to which I have handled transcendental philosophy, not only in this outline, but in the *Einzig möglicher Standpunkt*, which I published two years ago. I can easily imagine, that there are such admirers of Kant and of his critical works, who will be displeased at the smallest deviation from the councils, which this great philosopher has given, with re-

* The translator has prevailed upon his worthy and learned friend Professor Beck to make a selection of the principles of another masterpiece of Kant's (his philosophical doctrine of religion named, *The Religion within the Sphere of naked Reason*) which forms the fourth part of this work, and which, he trusts, will be as great a feast to our philosophic theologians, as it has been to him, but, as to our theological philosophers, he has a presension, it will not be quite to their taste.

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ference to the manner of treating the science, and will consider each of them as a sort of apostasy from the good cause. The critic inculcates, in many places, the distinction between the sensitive faculty and the understanding; it teaches, that as the sensitive faculty cannot think, so the understanding has not the power to intuit (*anschauen*) i. e. to apprehend immediately. It may, on the contrary, seem to some, as if I mixed and confounded all that, which has, with so much wisdom, been separated from one another; to those who are inclined to judge in this manner, I must be allowed to say, that they, by no means, understand the spirit of the deduction of the categories and the contents of these pure conceptions, in the way, in which the critic has given us them. The critic of pure reason proposes, in this deduction, the problem, What justifies us to apply the categories to objects of experience, as they are not conceptions, which are produced by the way of experience? and solves it, by showing, that these categories are the original use of understanding itself, and are for this reason

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criteria of objects, because they constitute the very understanding; that, which is the most remarkable herein is, that a conception of this question becomes possible only after the solution. The critic says of the categories, that the understanding is in possession of them; this may be understood in a twofold manner; if the understanding be thought as something, wherein these conceptions are inherent, and to which quite other conceptions a priori could have also belonged, thus something devoid of all signification is thought. The whole meaning of the critic, on the contrary, is, that these predicaments are the primary use of understanding itself, and that we can but first, by their means, have a conception of understanding. If the reader, to whom the critic itself appears difficult and unintelligible, will endeavour, with resolution and perseverance, to make use of his own understanding, in the way in which I shall here point out, to resolve the problems of this great work, he will discover the results of it with a clearness, in which he will have much more satisfaction, than many, who

who repeat the formulæ of the critic only; *that space and time are the forms of the pure sensitive faculty; that therefore things in them are but phaenomena, and that we know nothing at all, what the things in themselves are.* In short, all this is to me so easy, that I engage myself to render the secrets of critical philosophy perfectly intelligible to one of the slowest apprehension, and to convince him fully of it's doctrines.

How shall the method, however, be named, which I have adopted, synthetic or analytic? The distinction betwixt these cannot otherwise be made so intelligible, as by mathematical examples. The mathematical analysis bears its name on account of the analytic method merely; this consists in considering that, which is sought, as given, and going therefrom backward to that, which is given, as it's condition. When I seek the proof of a geometrical proposition, I consider it as true, and from it infer other propositions, which, so far as they are already established by means of others, can be invertedly considered as the conditions of my proposition.

position. The teacher of geometry, on the contrary, intimates the proposition to the scholar, which is to be demonstrated to him, and, without giving him farther account of the method which he is to adopt, goes thro' a concatenation of syllogisms with him, until he falls in with the proposition, which he intends to demonstrate; he had no occasion for the intimation of this, but could have represented the demonstration as a free play of understanding, whose end would have had the appearance of a discovery. This synthetic method is that of the teacher. According to the analytic method, one is, on the other hand, inventor, as being, in the research, conscious to one's self of that, which is sought.

This difference between the analytic and synthetic method I consider as of very little consequence in philosophy, and of which, in general, no great use can be made, as that, which is the most essential, in these affairs, is the understanding of one's self distinctly in one's own conceptions, that is to say, the being conscious to one's self of the original,

synthetic unity of them; this synthetical unity is the firm basis of my conception. The whole philosophical business consists in the exhibition of this synthetical unity. It is not so in mathematics. When I consider the proposition, the rectangles, from the parts of two chords of a circle, which intersect one another, are equal, this proposition expresses a connexion of conceptions, which is not yet evident from the mere understanding of it, and I then proceed analytically, when I seek another synthetical unity, that contains in itself the conditions of this connexion, which in this example is the inverse proportion of the intersected parts of these chords, the condition of which connection lies again in another synthetical unity, till at last the axioms reveal themselves as the final conditions of such a given conditional: Whoever is conversant with such cognitions, perceives easily that the possibility of this procedure lies in the mathematical construction, which is to be met with in every demonstration, and through which alone a theorem receives its universality, and thus a connection of concep-

ceptions is obtained. The philosophical procedure, on the contrary, remains with conceptions, and, therefore, there are no other synthetical positions in philosophy, than those, which properly express the generation of the original unity of understanding, and the synthetical, as such, are even unintelligible, when they are to refer to objects absolutely, that is, when they are considered as directly synthetic. There is, therefore, in philosophy, one method only, and this consists in the intelligibility of conceptions. My mode of proceeding in transcendental philosophy, then, is no other than that of the Critic of pure Reason itself. I but endeavour to point out, to the reader, the proper station (the transcendental of all cognitions,) sooner than the critic, which is difficult, because, in the beginning, it considers the categories as mere conceptions, consequently as predicates of objects, and sets out from this dogmatical station, in which it treats of space and time, and exhibits them, as the primary use of understanding, no sooner, than in the deduction of the

categories. When now, in this deduction, the subject is, upon what principle of right the categories, which are not conceptions, derived from experience, but a priori, are applied to objects of experience, it must be difficult for the reader of the critic to understand this problem, as it is intelligible to those only to whom the true nature of the categories is familiar, and also from this station only can the notion of that, which is named a priori, become intelligible.

Kant says, in his *Prolegomena to every future metaphysic*, (page 46). 'In proceeding at present to this solution, (of the problem: how are synthetic positions a priori possible?) according to the *analytic* method, in which we previously posit, that such cognitions from pure reason are actual, we can refer to two sciences of theoretic cognition only, namely, *pure mathematics* and *pure natural philosophy*, for only these can exhibit objects to us intuitively, consequently, when a certain cognition a priori should occur in them, shew the truth or harmony with the object in the concrete, i. e. its *actuality*,

uality, from which can then be proceeded, on the analytical road, to the principle of its possibility. This facilitates the business very much, in which universal contemplations are not only applied to facts, but even proceed from them, instead that they, in synthetical procedure in the abstract entirely, must be deduced from conceptions. In these prolegomena, then, the method is to be analytic and to lead to the same results, which the strict synthetic method of the critic of pure reason has discovered (page 20 of the proleg). I quote this, with a view to shew that I remember perfectly what this great philosopher has said upon this head and request, then, of the reader (of whom I must here presuppose, that he is well acquainted with the analytic procedure in mathematics,) to compare this example of the analytic method in philosophy with any one example from mathematics. In geometry, let us put the case, the rectangle, from the intersected parts of the one cord, is always equal to the rectangle, from the intersected parts of the other; Upon what conditions

must this depend? In philosophy, let us posit or lay down, that there are synthetic positions, and even whole sciences, which contain such in themselves and consist of such. Wherefrom must this phaenomenon be comprehensible? Wherein could the distinction between that mathematical, and this philosophical, procedure consist? In my opinion, therein, that we have an intelligible conception of the given in geometry, to which we seek the conditions; on the other hand, independently of the condition of synthetic positions a priori, no one is able to understand, what is meant by a synthetic position a priori.

These observations, I hope, however, will not be construed, as if I wished to master this great man; nobody can either entertain more respect, or harbour sentiments of more sincere gratitude to him, than I, and I hereby freely acknowledge, that, of all great human productions, I never admired any so much, as the inimitable works of the immortal Kant.

Halle, 1 Dec. 1796.

JAMES SIGISMUND BECK.

Seve-

Several inaccuracies having unfortunately escaped us, the reader is requested to attend to the following corrections:

Paragraph 2 line 12 read absolutely 3. 7 inquire into 30 the ranking of 6. 6 in the ranging 17. 1 range 7. 3 this merely logical procedure leaves 20 dele only 21 space only 32 dele only 33 those only, 34 dele alone 10. 1 dele comma after category 6 dele comma before and after *Space* Note 2 proceeding 18 the transcendental 19 the scheme 26 geometrician sets out. 11. 1 dele comma before and after *Reality* 10 synthesis sets out from 13 reality. 12. 2 positing or laying down 20 the lapse of 13. 1 dele comma after category 16 regular body of 17 sides, 15. 1 original, synthetic, *please, for the future, to insert commas, when two or more adjectives occur* 23. 1 understand myself so far only as *bottom* 4 we consider the categories as predicates of things only, 16. 4 dele of b. 5 et 11 dele of after category 18 b. 9 philosopher never quits the logical 19. b. 25 predicate existence 17 dele only 16 intelligible only, 4 dele of 20. 12 understanding in general has 17 reflection are, 21. 1 is the 3 dele had already 5 we have 6 ideas are conceptions, to which experience can never produce perfectly 10 come 11 we do not obtain by 21 come 23 b. 11 regia is not to be found, the 24 b. 5 consciousness has been already 25 18 dele that 19 dele comma after designation 25 dele only 26 unity only, 26 postulate 28. 12 plane 29 10 et 14 dele that 15 preceded 31 b. 1 quantity only is retained 32 1 et 9 are 4 proceed in their 35. 3 remains with the 9 dele of 36 4 absolutely 6 infinitely 37. 8 thorough action 38. 4 by various designations 39 smoke and ashes 41 3 *Really or empirically* 10. it is the 42 8 effects 9 absolutely 43. 6 meaning only in b. 2 accordingly 47. 10 contains 12 dele the 50. 6 and of relation, 28 are in commerce 52. 2 as determined by conceptions only, 56. 11 understanding *existence* in the categories of 17 dele from 59. 1 dele otherwise 60. 3 immediately 62. 6 merely 64. 1 or agreement and disagreement 66 b. 2 et 5 absolutely 70. 10 conformably 71. 4 it leads the attention by degrees only to 74. 3 obvious to the transcendental philosopher only 7 it is 26 metaphysic 79. 6 produce 81. 6 incessive 82 b. 5 of the individual 85 erroneous 86 precisely 91 b. 2 possible, by reason that 3 dele comma 94. 20 *empirically*, 37 entirely by itself

itself 96. 4 bodies only is understood 16 dele barely
 17 itself only. 98. 1 Space, 5 dele comma 15 et 22 ab-
 solutely 19 dele-only 20 homogeneous only. The *exist-*
ent space is the empirical and moveable space only, 99.
 7 absolutely 100. 4 is 14 perpendicularly b. 3 infinitely
 103. b. 14 rests on the prin. (101) solely. 104. 10 at one
 105. 1 is the 11 self into it. 12 sensation 106. 18 that
 where matter b. 3 understanding hangs the 107 mecha-
 nics have for their 111. 5 the *presupposition*, that matter
 113. 25 absolutely 36 categories of 114 b. 18 is the 19 is
 not 117. 17 is quite differently circumstanced from b. 43
 et 2 independently *top*. 8 independently 118. 2 dele only
 3 contact only. 14 infinitely b. 2 material 119 b. 1. 4.
 10. 13 infinitely 9 it is 6 ratio of 4 conformably 120.
 1 has now carried 5 is the *real*, which fills space. 6 is a
 123. 10 exchange 12 exchanged 124. 3 altered by 125.
 16 separates only 40 space is 43 infinitely small 106.
 4 consists 10 are original. 127. 6 in a mass 15 *phoro-*
nomically in the degree of velocity only, 17 fills a space
 by original, b. 13 As much 17 and of the 9 accordingly
 128. b. 2 twice as great 129. 8 whereby b. 4 and of the
 2 of the space, 131. 9 of the 20 therefore, upon the
 relative space solely 27 motion) relatively to one ano-
 ther only 28 as cause exclusively. 134. 9 by means of
 which it 14 relative, 136. 6 another only, 139. 3 ab-
 solute unconditional 8 a conditional 9 absolute uncon-
 ditional. *In short, please to read, in general, instead of*
conditioned and unconditioned, conditional and uncondi-
tional, which, like many other adjectives, are used sub-
stantively; this procedure is indispensable in abstract rea-
sonings, but, happily, agreeable to the genius of our lan-
guage 141. 9 we find the approximation in experience
 only. 143 b. 4 into rect- 22 posites 144. 7 nature rank
 under. 5. 6. 13 dele upon 146 b. 11 as object of the in-
 ternal sense only. 147. 7 for the future 149. 42 substan-
 ce) 61 indestructibility b. 3 which consists in this con-
 sciousness totally 150. 14 which rests on the use of under-
 standing only. 151. 24 doubtful only, b. 11 leads indis-
 pensably to 154. 4. 6. conditioned 155. 19 conditioned
 157. b. 21 event. 15 dele as 161 b. 5 by itself 162. 7 pre-
 viously posites or presupposes 163 b. 7 positing or laying
 down 166 b. 27 agreeably 167 b. 9 regression only 10 dele
 only *top*. 23. 29. 35 independently 169. 3 on this 9 We
 b. 9 conclude 8 may always suppose 171. 8 procedure
 173. 1 The presupposition of the 177. 5. 7 dele upon
 178. 9 dele only 10 contingency only 180. 8 to the ana-
 logy 181. 3 dele only 4 conceptions only, 188 b. 9 dele
 only 6 understanding) only. 190. 7 It rests 192 b. 1 cer-
 tainty

tainty only. 195. 13 supposed grounds. 199. 5 dele only.
 6 good-minded only. 13 relatively 203. 10 construction
 only 205. 6 considers the categories as the original 207.
 4 dele only 15 reason only. 18 philosophers only 24 un-
 derstanding only 213. 6 ranks under 215. 2 may always
 217. 12 is event 218. 6 the causality of 12 dele alone
 13 law only. 219 b. 3 thou consider 221. 5 The necessity,
 as character of a cognition obtained by subsumption
 under the moral law, is named *obligation*, and the ac-
 tion, determined by such a subsumption, *duty*. 223. 1 is a
 4 moral. 10 whether the 11 when it is to be performed
 according 229. 3 an objective 5 a subjective 231. 4 va-
 lue only 8 will only 10 can be 232 b. 2 good mind of
 234. 5 seem 235. 6 dele entirely 7 aim solely. 15 law
 only. 237. 10 the variety, as 239 posites 243. 18 law
 only) 244. 10 determinatives only. 245. 9 determinative
 only is 247. 7 man only is susceptible 248. 7 and this
 fellow-feeling not as pathological only, but 249. 2 reli-
 gion under the condition only, that it rest on morally
 good sentiments and on the 251. 22 he separates himself
 24 query concerning 252. 15 their 253. 4 nature ranks.
 254. 1 dele only 2 cognition only. 255. 10 suitably 256.
 4 to suppose 263. 8 ends only. 276. 9 conceptions 10 their
 11 these same conceptions, as representations which are
 281. 3 thoroughly 5 is only susceptible 282. 12 dele but
 b. 2 idea 287. 4 I think only 290. 3 dele only 4 object
 only. 297 b. 4 but only the operation of understanding
 301. 4 so far only 302. 8 humanity 305. 13 he only 307
 b. 5 he considers this his moral quality only, 311. 12 a
 conception of a substratum 312. 5 teaches 316 b. 3 pain-
 fulness 317 b. 8 to serve him only as 2 dele alone 319.
 3 judging 321. 18 conception's b. 2 dele comma 323
 b. 2 expression only 324. 1 are 15 beautiful 327. 11 de-
 le only 13 themselves only 328. 28 dares 334. 3 is 7 sub-
 jective. 8 nature only is 337. 8 conception in its cause
 331. 27 as valid 30 dele valid 32 as knowable 36 dele
 knowable 347. 8 conformities- 4 whom only 11 When
 we 349. 11 agreeably 350. 2 dele entirely 4 nature only
 339. 4 itself as cause and effect mutually. b. 4 It is
 5 when it is 6 and its 341 b. 2 its bare 343 b. 1 only.
 4 laws only: 353. 19 wish to grant nature more, 355.
 10 which can 358. 3 however produced by *culture*, which
 is 361. 9 That will only 11 dele alone 14 it will 18 its
 reference 360. 7 dele firmness and b. 5 leaves full 4 in
 its 1 in its parts. 363. 15 We 364. 15 be 374. 4 consists
 369 b. bad, as this is 372 b. 19 posites 375. 4 dele only
 5 disposition only; 13 man only acceptable 377. 3 con-
 scious b. 2 dares 378. 12 dele comma 379. 2 God, 3 its
 attain-

attainableness, 381. 35 and 383. 7 dele comma 384. 5 of
 executing an affair of understanding 381 b. 3 we were
 already 335. 6 ourselves its conformity by the con-
 ception of a causality according to conceptions in the
 cause. 59 b. 5 identity and difference 62. 1 and diffe-
 rence — this is necessary to be remarked, as diversity is
 the opposite to similitude or likeness; but difference to
 identity or sameness. 335. 12 the serviceableness (Nutz-
 barkeit oder Zuträglichkeit) to man 217. 2 the senti-
 ment of the will entirely. Even the same sentiment,
 however, has a twofold side. 378 b. 3 absolute impecca-
 bility, 387. 2 they rank in 386. 5 sentiments of 393
 note 4. of a 397 b. 6 good sentiment 398. 1 If one 12 and
 if it be held 3 doctrinal, 385. 7 if the last exposition
 have this 16 and if the Son of God be holden 19 deme-
 rit 402. 10 hid 409 b. 21 duty viz 23 dele viz (the

THE
CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

The logical Use of Understanding in general §. 1.

PART I.

OF THE FOUNDATION OF ALL THEORETICAL
COGNITIONS.

SECTION I.

TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 8.
Deduction of the Categories of Nature 10.

SECTION II.

REPRESENTATION OF THE METHOD OF TRAN-
SCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN KANT'S CRI-
TIC OF PURE REASON, WITH A VIEW OF
RENDERING IT MORE PERSPICUOUS 71.

SECTION III.

METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
PHILOSOPHY 92.
Metaphysical Principles of Phoronomy 97.
Metaphysical Principles of Dynamic 105.
Metaphysical Principles of Mechanics 126.
Metaphysical Principles of Phaenomenology 133.

SEC.

SECTION IV.

CRITIC OF PURE, SPECULATIVE REASON	137.
<i>Critic of rational Psychology</i>	146.
<i>Critic of rational Cosmology</i>	154.
<i>Critic of rational Theology</i>	170.
<i>Conclusion of the Critic of pure Reason</i>	182.

SECTION V.

THE METHOD, WHICH LEADS TO A COMPLETE SYSTEM OF PURE REASON	186.
<i>The Discipline of pure Reason</i>	187.
<i>The Canon of pure Reason</i>	196.
<i>The Architectonic of pure Reason</i>	201.
<i>The History of pure Reason</i>	207.

PART II.

OF THE FOUNDATION OF ALL PRACTICAL COGNITIONS.

SECTION I.

DISSECTION OF THE ORIGINAL USE OF PRACTICAL REASON	203.
<i>Table of the Categories of Liberty in regard of the Conceptions of Good and Bad</i>	222.
<i>Practical, material Motives in the Principle of Morality</i>	226.

SECTION II.

MORAL THEOLOGY	234.
----------------	------

SECTION III.

METHOD OF PRACTICAL REASON	243.
----------------------------	------

PART

CONTENTS.

LXXIX

PART III.

OF ORIGINAL, REFLECTIVE JUDGEMENT, AS A PRINCIPLE OF CONJUNCTION BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL, THEORETI- CAL AND THE ORIGINAL, PRACTICAL COGNITIONS	250.
---	------

<i>Table of the collective Faculties of the Mind</i>	264.
--	------

SECTION I.

OF THE DISSECTION OF THE ORIGINAL USE OF JUDGEMENT.	
--	--

<i>Dissection of the æsthetical Judgment of the Beautiful and Sublime</i>	265.
---	------

<i>The mathematical Sublime</i>	297.
---------------------------------	------

<i>The dynamical Sublime</i>	303.
------------------------------	------

<i>Determinations of the Conceptions of Beauti- ful and Sublime, under the Guidance of the Exposition of æsthetical Judgment</i>	309.
--	------

<i>Representation and Solution of the Antinomy of Taste</i>	325.
---	------

<i>Of the doctrinal Method of Taste</i>	332.
---	------

SECTION II.

OF THE DISSECTION OF REFLECTIVE JUDGE- MENT.	
---	--

<i>Dissection of teleological Judgment</i>	333.
--	------

<i>Representation and Solution of the Antinomy of teleological Judgment</i>	343.
---	------

<i>Of the Scope of Nature</i>	354.
-------------------------------	------

PART

PART IV.

MORE ELABORATE DISCUSSION OF MORAL RELIGION.

- Representation of the Christian Religion as a moral Religion* 361.
- Of the Dwelling of the bad Principle by the good, or on the radical Evil in human Nature* 364.
- Of the Conflict of the good Principle with the bad, for the Dominion over Mankind* 374.
- The Victory of the good Principle over the bad and the Foundation of a Kingdom of God upon Earth* 386.
- Of Worship and spurious Worship under the Dominion of the good Principle, or of Religion and Priestdom* 405.
-

PRINCIPLES
THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART I.

Thinking is that operation of mind, wherein we represent objects to ourselves, by adding certain designations to them; such a representation is named a *conception*; those designations, so far as they are thought in the conception, are its *marks*, they are however called *predicates* of the object itself, when they belong and can be added to it.

CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

PART I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

Of the logical Use of Understanding in general.

1.
Thinking is that operation of mind, wherein we represent objects to ourselves, by adding certain designations to them; such a representation is named a *conception*; those designations, so far as they are thought in the conception, are its *marks*, they are however called *predicates* of the object itself, when they belong and can be added to it.

2.

Logic is the science, which fully exhibits and strictly proves the formal rules of thinking, and is divided into *universal* and *particular*; universal logic is either *pure* or *applied*, in the first, we abstract from all empirical conditions, under which our understanding is exercised. Universal logic is however called applied, when 'tis directed toward the rules of the use of understanding under the subjective empirical conditions, which *psychology* teaches us.

Universal logic contains the absolute necessary rules of thinking, without which, no use of understanding whatever can take place. *The logic of the particular use of understanding* contains the rules of thinking correctly on a certain sort of objects. *Applied logic* treats of attention, of whatever hinders or promotes it, of the origin of error, illusion, prejudices, of the situation of doubt, scruple, conviction &c.

3.

Pure logic is divided into the doctrines of *understanding*, of *judgement*, of *reason*, or into the doctrines of *conceptions*, of
judg-

judgments and of *syllogisms*. Understanding is here considered as the possessor of conceptions; 'tis not the design of this science to inquire after the origin of these. The understanding has conceptions, as so many rules for the thinking of objects. Judgement, however, is the placing of objects under these rules, consequently the same with the thinking of objects. A syllogism finally is the deduction of one judgement from another.

4.

When we separate the designations, by whose addition we represent an object to ourselves, from the object, this thing, divested of all it's designations, which simple point we still retain in thought, in reference to them, is called *the analytical unity of consciousness*. This analytical unity forms the basis of all conceptions, i. e. of all thinking.

5.

As therefore thinking and judging are identical, so are the three laws of cogitation:

the position of contradiction (*principium contradictionis*), that of sufficient reason (*principium rationis sufficientis*) and that of exclusive third (*principium exclusi tertii inter duo contradictoria*), nothing but the principles of the categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive judgments. The first says: no object can be represented by designations, which annul one another in the conception. The position of sufficient reason is: if something be thought as conditional, this conditional is posited, provided the condition be posited. Finally the principle of the disjunctive judgment: of two designations annulling one another in the conception, one belongs to every object.

6.

In all judgments we distinguish *the conjunction* from *the agnition*; the first consists in the transition of consciousness from the one conception to the other, so that both conceptions come to one consciousness; the agnition consists, however, in the placing of an object under a precise conception.

INTRODUCTION.

7

I think the glass that stands before me, by means of certain designations, e. g. that it occupies a determinate place in space. If I judge now, that this object is a glass, there is *first* a transition of consciousness, from the conception of this object, to that of the glass. It is the complex conception of this object of glass, which is produced by means of this conjunction. The copula, *is*, however, expresses *secondly* the agnition, so far as I place my object under the conception of glass and consider it as a member of the sphere of this conception. The faculty of this agnition is the *facultas dijudicandi*.

7.

The procedure of understanding with conceptions is *the logical use of understanding*; this leaves room for the following question: what connects the conception of an object with this object? We always distinguish the object of a conception from the conception itself. What is now the band which connects both? This question cannot be answered from mere conceptions, as a mere conception is nothing but the representation of a thing, which represents it's ob-

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ject by adding certain designations, under which this band is not contained.

The answer, that the objects act upon us and beget the representations, is of no validity as an answer to this question, so long as one considers it from the station of mere conceptions, as the representation of the object, that is acting upon me, is surely not the object itself, which occasions this action. Berkeley only denied the existence of objects in space, but considered the existence of the thinking subject as unquestionably certain. As the representation of me, however, is not the same with my own self, the question still remains in it's full force, what connects my representation of my own subject with this subject? This question, which, when viewed from the station of mere conceptions, appears to us as very weighty, will afterward be resolved into a puerile one, i. e. which asks about nothing. 'Twill be obvious, that it is in itself unintelligible. But it will only appear in this light to those, who have carefully considered that, which alone constitutes all intelligibility.

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART I.
OF THE FOUNDATION OF ALL
THEORETICAL COGNITION.

SECTION I.

TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY,
OR DISSECTION OF THE ORIGINAL
USE OF UNDERSTANDING.

8.

The chief principle of all logical use of understanding is *the original use of understanding itself*, which we express in the postulate: *to represent originally*.

A postulate is no hypothesis; this is a position; it represents an object by means of conceptions, thereby, that certain designations are added to it.

Our

Our postulate postulates the original use of understanding itself. We are here in the situation of the geometrician, who does not deduce his science from notions of space borrowed from any philosophical school; not even from that of space being the order of things, so far as they exist as simultaneous, or that space is the form of external phaenomena. He postulates the original representing, *space*, and on this superstructs his science. We consider here the faculty of cognition with reference to objects, so far as we do not think them by precise ready conceptions, and have the same use of understanding in view, on which all logical use of understanding, i. e. all procedure with conceptions rests.

9.

All original use of understanding consists in the *Categories*, and their exhibition as postulates is the dissection of the original use of understanding. This consists every where in *an original composition* (synthesis) and in *an original agnition* (schematism).

We represent at once this original use of understanding dissected in its categories. But what is said in this paragraph can only become intelligible by the following transcendental deduction.

The category, (extensive) *Greatness* * is the original synthesis of the homogeneous, which goes from the part to the whole. Synthesis in general is the transition of consciousness from the one to the other. The word, *Space*, denotes even this original use of understanding. Every line which I draw (not so far as I think it, i. e. refer designations to a something) is an example of this original use of understanding. While therefore I *describe* a space and thus synthesize originally, I generate *Time*. Time itself then is an original synthesis of the homogeneous, which goes from the part to the whole (extensive greatness). *The original fixing* of this time, by which means that synthesis of the homogeneous itself is fixed, is *the origi-*

* *Greatness*, in this abstract and primary intellectual mode of procedure, is much more congenial with the german predicament *Größe* and renders it's sense more precisely, than Quantity, which is however used to express symbolical construction (see paragraph 31).

nal agnition, (transcendental fixing of time, scheme of the category).

This category, greatness, space, not as a conception, whereby we add it as designation to a thing but as original use of understanding itself, constitutes the essence of geometry, and here transcendental philosophy postulates the very same original use of understanding, from which the geometrician commences. When I see an object e. g. a statue, I thus generate the space, which the matter fills, in synthesizing originally. The fixing of this synthesis, which is the same with the determining of the time, that is generated therein, gives me *the precise figure* of this determinate body.

11.

The category, *Reality*, (intensive greatness) is the original synthesis of the homogeneous, which goes from the whole (of a sensation) to the parts. The original agnition here too is the primary fixing of this synthesis, whereby time is originally determined. It is consequently the begetting of a precise degree of reality.

The illumination of a surface affects me at once, and the synthesis begins from this sensation

tion and goes to its parts. The original fixing of time of this synthesis, furnishes the representation of a precise reality. When I attempt to contract the space, that a body occupies, which I am holding in my hand, I am led to ascertain the quantity of matter it contains, according to the sensation of resistance which I feel from it.

The category *Substantiality* is the original positing of a permanent in space, which makes all representation of time first possible. *Causality* is the original positing of a something, by which the synthesis of the sensations of a perception is, as a successive one, originally fixed. *Commerce* is the original positing of several substances in space, by which the synthesis in a perception is, as a voluntary one, originally fixed.

These three categories constitute the original use of understanding, which lays the foundation for the conception of the *Existence* of things. When I examine the use of understanding, concerning the judgment: here is (exists) a body e. g. a stone, which I see, I find, that it consists first in the positing of a permanent by means of which all representation of time is first possible.

Time

Time itself is represented as elapsing. 'Tis only possible to represent the elapsing of time by a permanent (substance) in space, which remains (and discovers itself somehow e. g. by weight, as a permanent), matter may assume any form whatever and may be divided or joined with other matter. Suppose now, that this stone changes its form, the synthesis of apprehension of this stone under the one form, and afterward under the other, is, as a successive one, *determined*. This being determined contains the original use of understanding, the positing of a something named *cause*, by which this synthesis, as a successive one, is fixed. It is the use of understanding, which forms the basis of the experience of an alteration. When however the synthesis of perception begins at the one extremity of the stone and continues to the other, or vice versa; and in general when this synthesis can be voluntarily directed, I say, that the parts of the stone exist at the same time. The original use of understanding consists here in the positing of these parts as permanent things, which mutually determine each others places in time.

13.

The category, *Possibility* consists in carrying back the conception of a thing to the ori-

original use of understanding of the categories greatness, reality and existence. *Actuality* is the generation of the conception of an object from this original use of understanding. *Necessity* is the existence of a thing already cognised from conceptions.

Possibility, actuality and necessity, do not concern the objects, but merely the faculty of cognition. 'Tis only said of things, *they are*. I judge of an occurrence, which is related to me, that it is possible, when I can carry its conception back to the laws of the original use of understanding. I would, on the contrary, judge of a regular seventeen sided body, that it is impossible, as its conception cannot be carried back to this primary operation. This cannot be cognised from mere conceptions. I judge, that the event, of which I myself have experience, is actual, when I take its conception from the original use of understanding itself. But that there is a cause for a certain event e. g. a stone falling from the roof, is necessary. The cognition of this existence is received from the universal conception of the causality of every event, under which I subsumpt this precise case.

The understanding, therefore, *synthesises* and *schematises* originally in the categories, we express this position in the formula: *we cognise not the things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us.* In this exhibition of the categories, we have not dissected conceptions, but the understanding itself in its original use. It is the dissection of all intelligibility. We understand ourselves but so far in our conceptions, as we can carry them back to this primary use of understanding.

¹⁵ The original synthetic objective unity of consciousness is the production of the original synthesis and original agnition in the categories. The conception of it is the conception of the objects of our cognition, so far as we understand ourselves therein. This unity, with reference to the original synthesis, is called synthetic; it is named objective with reference to the original agnition (transcendental determining of time). It is different

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rent from the analytic unity of consciousness of every conception whatever.

Attention to this difference is the most important business in this transcendental philosophy. I consider the categories as conceptions and have the analytical unity in view, when they serve me as designations of objects. I have this analytical unity in thought, when I attribute greatness, reality, substantiality, causality &c. to an object. The category, on the contrary, is the generation of the original synthetic objective unity, so far as it is the original use of understanding. I only understand myself, so far as I have well considered this original use of intellect, in the aspect of the categories as conceptions i. e. in their analytical unity, as also what I mean, when I say e. g. substantiality belongs to a thing. When attention is given to this logical use of understanding, where the categories are considered as attributes, and as such added to a thing, the inquiry after the thing itself, to which we add all these attributes, must occasion embarrassment. This can only be ascribed to our own unintelligibility, from which we can never free ourselves, but by attention to the primary use of understanding in the predicaments.

We do not cognise the things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us. We

misunderstand this position, when we are of opinion, that the things in themselves act upon us and produce the representations in us by means of their affection. The pen in my hand acts upon me by the light that is thrown upon my eye. The category of causality here consists in the original positing of a something, (cause), by which the synthesis of perception of my own state, is, as a successive one, originally fixed. This cause, namely the pen in the hand, is consequently phaenomenon and not thing in itself, because I here discover the original use of understanding in the category of causality. In short this position says, in other words, nothing more, than that we only consider the categories, as predicates of things, and can only place this conjunction in the things, because the understanding conjoins originally in them.

16.

Transcendental philosophy is the science of the original use of understanding in the categories. We name the cognition of the categories *transcendental* as of the original use of understanding itself. But *the transcendental use* of these categories, in any one position, is the application of them as predicates

dicates of objects, without considering, that they themselves entirely constitute the original use of understanding. This transcendental use is a mere play of conceptions, in which we do not understand ourselves. *The empirical use* of the categories, on the other hand, consists in that application of them, which is practicable under the condition of their being held an original use of understanding.

The use of the category of reality is transcendental, in the conception of a most real being. For in order to be able to attribute all reality to this being, he must be divested of the conditions of space and time i. e. one quits the original use of understanding of the category and plays with thoughts. The use of the category of greatness is also transcendental, in the position, *matter consists of simple parts*. The use of this category, on the contrary, is empirical, in the assertion, *that every part of matter always consists again of parts*.

17.

The objective validity of a conception is its intelligibility. When a conception can be carried back to the original use of un-

derstanding in the categories (the analytical unity of the conception to the original synthetic, objective unity of the original use of understanding), it is objectively valid. This is the property of a conception, which elevates it to a *cognition*. It is identical with *the real possibility* (13.) of a conception.

18. *The critical idealism* consists in the position, that the understanding conjoins originally in its categories, and that the use of the categories as predicates of objects (i. e. the conjunction, which we place in the things) entirely rests on this original intellectual conjunction. This critical idealism, when adopted as a mode of thinking, constitutes the critical mode of thinking. Whoever, therefore, has made himself well acquainted with that, which constitutes all intelligibility, and is thereby able to understand himself in the use of his conceptions, is a *critical philosopher*. We consider critical philosophy, as a way of thinking, which gives, to a train of thoughts, the dignity of
philo-

philosophizing, and furnishes stability and intelligibility to it, by founding it upon the original use of understanding. *The dogmatical* is opposed to this critical way of thinking. As the first is *the station of mere conceptions*, so the second is *the station of the original use of understanding in the categories*. The dogmatical philosopher remains by the logical use of understanding, whose chief principle is the analytical unity of the conception, and the representation of objects by adding certain designations to them. This mode of thinking is that of *the cognition of things in themselves*. A train of thoughts established on this dogmatical cast of mind is called *speculation*.

19.

Scepticism consists in the discovery of the unintelligibility of a speculation, it disturbs the dogmatical way of thinking by the inquiry after the conjunction of the representation of an object with this object. The sceptic himself however, is in danger of becoming a dogmatist, so long as he is

not a transcendental philosopher, and does not turn his attention to the original use of understanding in the categories. The dogmatical sceptic is *the material idealist*; he denies all conjunction betwixt the representations and their objects, i. e. the existence of these objects themselves; not because the question concerning this conjunction is in itself unintelligible, but because this conjunction itself cannot be found.

When 'tis enquired, whether the moon have inhabitants, I understand myself in this question, and both its affirmation and negation lie in the sphere of intelligibility. I do not understand myself however, in the question, concerning the conjunction of the representation and the object, as I therein quit this sphere of intelligibility, namely the original use of understanding. The sceptic falls in with the question, what conjoins my representation of any one thing, with this thing? and discovers, that the answer, the thing acts upon him and begets the representation, is not satisfactory, as he has only a representation of this acting, which occasions the question: what then is the band between the representation of the thing, that is acting upon us, and this thing itself? to which he can find no answer.

answer. The fault he commits lies therein, that he does not respect the original use of understanding in the categories in general and chiefly that of existence, consequently does not understand himself in the position: a thing *is* (exists). The idealist doubts or even denies the existence of objects in space, and considers only his own, *I am*, as certain. But that question about the band betwixt the representation and its object also affects this, *I am*. For my representation of my self, is not this self. What conjoins my representation of me, with my own self? When, on the contrary, I transpose myself to the original use of understanding, I find that the predicate of existence, which I add to a thing, rests on the original positing of a permanent in space, which makes all representation of time first possible. (The representation of space as the permanent form of things also rests entirely on this). I can represent my own consciousness to myself (which is but event) only by a permanent in space. We understand ourselves in our own illusions only *within* this sphere of the intelligible, e. g. therein, that the sea seems to us to be elevated at a distance, tho' 'tis not so; that the moon seems to be greater near the horizon, than in the meridian.

Hume hit the true spirit of scepticism in his attack, which was directed against the position of causality. He controverted this *causing*, as cau-

sation is attributed to an object and it, on that account, called a cause, and complained of the total unintelligibility of this conception, which complaint was perfectly grounded, as it rested on the aspect of the categories as predicates of things. Not only the category of causality, but all the others too, lie under this same unintelligibility, so long as the original use of understanding is not discovered in them.

20.

Aristotle considered the categories as the highest conceptions, and this view served him as a principle of searching for them. This however, was exactly the dogmatical aspect, which holds the categories to be designations of objects, and neglects the original use of understanding, that lies in them. They are even on this account the highest conceptions of objects, as they constitute this use of understanding, which is the production of the synthetical objective unity of consciousness, wherein the understanding alone has objects.

Aristotle, as well as *Locke* in more modern times, considered the categories as predicates of objects, taken from experience.

Qua-

Qualitates primariae and *secundariae* of the latter. Sensation and reflexion were, according to him, the source of all conceptions. His simple and complex conceptions,

Philosophy, according to *Plato*, was the art of reminiscence of conceptions, which we had already used, in a state prior to this life. *Leibnitz*, on the other hand, taught that we had certain innate conceptions.

Plato's ideas were conceptions, for which experience could never produce perfect corresponding objects. The moral conceptions in particular are of this nature. *Leibnitz* wished to explain the manner in which we came to the possession of certain conceptions, that we have not obtained by the way of experience, altho' we equally apply them to objects of experience. He observed a great difference with regard to the origin of our conceptions, and that, concerning this manner of origin, there is, however, a great difference between the conception of the black colour, and that of the greatness or reality of things. He said of these last conceptions, that they are innate, which means nothing but that we are ignorant how we came by them. 'Tis however to be remarked, that the answer; that

that we acquire other conceptions by the way of experience, is equally unintelligible, so long as we have neglected the original use of understanding. Transcendental philosophy, on the contrary, teaches us, that the predicaments are the original use of understanding itself. And now the question becomes insignificant, why the understanding has just these and no other predicaments? These, in quality of primary use of intellect, constitute the very understanding itself.

22.

The distinction between conceptions *a priori* and *a posteriori*, is now not difficult to be conceived. Designations of objects are represented in a conception *a priori* or in a *pure conception*, which we add to them, by reason that they express the generation of the synthetical objective unity of consciousness, which is the foundation of all analytical unity of the conception. A conception *a posteriori* or an *empirical conception* contains an attribution, which rests on the original use of understanding in the categories themselves.

The conceptions of greatness, reality &c. are pure conceptions. I ascribe greatness and reality

to

to objects, because they properly contain the production of the synthetical objective unity of consciousness, which I then think, by the adding of various designations, i. e. as analytical unity. The conception of a precise weight, or of a determinate bulk of a body is, however, an empirical conception, as these designations are obtained from the original use of intellect of the predicaments.

23.

Designations are added to a thing in *an analytical judgment*, which are already thought in the conception of this thing, and whereby the analytic unity (§. 4.) of this conception is fixed. Designations are, on the contrary, added to a thing in *a synthetical judgment*, which are different from those, whereby the analytical unity of its conception is determined.

When I represent an object (called body) to myself, by the criteria of extension and divisibility, it is then an analytical judgment, *that bodies are extended and divisible substances.* When, on the other hand, the analytical unity of the conception of gold is fixed, by the designations of its superiour weight to other mineral bodies, yellow

yellow colour, its fusion in fire, wherein it loses nothing of its weight, among which designations, that of its solution in aqua regia does not belong, the judgment, *gold is soluble in aqua regia*, is then synthetical. The conception of an object, by means of analytical judgments, becomes distinct, as they separate the characteristics, by which it is thought; but this conception is enlarged by means of synthetical judgments, as the analytical unity is already fixed in certain criteria, and still other designations are added to the object in these judgments, by which the conception of the object is no more disturbed.

24.

A judgment of experience is that judgment, wherein designations, taken from the original use of understanding, are referred to the analytical unity, which is already formed. Judgments of experience are synthetical.

We find in every experience the original use of understanding in the categories, consequently the production of an original synthetical objective unity of consciousness. When the understanding separates criteria from this original use of intellect, this unity of consciousness, which it fixes in

in these criteria, is accordingly called the analytical unity. The judgment, that refers these designations to the object, only unfolds the conception, which rests on the original use of understanding, and is analytical. When, however, other designations are admitted in the conception of the thing, from the original use of understanding, after the analytical unity of consciousness is already determined and fixed in certain criteria, the judgment, which expresses this addition of such new designations, is *synthetical*. Our paragraph expresses this last.

A judgment a priori is that, wherein designations, which are not taken from the production of the original *synthetical* objective unity of consciousness, are referred to an object. Every analytical judgment is a judgment *a priori*. For the designation, which is added to an object in such a judgment, is already thought in the conception itself, and belongs to the establishment of the analytical unity; it is consequently not taken from the original use of understanding itself. But there are also *synthetical* judgments *a priori*. The designations, which are added to the ob-
ject

ject in these, are properly the original use of understanding itself, by which the synthetic objective unity is generated, which is the basis of the analytical of the conception.

Thus the judgment, *that gold is yellow*, is analytical, so far as the designation, yellow already belongs to the establishment of the analytical unity (lies in the conception of the object) and this judgment is therefore valid, independent of all experience, i. e. it is not necessary to look back to the original use of understanding, as I express therein only the designation of the analytical unity, which is already formed; this is a judgment a priori. On the contrary, *extensive greatness belongs to every object*, is a synthetic judgment a priori. It is synthetic, as I had already established the analytical unity of the conception of an object in general, by any designations whatever, and still add to these that of extensive greatness. It is a priori, as I do not take these designations from the original use of understanding, but previously express this original use of understanding itself.

26.

The synthetic judgments a priori may be completely exhibited, according to the table

of

of the categories. Their principle is no position. We attain them by no derivation from conceptions. Their principle is the original use of understanding itself, the production of the original synthetic objective unity, which they precisely express — the postulat: *to represent originally*. As all experience consists in this original use of understanding, we may say, that the possibility of experience in general, is the principle of all these synthetic judgments a priori. They are also *principles a priori, which lay the foundation of all experience*. As we now consider the categories, in the quality of conceptions, as inmates of the understanding, we shall also name these synthetical judgments a priori, *principles of transcendental judgement*. They will be rules, under which every object must stand, in order to be object for us, i. e. that our conception of it may be intelligible.

The judgment, *Caius is mortal*, we derive from the universal position, *all men are mortal*. Our synthetical judgments a priori are not of this nature. It is, on the contrary, the original use of
under-

understanding itself, which is expressed in each of these principles.

27.

The principle of greatneses is, *all objects are extensive greatneses*. This position, when taken from the station of mere conceptions, is synthetical, since the conception of objects is already considered as therein fixed, by any designations whatever, and still the designation of extensive greatness is, over and above, thereto added. This connection of conceptions rests on the original synthesis of the homogeneous in the category, greatness. For the synthetic objective unity of consciousness is generated in this, which afterward remains for the analytical unity of the conception, in order that designations may be referred to it.

The connexion of conceptions in this position cannot be perfected from the station of mere conceptions. When one remains at this station and only has in view the reference of the predicate, greatness, to the analytic unity of the conception of an object in general, and the mere logical attribution, and gives no attention to the intel-

intellectual synthesis, greatness, herein consists the fancy of the cognition of the things in themselves, wherein a conjunction, which the understanding exercises originally, is attributed to the objects. We must still make the following remark in order to render this position more perspicuous. No doubt, I can call every thing, and even my own representation, an object. But each of my representations, and also the representation of a representation, has however only so far signification, as it is represented by means of a permanent in space, consequently but so far as it has the original use of understanding *greatness*, *space*, for a basis.

28.

The whole science of *mathematics* consists in this original use of understanding of the category, *greatness*. 1) Every geometrical axiom expresses such an original intellectual procedure, and represents it by means of a conception. The universality of these propositions arises from the intellectual synthesis, which embraces the sphere of the analytical unity of the conception.

The following axiom will serve as illustration:
two straight lines cannot inclose a space. I form

PART I.

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a rectilinear angle, which is not an inclosed plain. In opening the legs of this angle thro' all the four rectangles, I thus take the criterion from this original intellectual synthesis, that no plane is inclosed in all these cases. This carrying back a conception to the original use of understanding, *greatness*, is called *to construct* the conception. This and all other geometrical axioms are synthetic propositions. That they do not inclose a plane, belongs not to the designations, by which I fix the analytical unity of the conception of two straight lines. I must go to the original intellectual synthesis, i. e. I must construct my conception, in order to obtain this criterion. Positions of experience are on this account *particular* positions, as the (empirical) original intellectual synthesis does not reach the sphere of the analytic unity.

29.

2) Every geometrical theorem is a proposition cognised from a deduction from conceptions, which is conjoined with the construction of the conception. Out of the deduction from conceptions arises the consciousness of necessity, which adheres to these propositions; but their universality springs from the construction.

Every

Every theorem may serve as an instance. In order to demonstrate the proposition: that the three angles of a rectilineous triangle are equal to two right; we must draw a line, thro' its apex, parallel with the base. The proposition, that alternate angles in parallel lines are equal one to another, has already preceeded. That, in the present case, the side angles at the apex of the triangle are equal to the angles at the base, is also a consequence of that conception, and therefore *necessarily* certain. The imagination can however place the apex of the triangle elsewhere. This procedure is named construction. The case with the parallel and the equality of the alternate angles is, in all these situations, the same, and this is the reason of the *universality* of this proposition.

30

The fixed original intellectual synthesis of the homogeneous (space) is the *quantitative unity* (oneness). *Multitude* (plurality) is the original synthesis of these unities. *Totality* is the precise multitude.

31.

Arithmetic consists in the original use of understanding of the category, multitude;

36

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and

and the procedure therein is, as well as in geometry, by construction. The geometrical construction begets quanta (magnitudes), and we call it *the offensive construction*; the arithmetical, however, generates quantitates, and is named *the symbolical construction*.

There are no axioms in arithmetic, as the synthesis of quantum is not considered in it, and the synthesis of quantity is only retained.

32.

Mathematics is the science of reason by construction of conceptions.

The name, Science of reason, expresses, that mathematics proceeds in its propositions according to conceptions. Every theorem is a consequence from its preceding propositions, but its universality is always obtained by construction, in geometry as well as in arithmetic, that is, mathematics is not a Science from conceptions (29.) As the position of contradiction is the principle of cogitation, and precisely expresses the explication of thinking and of conception, it may be said, that mathematical propositions proceed according to the position of contradiction, but that they do not, however, arise from it.

33.

On this original use of understanding, greatness, rests the entire application of the conception of greatness, namely the adding of it as designation, and of all propositions of pure mathematics, to objects in space.

Leibnitz was of opinion, from the station of mere conceptions, to have a pure cognition of understanding of things in themselves in the position: matter is composed of simple parts. When we hold up this conception to the original use of understanding, we find it counterintelligible.

34.

Space and time are *continuous greatneses* (*quanta continua*), space is extended according to three dimensions, time has but one dimension. Both are infinitely great, i. e. there is no precise space and no precise time, beyond which there can be no greater space and no longer time. These are criteria taken from the original synthesis of understanding itself.

35.

The principle of reality is, *every reality has an intensive greatness, i. e. a degree.* This position is, when one remains by the mere conjunction of conceptions, likewise synthetical. For one thinks, at this station, to have already fixed the analytical unity of the conception of reality by means of any designations whatever, and to add to them the quite new designation of intensive greatness. This connexion is then by no means possible to be perfected. When, on the other hand, we transpose ourselves to the original use of understanding, reality, we find it to be an original synthesis of the homogeneous (greatness), which goes from the whole of a sensation, by remission, to smaller sensations (an intensive greatness) and that the synthetic objective unity of consciousness is begotten in the original fixing of this synthesis, which must serve us as an analytical unity, when we are to understand ourselves in the attribution of reality.

That, which makes the original use of understanding so difficult to be understood, is the coalescence

lence of all the categories in the generation of the original synthetic objective unity of consciousness. This use of understanding: reality, is conjoined with that of causality, the original positing of a something, in which the apprehension of my own states of mind is, as successive, originally fixed. It is, however, the business of transcendental philosophy to dissect the primitive use of understanding, and to exhibit it in its various ramifications.

An example of the use of the conception of reality, from the station of mere conceptions, is the conception of matter, as an object, which fills a space by its mere existence. The conception of the most real being rests on the same ground of unintelligibility.

36.

Every reality is a continuous greatness, i. e. reality is always contained between any two degrees whatever of a real substance. There is also no absolute greatest or smallest degree of reality. A precise space can always be filled uniformly, and still by infinite different degrees. *Negation* is the annulling of a reality. *Limitation* is a reality, so far as is, at the same time, therein negated.

37.

The principles of existence are: 1) *In all change of phaenomena the substance is permanent, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.* 2) *All variations happen according to the law of connection of cause and effect.* 3) *All substances, so far as they can be perceived as simultaneous in space, are in thors action and reaction.*

38.

When the mere connexion of conceptions is observed in these positions, *the principle of substantiality* is synthetical. I have fixed the analytical unity by many designations, in the conception of a thing in space. I do not think the characteristic of permanency therein. The primary use of understanding, substantiality, on the other hand, consists in the original positing of a permanent in space, whereon all time can but first be represented, by which the synthetic objective unity is therefore generated, which is the foundation of all determination of time (of succession and simultaneousness of objects.)

In

In having the mere analytical unity of the conception of matter in view, and not giving attention to the primitive use of understanding, the dogma of the creation, or the bringing forth of all matter from nothing, arose, which, with reference to objects that belong to the sphere of the intelligible, cannot be admitted, as this doctrine is counterintelligible. This original use of understanding was, however, an obstacle to the dogma of the annihilation of matter. *Gigni de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti*, are two positions, which express the primary use of understanding of the conception of matter. When thinking is the subject in question, nothing can hinder me to think the matter of the stone in my hand, out of nature. But the original use of understanding of the existence of this thing teaches me, that this conception has no meaning. 'Tis contrary to it.

39.

The states of the permanent are called the accidents of the substance; these *begin* and *end* (change). The substance remains and but varies, or alters, i. e. exists in different states. The existence of the substance is called *subsistence*; that of the accidents, *inherence*.

A

A piece of wood is consumed by fire into ashes and smoke. The matter remains, is immutable; it is the permanent, which but varies and exists in different states.

40.

The principle of *causality*, considered from the station of mere conceptions, is a synthetical position. The criterion of causation does not lie in the conception of variation. Something varies, (it happens), is as much as, something exists at present, which did not exist before. The determination of the cause, which is previous to the event, is foreign to this conception. The primary use of understanding, causality, consists however, in the original positing of a something, by which the synthesis of apprehension is, as a successive one, fixed, wherein the synthetic objective unity of the conception of variation is generated, and this conception acquires meaning.

This position was formerly expressed thus: every contingent has its ground. When under contingent, that is understood, which already exists as consequence, the position is analytical.

cäl. The sequel will furnish many instances of this glaucoma, where the criteria are placed in the conception, which are wished to be found therein, and by these means one is persuaded to have discovered proofs for synthetic positions.

41.

The intellectual or logical contingency of things is their existence, so far as they can be annulled in thought. *Real or empirical contingent* is, on the other hand, the existence of the states of the permanent; so far as it is dependent upon the existence of their causes.

The intellectual contingency is a mere ens rationis. Nothing hinders me to annul in thought even the very substance of matter, tho' it be the permanent. To infer the existence of a being, that is absolutely necessary, from this intellectual contingency, is a procedure which runs counter to the original use of understanding in the categories. The assertion, that the state of a substance, when it is *a*, could have also been *non a*, at the same time, is equally counterintelligible, with respect to empirical contingency.

42.

42. The state of a substance, by which it is cause of the state of another substance (of its effect) is called its *causality*. This is an event, and previously posits again, according to the law of causality, another cause. Consequently the original use of understanding of the category, *causality*, leads us to a progression of effects and causes, in which no absolute first cause (liberty) can be found.

43.

Power is the permanent (the substance) which is thought as cause. *Action* is the causality of the cause, so far as it is active. *Passion* is the state of transition of two states in one substance. As the conception of variation has only meaning in the original positing of a permanent, and action signifies the causality, that had itself a beginning, of the actor, so every action is an empirical criterion of the permanency of the acting cause.

The possibility of acting is a *faculty*. Power is a constant effort of acting (*conatus agendi*) and

is

is either living or dead, according as it is sufficient for a determinate action or not.

44.

Every effect is a reality, and as such a precise intensive greatness. The degree of this variation of a thing, is called a *moment*. The causality of the cause is, in the same manner, an intensive greatness, and every cause is active by a precise degree of it.

45.

When a substance passes from a state A to another B, there is a time elapsed betwixt the two states. The causality of the cause continues during this time, and the substance must therefore pass uninterruptedly from the state A to the state B. This commutation of both states cannot consequently be thought but as reaching one another in a continuous transition.

46.

The principle of *commerce*, so far as 'tis viewed from the station of mere conceptions, is a synthetic position. The analytical

lytical unity of the conception of simultaneous substances is already thought therein as determined, and not the designation of thoro' action and reaction. When, on the contrary, we direct our attention to the original use of understanding, we find it consists, in this category, in the original positing of the permanent, that mutually determines each others place in space, by which the synthesis of apprehension is, as voluntary, originally fixed, and the synthetic objective unity, which is the foundation of the conception of the simultaneousness of things, is generated.

47.

These three principles are the laws of the existence of objects, and herewith too the laws, to which nature is necessarily subjected. This necessity cannot be asserted of empirical rules (e. g. of that, that after a clear sunset, the following day will be serene). Necessity is, however, the character of a cognition from conceptions. As the categories of relation are the original use of understanding,

ding, which contain the intelligibility of the conception, wherein we attribute existence to the objects, so these categories serve us as the universal conceptions of all existing things, i. e. of nature in general.

48.

The principles of *modality* are the following. 1) That, which coincides with the formal conditions of experience, is *possible*. 2) That, which coheres with the material conditions of experience, is *actual*. 3) That, whose coherence with the actual is determined according to universal conditions of experience, *necessarily* exists.

49.

The principles of modality are distinguished from the principles of the other categories in the following manner. These expressed a designation of an object, (whose conception was already fixed by certain designations,) which is not thought in this conception, and therefore this connexion of conceptions could not otherwise be perceived, than in the observation, that this designation

signation is the original use of understanding itself, by which is generated the original synthetic objective unity, which is the basis of the analytic unity of the conception. In the principles of modality, on the contrary, the relation of the logical to the original use of understanding is but represented, and this relation characterized. Therefore they are properly *postulates*, to represent this relation, and are not objective, but only subjective synthetic positions.

50.

The principle of *possibility* postulates the carrying back of the analytical unity of the conception to the original synthetic objective unity of the original use of understanding. This, in the categories, greatness, reality and relation, constitutes the formal conditions of experience. That object is possible, whose conception can be carried back to this original use of understanding.

The principle is therefore a nominal explanation of the real possibility of a thing. The mere conception of a thing but expresses its *logical possibility* i. e. only the logical use of understanding
and

and the analytical unity of consciousness. An object now can often be logically possible, without being, on that account, *really possible* too. A rectilineal figure of two angles is logically possible, as I certainly have a conception of an object, in which I fix an analytical unity, by the adding of the designations, inclosed space of two sides. But no original use of understanding corresponds to this conception, and the object is therefore really impossible. 'Tis only the logical possibility, which we express in all the principles of transcendental judgement already discussed, that namely greatness, reality, substantiality, causality, belong to a thing, or that many substances stand in commerce one with another. 'Tis the original use of understanding itself, which secures to them the real possibility. When one however conjoins conceptions, from the matter, which experience furnishes, without receiving from experience itself the examples of this connexion, these are but chimeras. The real possibility of these conceptions cannot be perspected a priori, like those of the categories. For these are precisely the conditions, and, as it were, the vehicle of all real possibility. Experience itself must furnish us with an instance of a human faculty, capable of being in immediate communication of thought with other men, if we should grant real possibility to such an object.

51. The principle of *actuality* postulates the logical use of understanding, as referring to an original one, i. e. it postulates the analytical unity for a conception, as taken from the original synthetic objective unity of the original use of understanding.

The object gives itself to me, it affects me. Herein consists the original use of understanding of the category, reality, with which that, in the categories of extensive greatness and of relation, coalesces. This original use of understanding passes to the logical, when I judge, *the object exists*, and add to it the existence with all the categories as predicates. The predicate of actuality then previously posits the original use of understanding, from which the conception of the thing must be taken, in order to be able to say of it, that it exists. One does not say of a geometrical figure, that it exists, for it is the original use of understanding itself, which is the execution of the rule, that is thought in the conception of the figure. I say, however, of matter, of a stone, of a plant, these objects *exist*, since here the original use of understanding in the begetting of the synthetic objective unity of consciousness precedes the conception.

52. The principle of *necessity* postulates the logical use of understanding as only determined by conceptions, it therefore postulates the analytical unity of the conception as consequence of a conception.

Necessity adheres to a cognition, so far as 'tis a cognition from conceptions. I judge of an event, it *necessarily* has a cause, so far as this judgment is thought as consequence of the universal one, every event has a cause. Finally this conception (which is already derived from an analytical unity) must also support itself upon an original use of understanding, so far as it is cognition, and more than mere conception. The original use of understanding in the categories of relation is what alone secures signification to the conception, wherein I think a thing as existing, (add to it the predicate, existence).

53.

On this now rests the proper insight into the questions, whether the field of possibility be greater, than the field, which contains all that is actual, and if this again be greater, than the multitude of that, which is necessary? Possibility, actuality and necessity, do

not concern the things, but only our cognition. 'Tis but said of things, *they are*. There is, in this respect, no comparison of objects, and the conception, wherein one is of opinion, that something must be added to the possibility of a thing, in order to make it actual, is devoid of all meaning.

54.

The conception of these principles of transcendental judgement is therefore as follows. They join predicates to objects, which are properly the original use of understanding itself, whereby the synthetic objective unity is generated, on which rests the analytical unity, to which these predicates are referred, in these judgments. The four formulas of the schools perfectly harmonise with them: *in mundo non datur saltus, non datur hiatus, non datur casus, non datur fatum.*

55.

The result of transcendental philosophy then is the position, *we do not cognise the things as they are in themselves, but only*

as

as they appear to us. This position expresses nothing more, than that the understanding synthesises and schematises originally in the categories, that these constitute the original use of understanding and of all intellect, that they are, in this quality, to be distinguished from their aspect and use as mere conceptions, and that the conjunction, which we ascribe to the things in this last use, entirely rests on that conjunction, which the understanding exercises in its original use.

The exposition of these principles has made this distinction obvious. In the position: extensive greatness belongs to every object, I add a designation to the object, and therein express a conjunction, which lies in the things. But the category, *greatness*, is the original synthesis of the homogeneous, which is generated in the synthetic objective unity of consciousness, whereon rests the analytical unity of the conception, which I think in this attribution.

56.

The conception of a *noumenon* is the conception of an object, that we represent to ourselves in an attribution, which has no ori-

ginal use of understanding for a basis. This conception is merely *problematical*, and serves only to make us observe the character of all our conceptions, which renders them cognitions. Such an object is a *noumenon in a negative sense*. As the predicate, *existence*, which we add to objects, rests on the original use of understanding, *existence* in the category of relation, and is therefore (which expresses the same) a predicate of the objects of experience only, so the question, whether noumena exist? has no meaning.

This question quits the source from whence the signification of all questions and conceptions can flow, and has notwithstanding the appearance as if it were not distinguishable from questions which concern objects of experience. It confounds the noumenon in the negative with that in the *positive sense*. For objects are meant, in the last, which the understanding cognises how they are in themselves (exist), after abstraction is made from all sensitive faculty (which is so much as from the original use of understanding):

57.

The division of our *conceptions* into *sensual* and *intellectual* rests upon the necessary distinction (for the security of cognitions) betwixt the logical and original use of understanding. An intellectual conception is the conception of a noumenon in the negative sense. A sensual conception, on the other hand, is a conception, which rests on the original use of understanding of the category. Though this division of our conceptions be perfectly admissible, that of objects and of the world, as the complex of all objects, into the sensual and intellectual world (sensual and intellectual objects) is quite inadmissible.

The division of objects into sensual and intellectual, presupposes the application of the conception of existence to the latter. But when we abstract from the original use of understanding, by positing things, which must lie without its sphere, the conception of existence, with reference to these objects, has no meaning. The illustration of this, however, by the example of the division of astronomy into the spherical and theoric part of that science, rests on the distortion of the conception of this division.

Therefore the division of *cognition* into that of the cognition of phaenomena and of things in themselves is totally insignificant. Our conceptions are cognitions, so far as they rest on the original use of understanding, and their objects are consequently phaenomena. Leibnitz made this division of cognition. He was of opinion, that the sensitive faculty occasioned confusion in the cognition of things, from which must be abstracted, in order then to cognise the things as they are in themselves, by the pure intellectual faculty. He did not take notice, however, that, in this abstraction from the sensitive faculty, he abstracted directly from the original use of understanding itself, and therefore precisely from the condition, under which our conceptions have signification. The chief moments of the system of this great man may be fully represented and estimated according to the clew of the categories.

59. A judgment, whose validity cannot otherwise be cognised, but by inference from other judgments, requires a *perquisition*, wherein these higher principles (which are again positions) are sought after. This business is but logical, as it abides by mere conceptions, and depends upon a *logical comparison*. In this, the conceptions, which are conjoined in the proposed judgment, are compared with one another, and this takes place according to the logical functions of judgments. Are the objects, which are comprehended by a certain conception, with regard to a certain criterion, *identical* or *different*? Do two conceptions *harmonize* or do they *contradict one another*? Is the criterion, which I conjoin with the analytical unity of a conception, already comprised under the designations, by which this unity itself is fixed, or is it not comprised therein, i. e. is the connexion of the conceptions in a judgment an *internal* or an *external* one? Is, finally, a conjunction, which lies in the objects, expressed in the judgment, or a conjunction-

junction but voluntarily thought, i. e. does our judgment concern *the matter* or *the form* of certain conceptions? Accordingly four conceptions arise to us, as so many logical comparative conceptions, of *identity* and *diversity*, of *accord* and *discord*, of *external* and *internal*, of the *matter* and *form*, of conceptions, whose conjunction is expressed in a judgment.

60.

When a judgment is immediately certain, no research is then necessary to assure us of its validity. But an immediate certain judgment requires *a transcendental reflexion*, in order to bring its intelligibility to light. This transcendental reflection consists in the carrying back of the analytical unity of the conception, which is represented in the judgment, to the synthetic unity of the original use of understanding.

The proposition, two straight lines inclose no space, is immediately certain. Whence this certainty, as the proposition is synthetic? It is the original use of understanding in the category, *greatness*, which gives it signification.

61.

61. We shall now call those logical comparative conceptions, *conceptions of transcendental reflection*, so far as they furnish a guide, by which we can carry back the logical conjunction of the conceptions in a judgment, to the original synthesis of the original use of understanding. The intellectual system of the great Leibnitz, wherein he intended to introduce a cognition of the things in themselves, by the pure intellectual faculty, was occasioned entirely by the neglect of this transcendental reflection. We shall examine his positions, according to the clew of the conceptions of transcendental reflection, by which their unintelligibility and voidness will appear of themselves.

62. 1) *Identity and diversity.* The *principium identitatis indiscernibilitatis* says, that there cannot exist in nature two or more things of the same quantity and quality (with the same internal designations). Leibnitz founded this position by the following mere
logi-

logical reflection. A thing which is often represented to us, with the same internal designations, is not *many*, but *one* thing. When we abstract from the way, in which these objects appear to our sensitive faculty, according to which we determine their place in time and in space, the understanding cognises these things, as they are in themselves. As therefore the diversity of space and time, in which two things of the same internal designations are found, does not concern the things in themselves, so, such things are by no means different from one another, i. e. they are not two, but one thing.

63.

This assertion turns away entirely from the use of understanding of the categories, *quantity* and *quality*, in considering the designations of space and of time, as having no reference to the things in themselves. As the synthetic objective unity of consciousness is generated in this original use of understanding, in which the analytical unity, that we think by the addition of the designations of
quan-

quantity and quality, has signification, so the conception has no meaning, in which quantity and quality are added to a thing in itself, but is, on the contrary, entirely divested of all intelligibility. The position *identitatis indiscernibilium* consequently contains no cognition of the things in themselves, but only the logical truth, that, when abstraction is made from the criteria, which distinguish two conceptions, an universal conception is obtained, which comprises both.

64.

Accord and discord. Leibnitz's theodicee is built upon the position: that realities conjoined in one subject, can never be in discord. He secures this position by the following logical reflection. All discord between realities in nature is but seeming, as this representation arises entirely from that of the relation of objects in space and in time. But this aspect of the things belongs to the mode of representation of our sensitive faculty from which we must abstract, in order to cognise the things, as they are in themselves.

There

There is however, no discord of realities contained in this cognition of the things in themselves. All realities in nature are but different one from another in degree. This difference however must exist, as *different* things must exist, in order that nature might not contain everywhere a dead uniformity. The evils in the world are consequently nothing but the phaenomena of these realities of things, which are different according to degree, but not productions of the discord of these realities.

65.

When Leibnitz, in favour of his position, orders to abstract from the mode of representation, which posits the reality of things in space and in time, he also therewith abstracts from the original use of understanding, *reality*, itself. As the analytical unity of the conception, wherein we attribute reality to an object, entirely rests on the original use of understanding, so the conception of reality, which belongs to a thing in itself, is destitute of all meaning. Realities

lities in nature (so far as we have an intelligent conception of them) are, by all means, in discord, and daily experience shows this to us everywhere. Nothing more remains, therefore, of this philosophers position, than the logical truth: that a conception, which contains nothing but affirmations in itself, contains, at the same time, nothing negative.

66.

3) *The internal and external.* Leibnitz's monadology rests on the following logical reflection. The relations of substances in space and in time are but apparent designations of them. They are not internal designations belonging to the substances themselves. When we abstract from the sensitive mode of representation, in which we represent the things in a certain order to ourselves, we obtain the pure cognition of intellect of the insulated substances, which can but be this by internal designations, that belong to each substance by itself, (designations which must belong to the substance independent of all other). We cannot, however,

con-

conceive any other absolute internal designations, than the powers of representation. Therefore all substances are *monades*, i. e. simple beings, whose absolute internal designations are powers of representation.

67.

A transcendental reflection convinces us, on the contrary, that the original use of understanding, *substantiality*, consists in the positing of a permanent in space, by which time itself can only first be represented. On this rests the analytical unity of the conception, wherein we attribute substantiality to a something. To abstract from the external relations of substances in space, is as much as to abstract from all intelligibility of the conception of substance. All that now remains to us of this monadology, is the logical position: that an object (the analytical objective unity) is thought in every conception by the adding of certain designations.

With this doctrine of atoms falls too the principle of *harmonia praestabilita*, (which rests thereon), as a principle of illustration of the possible commerce of substances among one another.

As each substance is only occupied about its own proper internal state, consequently cannot be in any active conjunction with other substances, so must a substance, which is different from all others, have made its states originally corresponding to one another.

68.

4) *Matter and form.* Leibnitz founds his doctrine of space and time (whereby space is the order of things, so far as they are simultaneous, and time the order of things, so far as they are consecutive), on the following logical reflection. Space and time are but so far designations of objects as they are considered with reference to one another. We must now abstract from the relations of things to one another, and consider each thing only in relation to itself, i. e. with its internal designations, when we wish to cognise it, as it is in itself, by the pure intellectual faculty. Therefore the things in themselves (the monades) are neither in space nor in time, and the representations space and time are nothing but the conception of their relation to one another.

69.

We oppose a transcendental to this logical reflection. We appeal to the original use of understanding in the categories; according to which, space and time themselves are this original use of understanding. To abstract from this, is to abstract from the synthetic objective unity of consciousness, which is the basis of the analytical of the conception of an object. When we reflect only logically, in comparing simply our conceptions, there remains nothing of Leibnitz's doctrine of space and time, but the position: that the contents (the matter) of a judgment (the conceptions, of which it consists) must be thought by us, before we can conjoin them in a judgment.

70.

The result of our transcendental philosophy therefore consists therein, that all signification and intelligibility of our conceptions lie in the original use of understanding, that it can be said of each of our conceptions, that *is has an object*, that *it refers to an object*,

object, and that it has *objective validity*, but so far as its analytical unity can be carried back to the original synthetic objective unity. We may now, conformable to this transcendental exposition, represent the conception of a *nonentity*, i. e. of nothing, according to the table of the categories.

Nothing is *first* that, which is neither one, nor many, nor all, i. e. to which no original use of understanding, greatness, corresponds (an *ens. rationis*). Such is the conception of a noumenon, that is neither in space nor in time, and to which, however, existence must belong.

Nothing is *secondly* that, which has not the original use of understanding, *reality*, for a foundation (a *nihil privativum*). Such is the conception of empty space.

Nothing is *thirdly* that, whose conception does not rest on the original use of understanding in the original positing of a permanent in space (an *ens imaginarium*). Such is the conception of a mathematical figure.

These three conceptions do not run counter to the original use of understanding; they are therefore not *counterintelligible*. But they are *unintelligible*, as the analytical unity, which is thought in them, cannot be carried back to any original synthetic objective unity.

Nothing is also *fourthly* that, whose conception runs counter to the original use of understanding (a *nihil negativum*). Such is the conception of a rectilinear figure of two sides; the conception of a substance, which is present in a space, yet without filling it; the conception of a creation of matter.

Nothing is *fifthly* that, whose conception does not rest on the original use of understanding in the original positing of a permanent in space (an *ens mathematicum*). Such is the conception of a mathematical figure.

SECTION II.
REPRESENTATION OF THE METHOD
OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY,
IN KANT'S CRITIC OF PURE REASON,
WITH A VIEW OF RENDERING IT
MORE PERSPICUOUS.

This method is accommodated to the *dog-*
matical cast of mind of its readers, and sets
 out from *the station of mere conceptions*.
 It only leads the attention by degrees to the
 transcendental station, and the reader, who
 has but the analytical unity of his concep-
 tions and the mere logical use of understand-
 ing always in view, is first conveyed, by *the*
deduction of the categories, to the original
 use of understanding in them, and to the pri-
 ginal synthetic objective unity of conscious-
 ness. 'Tis necessary to have first attained
 this transcendental station, in order to be
 able to understand the critic in its way
 to it.

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Nothing is *fifthly* that, whose conception does not rest on the original use of understanding in the original pointing of a permanent in space (an *ens negativum*). Such is the conception of a mathematical figure.

Nothing is *sixthly* that, whose conception does not rest on the original use of understanding in the original pointing of a permanent in space (an *ens negativum*). Such is the conception of a mathematical figure.

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to it.

The critic begins with the difference betwixt cognitions a priori and a posteriori, which it distinguishes as a fact. It now seems very intelligible, when it is said, that these cognitions are a posteriori, and are called empirical, which have their source in experience, and on the contrary, there are a priori, and are named pure cognitions, which are found in us independent of experience, and only stand in need of experience as an occasion to discover themselves. But the conception of experience itself seems to escape us; when we are put in mind of the sceptical question, concerning the conjunction of our representations with their objects.

73. The critic however, immediately at the beginning of its enquiry gives two criteria, by which cognitions a priori can be certainly distinguished from cognitions a posteriori. These are *universality* and *necessity*. But even these criteria escape the reader, who is not yet a transcendental philosopher. 'Tis said

said of the judgments of experience, that they do not bear these criteria in themselves. One cannot say, for example, that *all* men have black hair, nor even, that those, who have, have it *necessarily*. But when one does not extend the conception of the subject in the judgment of experience, farther than experience reaches, such a judgment can be valid as universal. The necessity of a cognition can, however, in general signify nothing more, than that a cognition is a consequence from conceptions, and therefore this criterion cannot belong to any absolute first cognition, but only always to such a one, as is thought as a conclusion, in a syllogism, since it exactly denotes this property. We have (par. 28.) accurately taken notice of the different sources of these various criteria.

74.

The whole design of the distinction betwixt *analytic* and *synthetic judgments* is obvious only to the transcendental philosopher. When the designation, which is ad-

ded to an object in a judgment, is already thought in the conception of it, the judgment is analytical; when it not thought therein, the judgment is synthetical. The exposition of the analytic judgment recalls to us the analytic unity of the conception. But the question, *how are synthetic judgments (as well a priori as a posteriori) possible?* leads to the original synthetic objective unity, to the original use of understanding, which contains this possibility in itself. As the critic engages in the dogmatical aspect of our cognitions, from the station of mere conceptions, so it represents the question, how are synthetic judgments a posteriori possible? as resolved, in the answer, that this synthesis is occasioned by means of experience. It exhibits, however, the want of a critic of the faculty of cognition, in the question, how are synthetic judgments a priori possible? The possibility of metaphysic, as a complex of cognitions of objects, which lie without the sphere of all experience, rests on the answer to this question.

The transcendental philosophy of the critic is divided into two enquiries, into the transcendental æsthetic and the transcendental logic. The first has the pure sensitive and the second the pure intellectual faculty for its object. This distinction and the representation of the faculty of cognition as consisting of the pure sensitive and of the pure intellectual faculty, will be introduced in the following consideration. Our cognition arises from the affection of objects. The objects act upon us, and produce sensations, (they affect us). The faculty of being affected, is *the sensitive faculty*; it is the receptibility of our mind, the sensations produced by the affection of objects are, however, not yet cognitions. In order that these sensations may become cognitions, there is still another function required, and this belongs to *the understanding*. This consists in a spontaneity of the mind. These faculties can but beget cognition when united. The critic, in this whole mode of representation, accommo-

dates

dates itself to its reader, who is accustomed to consider all cognitions from the station of mere conceptions. It transposes itself to the station of one, who is in the state of cognising, without being conscious to himself of the original use of understanding therein, and who finds himself *within* the sphere of experience, without ever having bestowed his attention upon that, which constitutes all experience (the original synthetic objective unity), in order to lead him by degrees to this chief principle of all cognition. One but remarks in the attainment of this point, the original use of understanding, which constitutes even the conception of the affection of objects (causality) and the conceptions of certain faculties of our mind as the sensitive faculty and the understanding, and without having oriented himself in this highest point of all cognition, the unintelligibility of the conception of objects, which *affect* and produce sensations in us, will torment the reader of the critic.

76.

As the sensitive faculty in general is the faculty of being affected by objects, so the *transcendental aesthetic* has the rules for its object, according to which this affection takes place. Space and time are these rules. Space is the rule, under which the sensitive faculty is affected by external objects; Time that, under which the mind is affected by its own functions. The pure sensitive faculty is the faculty of these rules. These rules however are no conceptions.

The ebb and flow follow the rule of the position of the moon. This rule is a conception. I think the motion of the moon by certain firm designations, and the vicissitude of ebb and flow could also proceed according to a rule quite different. But concerning space and time, the affection of objects can, by no means, be thought as independent of these rules. 'Tis undoubtedly very difficult and really impracticable to represent the true spirit of the critical theory of space and time, when abstraction is made from the original use of understanding, and they are considered only as forms or rules of the sensitive faculty (see the note p. 160. of the critic of pure reason).

77.

77.

I, by all means, have a conception of space and of time. Space and time themselves are however not conceptions, though I have conceptions of them. Space and time are *pure intuitions*. I hereby show my conception of them (the analytical unity, which I fix by certain designations); they themselves however are not conceptions, but belong to the original use of understanding; and to the generation of the original synthetic unity, on which rests the analytical unity of the conceptions of them.

78.

The critic undertakes the inquiry concerning what space and time are, in two different expositions of the conceptions of them, in a *metaphysical* and in a *transcendental*. The first is the mere logical exposition of these conceptions: it marks the designations, by which we fix their analytical unity and think these objects. The second leads to the original use of understanding: *time* and *space* themselves.

77

79.

79. The metaphysical exposition of these conceptions teaches, that space and time are not empirical conceptions, i. e. not conceptions of objects that affect us, so that our representation of these objects must originate from the sensation, which they produced in us. It further teaches, that space and time are by no means conceptions. Space and time in this are in the same relation, as all other objects. As I have a conception of wood, so have I too conceptions of space and of time. But as wood itself is no conception, space and time are likewise no conceptions. This exposition says further, that we can, by no means, conceive that space and time are not, though we may easily think, that no objects are to be found therein. It finally teaches us, that both objects are thought by us, by the predicate, *greatness*, and indeed as infinite greatnesses, also not as feigned, but as given objects.

80.

The metaphysical is the introduction to the transcendental exposition of these conceptions.

ceptions. The transcendental exposition leads to the original use of understanding: space and time. *First* concerning space; it appeals to geometry, as a science whose axioms and theorems are all synthetic and apodictically certain, which properties cannot be comprehended but by the given explanation, which represents space as a pure intuition (original use of understanding). We must now, above all things, remark here, that this appeal to geometry is an appeal to the *procedure* of the geometrician, and that the meaning of the critic herein is not, that the propositions of mathematics borrow their certainty from the conception of space, whereby it is a pure intuition. This procedure of the geometrician, first in his axioms, is a *pure intuition*, (the original synthesis of the homogeneous, construction) is space itself, (28. and 29.) *The universality* of the axiom rests on this original intellectual synthesis, which pervades the sphere of a conception. But the cognition of theorems proceeds according to conceptions. They already rest on conceptions, namely on the axioms, and serve

serve again as principles of other theorems. The apodictical certainty of theorems consists herein. Their universality, however, rests entirely on the original synthesis of the homogeneous. (29).

One cannot properly say of the axioms of geometry, that they carry apodictical certainty with themselves i. e. necessity, as they are not at all (like theorems) cognitions from conceptions, but entirely conceptions, which are immediately taken from the original use of understanding. So far only as I subsumpt objects under these conceptions, and determine them by these, do I call such expressions apodictically certain. When I think, e. g. a certain pair of straight lines, by any designations whatever, and say of these lines, that they cannot inclose a space, this cognition is apodictically certain, as it is already contained by subsumption under the universal proposition: no two straight lines can ever inclose a space.

81.

Secondly as to time, the transcendental exposition too appeals to the original use of understanding, on which the cognition of the axioms of time rests, e. g. time has but one dimension.

dimension; different times are not simultaneous or coexistent, but successive.

§2.

The reader of the critic will at once understand the whole spirit of the critical theory of space and time, when he remarks, that *space* is the original synthesis of the homogeneous, which goes from the parts to the whole and that in this original synthesis *time* itself is begotten. The critic notifies this original use of understanding by the expression, *pure intuition*. The category, *greatness*, as original use of understanding (not as conception) is therefore quite identical with the *pure intuition, space and time*. The category, *reality*, as original use of understanding, is also identical with the *empirical or material intuition*. It is the original synthesis of the homogeneous in the sensation, which goes from the whole to the parts, (so that this use of understanding begets the conception of the whole, and thereby makes that of the parts possible).

As

As long as one does not hit this point and only understands by intuition the immediate representation of a thing (representation of an individual thing), but does not remark in it the original use of understanding itself, so long is one very distant from the critical cast of mind and from the spirit of the critical idealism.

83.

The critic infers from this theory of space and time, that space and time, by no means, represent properties of any things in themselves whatever, but that they are mere forms of all phaenomena. It infers that all our cognition is cognition of the phaenomena, but not of the things in themselves, and for this reason, names its doctrine *the critical, formal or transcendental idealism*, which it distinguishes, however, from *the dogmatical or material idealism*. There is nothing, which we wish to inculcate so much, as the assurance that our critical idealism consists in the assertion, that the understanding synthesises and schematises originally in its categories, and that all conjunction which we place in the objects, (e. g. in the judg-

ment, every reality is an intensive greatness), is only for this reason objective, because we synthesise originally in the categories. The intelligibility of all our conceptions lies in this point. The material idealism neglects this, and is always dogmatical, as it never quits the station of mere conceptions. The critical has so little in common with the dogmatical idealism, that the whole insignificancy of the latter is discovered in the first.

84.

According to the method, however, which the critic has adopted, it is not easy to find this true spirit of its idealism in its transcendental aesthetic. This seems to occasion the representation, that the things in themselves affect us, and produce the intuitions in us. In this point of view then, the critical doctrine must *first* seem to us to say nothing but the identical position, which no body calls in question, that our representations are not the things, which are represented. But, *secondly*, when this system afterward asserts, that

that no application of the categories nor of the conception of causality, can be made to the things in themselves, it must seem to us to contradict itself, when we are of opinion to have found the doctrine therein, that the things in themselves affect us. When, on the contrary, the doctrine of the critic consists, with regard to the categories, therein, that these constitute the original use of understanding, and herein also consists the true spirit of the category, causality, the formula: the phaenomena (and not the things in themselves) act upon us and beget sensations, even expresses this use of intellect in that category.

85.

It is, therefore, very erroneous to interpret the critic, as if it taught, that the things in themselves in a manner hide themselves from us, but that notwithstanding they discover their existence, by their action upon our sensitive faculty. This aspect transforms the critical idealism into a dogmatical system, as the categories are therein con-

dered from the station of mere conceptions. The phaenomena are the objects of our cognition; they are real existing objects, and it is not illusion, but truth, when we say of our representations of them, that objects correspond to them. The critic, in its transcendental aesthetic, names the phaenomena themselves, representations. Its design in this is but to lead the attention of its reader by gradation to the synthetic objective unity of consciousness.

86.

Transcendental logic is the second part of transcendental philosophy in the critic. It represents the understanding insulated in it, and discovers the share, which it has in the generation of cognition. The understanding, according to the logical use of understanding, is the faculty of thinking, i. e. of representing objects to one's self by conceptions; which again is nothing else than judging (but fixing the analytical unity of consciousness by the adding of certain designations). The unfolding of this logical use of understanding

in

in judgments serves the critic as a guide to the dissection of the original use of understanding.

87.

Every judgment may be considered according to its quantity, quality, relation and modality, and is according to quantity, either an universal, a particular, or individual judgment; according to quality, either positive, negative, or infinite; according to relation, either categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive; finally according to modality, either problematic, assertive or apodictical.

88.

The harmony of these forms of judgments with the categories is obvious. The critic considers them in the beginning as mere conceptions. They are, from this station, taken notice of as predicates, which are joined to the things, and 'tis accordingly said, that greatness, reality, substantiality, possibility &c. belong to the things. But that harmony gives occasion to surmise that these conceptions are quite different from those

called empirical conceptions and that the principle whereby substantiality is attributed to an object, must be very different from that, why one judges, it is black, fluid, or hard.

89.

The critic, on account of that harmony of these categories with the logical functions of judgments, names them *conceptions a priori*, and still more precise, *pure conceptions of understanding*. It signifies thereby in particular, that these conceptions do not arise from experience, such as the conception of the transition of water to ice. It places itself, in this manner, in the situation of its reader, who believes himself to be in the right concerning the origin of conceptions of experience. It therefore puts the question, since the pure conceptions of understanding have not their origin in experience, with what right do we apply them to objects of experience? This question is answered in the transcendental deduction of the categories.

A little attention given to that, which is called experience, destroys, however, very soon, the quiet assurance with regard to the origin and the validity of the application of conceptions of experience, and it will be discovered, that the deduction of the categories effectuates much more, than it seems to promise, as it properly leads into the nature of experience itself. So long as the categories are considered as mere conceptions, just so long will the question surprise, how does the understanding come by these conceptions? The deduction of the categories teaches us to know these, as the original use of understanding, and the categories are in this quality, the very understanding. From this station we take a view of the nature of experience itself.

91.

From what has been said, it will not be difficult to discover the true spirit of the principle of the use of the categories. The result of their deduction is as follows, the categories have application to objects of ex-

perience, since they make all experience possible. The possibility of experience is not introduced here as a conception, from which that application can be developed. This representation has no meaning. But when we transpose ourselves to the original use of understanding of the categories, we at the same time transpose ourselves to the situation, wherein all experience is generated, and perceive therefore so clearly, that the categories make all experience possible, that they are properly that itself, which experiences.

SECTION. III.

METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY, OR CARRYING BACK THE CONCEPTION OF MATTER TO THE ORIGINAL USE OF UNDERSTANDING IN THE CATEGORIES.

92.
After a dissection of the original use of understanding, we reject the thought of the cognition of things in themselves. An *Ontology* (science of the essence of things) well-understood, is nothing but transcendental philosophy, and all metaphysic of nature, instead of ranging and losing ourselves in the intelligibilis * regions, carries back our conceptions of nature to the original use of understanding in the categories.

93.

To objects, which we think by the predicate, existence, we attribute even therein

* See this word in the tran^s. preface.

a *nature*. If we abstract from the existence of a thing, but still retain the complete conception of it, the complex of the designations, by which we fix the analytical unity of the conception, is the essence of the thing.

94.

We shall here represent the principles of a *rational doctrine of bodies*. A doctrine is *rational*, so far as its truths are cognoscible from principles, and consequently are apodictically certain. Such a doctrine is only so far called, *science*, in the strict sense. The rational doctrine of bodies is the true *physics*. This, as it must consist in a rational *extension* and not in a mere *developement* of its conceptions, cannot be otherwise effected, than by *construction* of the conceptions. For this, that is, mathematics in general, shews us the only possible way, in which conceptions can be extended, independent of experience.

I develope my conception of gold, when I mark the yellow colour among the other designations,

nations, by which I think this object. I extend my conception of a precise body, which I name gold, *empirically* when I find e. g. that it is soluble in aqua regia. But I extend my conception of a body in general *rationaly*, when I cognise according to the manner of procedure of physics, that the line in which a heavy body falls encreases with the quadrate of the time. The apodictical certainty of such a cognition rests on syllogisms and is therefore called rational. But its extension and also its universality rests on construction, on the original synthesis of the homogeneal, which reaches the sphere of the conception. That empirical extension extends only the conception of a determinate object, which I think by this conception, and not the conception itself. I cogitate, in the foregoing example, a certain object by the designations, which I think in the conception of gold. This object now stands entirely for itself, and the new-acquired designation of the solubility in aqua regia, concerns only *this* body, and is therefore an extension of *its* conception, but not of the conception of gold, which is as much, as that I am not entitled every where to expect that designation, where I find these criteria, which constitute my conception of gold. On the contrary, as the rational extension rests on construction, so this construction leads me to apply
that

that law of the fall of bodies, to every body, to which the designation of gravity belongs.

95.

Psychology is the complex of the rules of the state of the human mind. This state of mind is a phaenomenon in time, and consists, as event, in a constant vicissitude. We must, by no means, think of a rational extension of conceptions in psychology, as no construction can take place in it. *Rational psychology* is therefore totally impossible, and all knowledge of our soul can never be but empirical.

96.

As of all natural philosophy, however, the doctrine of bodies has, quite alone, a rational part, and therefore this doctrine of bodies is alone understood by the name of rational physics, so this is merely called rational, because its cognitions are derived from principles. There must therefore be *first* principles, which are not again cognitions from conceptions. These first principles are the original use of understanding itself.

self. We call them, however, *metaphysical* principles and remark, that a principle is metaphysical, when it expresses the original use of understanding with reference to given cognitions of nature. But it is *transcendental*, so far as it barely expresses this original use of understanding itself.

The position: every alteration has a cause, is a transcendental principle, as it expresses nothing farther than the original use of understanding of the category, existence. On the other hand, the position: the alteration of matter has an external cause, is a metaphysical principle, as this use of understanding is therein expressed with reference to the natural conception of matter.

97.

Transcendental philosophy having dissected the original use of understanding in the categories, we thereby have a clew for the exhibition of the metaphysical principles of natural philosophy. This metaphysic of nature will now carry back the conception of matter to the original use of understanding, *first*, of the category, greatness, *secondly*,
of

of the category, reality, *thirdly*, of the category, existence, and *fourthly*, of the categories of modality. On this rests the division of this science into *Phoronomy*, *Dynamic*, *Mechanics* and *Phaenomenology*.

Metaphysical Principles of Phoronomy.

98.

Matter is the *moveable* in space. Space which is itself moveable, is called *material* or also *relative* space; that, in which all motion must, at last, be thought, (which is therefore itself, absolutely immoveable) is named *pure* or *absolute* space.

The original use of understanding in the metathesis of the place of matter, is here *postulated*. This is the category, greatness, original synthesis of the homogeneous from the part to the whole, space. This transposition of the place of matter, happens but with reference to a space. This space is again transposable with reference to another space, and this with reference to a third &c. In this manner we conceive an absolute immoveable, intransposable space, to which

we

we refer, at last, in thought, all motion. Is this absolute fixed space something, or is it nothing? Pure space is only the original synthesis of the homogeneal. The *existent* space is only the empirical and moveable space, and the conception of an absolute immoveable space is but an idea, that has itself no object; whereby, however, the use of experience of understanding obtains unity in the reference of one moveable space to another higher moveable space.

99.

Motion of a thing is the variation of its *external relations* to a given space.

The original use of understanding, which is the basis of the conception of motion, is the transposition of place, which always happens with reference to a *relative* space. The conception of motion in absolute quiet space has no object. The external relations are the relative space. *Direction* and *velocity* however are the two moments, which constitute the conception of motion. *Direction* is the angle, which the line of motion makes with a fixed line in relative space. *Velocity* is the line, which is described in an unity of time. This variation of external relations however is no event. But variation of *direction*, or of *velocity*, are events, which pre-

sup-

suppose causes. As phoronomy has this metathesis of place alone for its object, the quantity of the moveable is here not taken into consideration; the second and third chapters bring the conception of this to the original use of intellect. The abstracting from the corporeal greatness of the moveable, or the considering of it as a simple point, are, however, identical.

100.

Rest is the *permanent* presence, at the same place.

Rest is not want of motion. Tho' this definition be customary, yet this criterion (want of motion) is not sufficient for the object, that is wished to be characterised. For the want of motion of a moveable expresses nothing but its presence at one place. When however a body goes over a straight line, it is once present at each point of it. Does it now rest at this point, or does it move? Every body says the last; and indeed not because this presence continues no *finite* time. For when a body is thrown up perpendicular, and arrives at that place, from which it is forced by its gravity to fall down again, it does not remain an instant at this place. One must, however say, that it rests there. Why so? The smaller the velocity of a motion is, so much

much the smaller is the motion itself. Is this motion at any one place = 0, so is the moveable in the *permanent state*, it is there *permanently present*, though it may possibly not continue there for any finite time; it *rests there*. Therefore the conception of rest is a conception of greatness, and can even be thought as an infinite small motion. This conception of rest is consequently *constructible*.

Every motion, as object of a possible experience, can be voluntarily considered as motion of a body in a quiescent space, or as rest of a body, and on the contrary, motion of the space in an opposite direction, with equal velocity.

Phoronomy abstracts from motive powers, whose consideration belongs entirely to mechanics, consequently from that original use of understanding, which determines the judgment with regard to the motion of a moveable, namely which of the two is moved, whether the body with reference to a space, or this space itself, while the body is quiescent. Therefore, as the mere motion is here taken into consideration, it is always the same object, whether we represent to our-

self the motion, as rest of the external space and motion of the body, in a certain direction and with a certain velocity, or as quiescence of the body and, on the contrary, motion of the relative space, with the same velocity, but in an opposite direction.

They are two conceptions, however, which rest on the same original use of understanding, therefore represent the same object, the opposition of these conceptions is only *alternative* i. e. one can choose either; but not *disjunctive*, which would concern the object.

102.

A motion is composed of two motions, when these two different motions can be represented, in the same moveable, as existing at the same time.

This conception seems to annul itself, in appearing to say, that one motion (in a certain direction and with a certain velocity) is another, at the same time. The foregoing paragraph, however, contains the possibility of construction, i. e. the carrying back of this conception to the original use of understanding, and herewith the reality of this conception.

105.

Two motions are composed at the very same point, when the one is posited as motion of the point in absolute space, and the other as motion of the relative space in an opposite direction and with the same velocity.

First case. Where two motions in the very same direction belong at once to the same point.

$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{A} & \text{B} & \text{C} \\ \text{a} & \text{b} & \\ \text{b} & \text{c} & \end{array}$ The point A is represented in motion first with the velocity ab in the direction AC and secondly with the velocity bc in the very same direction AC. Posite then the motion of the point A in absolute space, in the direction AC and with the velocity $ab = AB$, A will, at the expiration of the unity of time, be found at the place B. When now the relative space moves at the same time with the velocity $bc = CB$ and in the direction CB, A, after the expiration of the unity of time, will be found at the place C in relative space, and will have moved, for all experience, with


the velocity $AC = ab + bc$ and in the direction AC.

Second case. Where two motions, in perfectly opposite directions, are conjoined at the very same point.

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} A & & C & & B \\ a & \text{-----} & & & b \\ a & \text{-----} & c & & \end{array}$$
 A is represented in motion, first with the velocity ab and in the direction AB; but secondly with the velocity ac and in the opposite direction CA. Posite then the motion of the point A with the velocity $ab = AB$ in absolute space. But at the same time the relative space is moved with the velocity $ac = AC$ in the same direction AB, the point A in absolute space, after the expiration of the unity of time, will be found at the place B. On account of the motion of the relative space, however, the place A will, after the expiration of the unity of time, be found at C. Therefore A will be found, for all possible experience, to have moved with the velocity $ab - ac = CB$ and in this direction.

Third case. Where two motions of the very same point are represented conjoined
 accor-

according to directions, which inclose an angle.



The point A must be represented in motion with two motions at once; and first with the velocity AB and in the direction AB, and secondly with the velocity AC and in the direction AC. Suppose A moved in absolute space in the direction AB and with this velocity, thus A, after the expiration of the unity of time, will be found in B. But the relative space is moved, at the same time, in the direction CA, and with this velocity, so will the place D in absolute space, after the expiration of the unity of time, be found in B, and the body will be found for all experience to have, in a unity of time, gone over the diagonal AD of the parallelogram ABCD.

The construction of the conception of a complex motion entirely rests on the principle (101). That all motion is but alteration of external relations, and that absolute rest, as well as absolute motion, is nothing, and that this conception has no object, is a proposition, which is equally certain with every geometrical axiom, as it, as

well as this, immediately rests on the original use of understanding. When therefore this bare motion is considered, and no attention given to any motive power, 'tis the same object, which is represented, either as movement of the external space and rest of the body, or as quiescence of this space and motion of the body in an opposite direction and with equal velocity.

104.

Phoronomy has carried back the conception of matter to the original use of understanding, greatness. This is the metathesis of place of the moveable, the synthesis of the homogeneous, which is thought as originally completed, the category *unity*. The category *multitude*, however, is the original synthesis of the unities. This now corresponds to the conception of the complex movement at one and the same point. The category *totality* finally is the completed synthesis of the unities, and this is attained in the representation of the composition of two motions, whose directions inclose an angle.

Meta-

*Metaphysical Principles of
Dynamic.*

105.

Matter is *moveable* so far as it *fills* a space. The resisting of all that is moveable, which exerts itself by its motion to penetrate into a certain space, is called *filling* a space. A space which is not filled is a *vacuum*.

'Tis the original use of understanding, reality, to which dynamic carries back the conception of matter. This reality is the same with that of *filling* a space, and 'tis only necessary to turn all one's attention to the original use of understanding and to transpose one's self to it. This consists in the original synthesis of sensations, from the whole to the parts, and in the original fixing of this synthesis (the transcendental determination of time, schematism of the category). This category must be considered by itself, as was done in transcendental philosophy. The original use of understanding however, immediately coalesces with the category, existence, as we have already mentioned. As my finger endeavours to penetrate into a space and *feels* resistance, so the use of understanding, reality, consists in the synthesis of this sensation and the original determination of time of it. Different from this, tho'

conjoined with it, is the use of understanding, existence, the original positing of a permanent, or constant, by which time itself is represented, and by which my own successive apprehension, (as I was not before in the state of sensation, and now find myself therein) is fixed as successive, i. e. the category, causality, on which rests the conception of a real in space.

106.

Matter fills a space not by its mere *existence*, but by a peculiar *motive power*.

The original use of understanding expresses this conception of plenitude of space (105.). The category existence posits a permanent, or constant, whereby time itself is first representable, as cause of the resistance. The event however which is occasioned, is a motion. Therefore the power, by which matter fills a space, is a *motive power*. The conception, on the contrary, that matter fills a space by its mere existence, expresses an *occult quality*. This assertion is taken from the dogmatical station, from that of bare conceptions, from which the categories are considered as predicates, and the original use of understanding is not taken notice of in them. It can, therefore, be cognised only from conceptions and also according to the position of contradiction, that there,

there, where matter is, there can be no other matter at the same time. But only first when I have been attentive to the original use of understanding causality, do I understand myself in my conceptions and perspect, that, when the motive power, which fills a certain space, is equal to that, which is endeavouring to penetrate into the same space, this space cannot be filled by it. As a greater power however can be posited above every finite one, this greater power would, by all means, fill the same space, which is already filled (quite uniformly) by the smaller. In short, the understanding attaches the whole conception of matter to this motive power. It, and nothing else, is matter.

107.

The power of attraction is that motive power, by which matter can be the cause of the approximation of other matter to itself, (or, which is the same, whereby it resists the removal of other matter from itself).

The power of repulsion is that, by which matter can be the cause of removing other matter from itself, (or, which is the same, by which it resists the approximation of other matter to itself.

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We must here and in future well remember the contents of the preceding paragraphs, and, in order to understand these expositions with clearness, must divest ourselves of the prejudice, that matter fills a space by it's mere existence, and that, where matter is, there no other can be at the same time. Therefore it will be intelligible to us, that the repulsive power of matter, of which we are treating, is that motive power, which properly composes the material of a space. The communication of motion by a percussion (which mechanics has for its object) is not thought of here in the conception of repulsive power, but only the diffusion of the material. The power of attraction must also not be confounded with that draught, which a body in motion occasions and carries another along with it. It is the power of attraction (which will soon be shewn to be an essential power of matter) by which matter endeavours to take other matter into itself (intusufception).

108.

Matter fills it's spaces by repulsive powers of all it's parts, i. e. by an expansive power peculiar to itself, which has a precise degree, above or below which greater or smaller ad infinitum can be thought.

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For wherever this expansive power is, there too is matter. Therefore there are no parts of a material space, in which the expansive power is not to be found, because this would signify, that there is matter, which is not matter. This expansive power, however must have its precise degree. For were it infinitely great, it would diffuse itself in a finite time thro' universal space which is incompatible with the original use of understanding. But were it infinitely small, no diffusion whatever of this power would, in a finite time, take place, which is equally counterintelligible. We call this expansive power the *original elasticity* of matter, because it is matter itself, and its conception constitutes the conception of matter, and thereby distinguish it from the *derived elasticity*, which reveals itself as empirical property of various matter (e.g. of air).

109.

Matter, in its motion, *penetrates* other matter, when it totally annuls the space of its expansion by compression.

We

We must here not think of empty interstices, which are contracted by *external* compression of matter, when it is believed, that this compression can be continued even till no empty interstices more are therein to be found.

The mechanical compression is such by the communication of motion. On the contrary, the dynamical compression of matter, which is our subject at present, consists in the penetration of matter into the space, which is already filled with matter, and matter is compressed, when the space of its expansion is contracted. It would be penetrated, when, by such dynamical compression, this space could be entirely annulled, i. e. be brought even to a mathematical point.

Matter can be *compressed* to infinity, but never *penetrated*. For as the original expansive power is the material of a space and the permanent, which makes all representation of time possible, so the degree of this power must be in the inverse ratio of its diffusion. Now a greater power can be thought, than every finite power. Therefore every determinate matter, which is nothing but a precise quantum of original expansive power
that

that fills a certain determinate space, can be brought by a greater compressive power to a smaller space. Were now this space brought even to a mathematical point, the degree of expansive power would become infinitely great, and this power would not be present at any place, which is repugnant to the original use of understanding.

111.

The *impenetrability* of matter, which rests on the resistance that proportionally increases with the degrees of compression, is called the *relative*; but that, which rests on the *previous position*, that matter, as such, is by no means capable of compression, is called the *absolute* impenetrability. The *plenitude of space* with absolute impenetrability is called the *mathematical*, that with relative only, the *dynamical* plenitude of space.

There is no other compression, according to the conception of absolute impenetrability, than that, which consists in the contraction of the empty interstices of matter. This impenetrability is nothing more nor less than an *occult quality*.

lity. For the answer to the question: why the space, that is uniformly filled with matter, cannot still be filled with other matter, at the same time? is, because matter is impenetrable. The conception of relative impenetrability (110.), on the other hand, rests on the original use of understanding of the dynamical plenitude of space, i. e. of the category, reality, and is therefore not subject to this reproach.

112.

Material substance is that in space, which is moveable by itself, i. e. separated from every thing else, which exists without it in space. The motion of a part of matter, by which it ceases to be a part, is called *separation*. The separation of the parts of matter is the *physical division*.

Material substance, matter, original power of expansion, are identical. It is the permanent. Its quantum is *permanent*, tho' the space of its expansion should be extended or contracted, and its place in space varied. The original positing of this permanent is an original use of understanding and makes all representation of time possible.

113.

Matter is *infinitely divisible*, and into parts of which every one is again matter.

For the space, which is filled by matter, is mathematically divisible ad infinitum, i. e. it consists, how small soever it may be, always of other spaces. Now the material substance is the same with the original expansive power, which fills this space. As the mathematical separation of spaces separates these space-filling powers from one another, so it is a division of material substance into material substances, and goes therefore, like that of space, to infinite.

The position, matter is composed of simple parts, can perfectly consist with the previous position of the absolute impenetrability of matter, but not with the conception of relative impenetrability and the dynamic plenitude of space. For according to the first, whose conception represents matter by the predicate of existence, and is however not taken from the original use of understanding of this category, one may admit, that, though the space, which matter occupies, be geometrically divisible to infinity, yet its parts cannot be separated one from another, this mat-

ter

ter is therefore an absolute simple substance, i. e. a monade. This assertion would be really dogmatical, as proceeding from the station of mere conceptions, and could only have the appearance of validity, so long as the intelligibility of the conception of matter, which consists in nothing but the original use of understanding of the categories, was not brought to light. With this the monadist is deprived of every subterfuge. The adding of the designation, existence, rests on the original use of understanding of the category relation, which here consists in the original positing of a motive power, that fills space; wherever this is, there is also material substance subsisting of itself, a permanent, or constant, by which all representation of time is possible.

The monadist, who is, as already said, a dogmatist, proves from mere conceptions, that matter consists of simple parts. 'Tis a composite. When now all composition is annulled in thought, the simple remains. This station of mere conceptions, which has been so often mentioned, is that of the cognition of things in themselves. Were our cognition, therefore, a cognition of the things in themselves, that position would be apodictically certain. Carrying back the conception of matter to the original use of understanding, and thereby furnishing intelligibility for our conception, is, however, identical with the

cog-

cognition of matter as phaenomenon. From this station, therefore, from which we understand ourselves, and our conceptions have but first signification, does our position maintain the infinite divisibility of matter.

114.

The possibility of matter requires a power of attraction, as its second essential fundamental power.

For a certain determinate quantum of matter, which is nothing but a certain quantum of original expansive power, contains nothing in itself, which limits its plenitude to a certain space. By mere repulsive powers matter would therefore be diffused thro' universal space. As now the degree of expansive power is in the inverse ratio of the space, in which it is diffused, so the degree of an expansive power, which is spread in universal space, would be infinitely small, i. e. equal to nought. A finite quantum of matter would therefore be found nowhere, i. e. every space which could be given would be perfectly empty, which is repugnant to the original use of understanding. Therefore the *real*

possibility of matter (the intelligibility of its conception) still requires an original compressive, i. e. attractive power, by which the diffusion of every determinate quantum of matter may be limited to a precise space, and matter therefore in general exist.

We likewise call the original power of attraction an original compressive power. But this is not the mathematical compression, by which a body forces another out of its place by pressure, i. e. by means of its power of expansion. This requires for its own possibility an original power of attraction, which is the ground of a dynamical compression (109.) It is the power, by which a filled space exerts itself to take another into itself.

The cognition, however, that an original power of attraction belongs to matter, is a cognition from conceptions; and the certainty, which it yields, therefore apodictical. The position, that an original power of expansion belongs to matter, was not of this nature. The mode of cognising this, was the same with that of every geometrical axiom, in holding up the original use of understanding and immediately exhibiting by it the reality of the conception. 'Tis obvious that the original power of expansion is the material

terial itself, the material substance, therefore that, which constitutes the conception of matter. But the original power of attraction has by no means the same property with the original power of expansion, that by it matter is given. It is not the *real*; it only *limits* the real. The existence of this power is cognised as *consequence* from the conception of a space, which is filled by the expansive power, *because* matter, existing by means of expansive power alone, would spread itself thro' universal space, in so much that no precise space whatever would be filled,

115.

Matter is not possible by mere power of attraction, without repulsion. For if matter existed by mere power of attraction the space of its diffusion would be diminished ad infinitum, i. e. it would go to a mathematical point, consequently there would exist no matter. Therefore repulsive powers, which limit this original compression, are necessary for the possibility of matter.

This position in fact expresses nothing but what has been already illustrated, that matter fills its spaces by means of repulsive powers of all its

parts, (108.). The positing of this power of expansion, as the permanent in space, constitutes the intelligibility of the conception of matter. Thus when the original power of expansion, which fills a space, is posited, the existence of an original power of attraction is cognoscible from mere conceptions, and, vice versa, the existence of an original power of expansion is cognoscible from bare conceptions, when original power of attraction is previously posited. Our paragraph expresses this last. When we are however attentive to the relation of our understanding to the generation of the conception of matter, and also to the real possibility of this conception, 'tis the original power of expansion, in the positing whereof is revealed the original use of understanding, with which natural philosophy must therefore commence.

116.

Contact, in the physical sense, is the immediate action and reaction of *impenetrability*. The action of one matter upon another, without the reach of contact, is the *action at a distance* (*actio in distans*). This action at a distance, which is possible even without the assistance of intermedial matter, is called the immediate action at a distance,

OR

or also the *action* of one matter upon another *thro' the empty space*.

Two spaces are in geometrical contact with one another, which, in fact, come together, but in such a manner, that the one falls either entirely within, or entirely without the other; but filled spaces are in physical contact with one another by immediate action and reaction of their powers of expansion, in their common boundaries. As now there is matter, where original power of expansion is, so cause and effect of both substances, which are in contact with one another, is nowhere but in the common boundary. The original power of attraction of matter is of another nature; its action is independent of all contact, and therefore an *action at a distance*.

117.

The essential attraction of all matter is its immediate action upon other matter thro' the vacuum. For the original power of attraction is the cause of the diffusion of a precise quantum of original power of expansion, which extends to fixed boundaries, it therefore itself contains the ground of the possibility of physical contact. It also acts inde-

pendent of all matter that is found between the movent matter (which belongs to it) and the moved matter (on which it acts) and the action of one matter upon another, by means of this power, is therefore an action through the vacuum.

That our understanding, relative to the cognition of the original power of attraction of matter, is quite different from that of the original power of expansion, we have already weighed. The first cognition is from conceptions, the second immediately rests on the original use of understanding. The first is not, however, an insignificant conception, but a true cognition, as its first principle is the original use of understanding of the categories, reality and existence. 'Tis necessary to be very attentive to this. Matter is given us in the power of expansion, and therein alone consists all material. The original use of understanding here consists in the original positing of a cause, of a motive power, which resists that, which is exerting itself to penetrate into the same space. Therefore, as this motive power, as mere power of expansion, would diffuse itself thro' universal space, and thereby leave every *precise* space empty, there still belongs to matter an original power of attraction, which

which bounds it diffusion to a determinate space. It is therefore a conclusion, i. e., a cognition from conceptions, wherein we attribute this original power of attraction to matter. This power then acts independent of all plenitude, consequently immediately upon every other matter, whether there be other intermedial matter or not.

The original powers of expansion and attraction are fundamental powers of matter. 'Twould, however, be counterintelligible to pretend to make them comprehensible. The highest pitch of all philosophy, i. e. of all that is comprehensible, is the intelligible, and this lies nowhere but in the original use of understanding.

Those powers are called, for this reason, fundamental powers, in order to shew that they are not derived from any thing, i. e. that they can, by no means, be comprehended, and not indeed because this is impossible for us as men, but as it is in itself impossible, and a position, which requires this, has no meaning whatever. But as the cognition of the original power of attraction is actually a comprehending, and this cognition is not an immediate cognition of understanding, like that of the original power of expansion, since therefore the conception of matter is already constituted by the criterion of power of expansion, so the judgment: an ori-

ginal power of attraction belongs to matter, appears to us synthetical, and it is difficult for us to allow, without this view of the original use of understanding, that matter, by means of this power, acts where it is not. It seems contradictory to say, that matter acts where it is not. But this contradiction lies in the permutation of the original power of attraction with the power of expansion. Concerning this, it is unquestionably valid, that matter acts *only there*, by means of it, *where* it is, since it itself makes up matter and constitutes the conception of it.

That which is called adhesion, is evidently different from this original attraction; this belongs to the essence of matter, as matter in general; that is a property of various matters, which is empirically cognoscible. That takes place only in contact; this acts independent of contact and makes it first possible.

118.

A movent power, by which material substances can act upon one another only in the common surface of contact, is called a *superficial power*; but that, by which a material substance can act immediately upon the parts of another, even beyond the surface of contact, is named a *penetrating power*.

The

The original power of expansion, which constitutes the material itself, is only a superficial power. When I posit, that one matter acts, by it, upon another, this but happens in the common surface of contact, so that this action at one place (in the surface of contact) is identical with the existence of matter (of an infinite small quantum of power of expansion). The original power of attraction is, on the contrary, a penetrating power. By it matter acts, where it is not, and occupies a space, without filling it. As now it belongs to the essence of matter, we must therefore exclude all empirical designations of matter, in its consideration, and give attention to the mere possibility of matter, so the quantum of attraction of a matter is proportioned to the quantum of the material, i. e. of its original plenitude.

The original power of attraction, on which rests even the possibility of matter, as such, extends itself in cosmical space, immediately ad infinitum, from every part of it to another, and acts according to the inverse ratio of the quadrates of the distances of the matters. For this reason, as this power

er is an essential, fundamental and, as already said, penetrating power of matter, so that, independent of all plenitude of the space, which is found betwixt the matter, in which it inheres, and the moved matter, it acts immediately on the latter; thus no principle of annihilation of its effects can lie in the extent of this distance. The original power of attraction therefore, which is peculiar to the material of a space, spreads its effects in all directions ad infinitum. But as the degree of attraction is as much smaller, as the surface is greater, on which a certain quantum of attraction spreads itself, and as these surfaces of different distance, which take up the same quantum of attraction, that proceeds from the same point, are in the same relation as the quadrates of these distances (according to geometrical demonstration), it is evident, that the effect of the original power of attraction of matter is in the inverse ratio to every other matter, as the quadrate of their distance from one another.

As now every part of a space filled with matter exercises original attraction on every other
part

part of this space, and is again attracted by it in its turn, so 'tis this conflict of the fundamental powers of matter, which makes the diffusion of a power of expansion to determinate bounds possible, consequently the plenitude of a space to a precise degree.

The problem is now cogitable, to construct the possibility of matter, i. e. to produce the original use of understanding for the conception of a power of expansion of a precise degree, a material which fills a certain space. The solution of this problem belongs no more to the metaphysical principles of natural philosophy, but becomes an object of pure mathematics. As however matter acts immediately by its attraction on all other matter in the whole cosmical space, so the plenitude of a space to a precise degree, i. e. a precise matter, is only possible by the interlacing of all other material substances in cosmical space.

The effect of the original powers of attraction, which is essential to all that is material, is the *universal gravitation*. In a system of material substances, which exercise original attraction upon one another, *gravity* is the exertion of moving itself in the direction of the greatest gravitation. The attractions must not be represented as rays, which proceed from one point and thence to the surface, as this mode of representation

presentation leads to the diverging of the rays, and afterward occasions points in the surface, which are not attracted; but the surfaces, which are attracted must be made to the terminus a quo, and from this, which is attracted in all its points by one material point, to draw straight lines to this point, and represent these as radii of power.

It is also said of the original attraction of matter, that it acts at all distances, in the inverse ratio of the quadrates of the distances. We may say of the original elasticity, that it acts in the inverse ratio of the cubes of the infinite small distances. For this power is a mere surface-power, which only acts in contact, it can however be represented as active at infinite small distances, notwithstanding the conception of it be identical with that of the material in general. As the degree of this elasticity is in the inverse ratio like the corporeal space, wherein this power diffuses itself, so this effect is in the inverse ratio of the cube of infinite small distances, conformable to the mathematical mode of representation of relation of bounds, in which the contact is still thought as an infinite small distance.

120.

Our dynamic has then carried back the conception of matter to the original use of
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understanding in the categories of quality; according to which the original power of expansion was the *real*, which filled the space. The original power of attraction was a *negation*, by which, so far as it can, all matter would be penetrated, consequently the *solid* totally annulled. Matter, that is, the dissemination of original power of expansion in precise bounds, is but possible by the union of both powers, therefore only through *limitation* of the effect of the first power by the second.

121.

But with regard to the explanation of the specific difference of matter, it is not an object of the metaphysic of nature, which, in the exhibition of the fundamental powers of matter, dissects the original use of understanding, on which its conception rests. Our sole business now is to shew the moments, by which this difference may in general be distinguished.

122.

A *body*, in the physical signification, is matter between precise bounds (which has there-

therefore a figure). The space betwixt these bounds, considered according to its extent, is the *contents of the space*. The degree of plenitude of a space of precise contents, is called *density*.

There is an absolute density in the system of absolute impenetrability, which matter has, when it has no empty interstices. We have posited in the place of this empty conception, that of plenitude of space through original power of expansion. A matter is, according to this, denser than another, when the degree of its plenitude is greater than that of the other, and an absolute density in this signification is consequently a nonentity.

123.

Attraction, so far as it is thought as acting only in contact, is called *cohesion*. Matter, whose parts, notwithstanding their ever so firm cohesion among themselves, can nevertheless be brought to move upon one another, by the smallest motive power, is *liquid*. Parts of matter are however moved upon one another, when they are only forced, without diminishing the quantum of contact, to change

change this among themselves. Parts of matter are *separated*, when the contact with others is not only changed, but annulled, or its quantum diminished. A *firm (rigid)** body, is that, whose parts cannot be moved upon one another by every power, (which consequently resist this displacing, with a certain degree of power). *Friction* is that, which impedes this displacing of matter. The rigid body is *brittle*, when its parts cannot be moved upon one another, without breaking.

Let a fluid be bisected by a plane; when these planes, formed by the fluid, attract one another with the same force, by which they are drawn in an opposite direction, by their adjoining parts, there is no adhesion to overcome, though that attraction should be considerable in the contact, and this body is therefore a fluid. There is no cohesion to overcome in it, though the parts may, by all means, cohere with a greater power than in firm bodies. When, on the contrary, a rigid body is separated in thought

* The *rigid* must be properly opposed to the *fluid*, as Euler has determined it. To the *solid* is to be opposed the *hollow*.

by a section, its parts, in this plane of contact, draw themselves together with a greater force, than they would be drawn in an opposite direction, and there is, therefore, a cohesion to overcome. The particles do not admit of being moved upon one another. From the cohesion of the particles in a fluid body, and the possibility, on that account, of moving them upon one another, follows even the property of the fluid, that its particles endeavour to produce the greatest quantum of contact among one another, and the smallest with the circumambient space, that, therefore, a drop of water always endeavours to assume the globular form. The hydrodynamic rests on the property of the fluid, that no friction of the particles is therein possible, but that on the contrary a spreading of the pressure, on any part whatever, takes place in it, in all directions.

124.

Elasticity is the faculty of matter of recovering its size or figure, which has been changed by another motive power, upon its remission. It is either *expansive* or *attractive*; the first in order to assume the former greater volume after the compression, the latter the former smaller after the expansion.

125.

125.

The action of bodies in motion upon one another, by communication of their motion, is called *mechanical*; but that of matters, so far as they, even in rest, mutually alter the conjunction of their parts, by their own powers, is named *chemical*. This chemical influence is called *solution*, so far as it has the separation of the parts of a matter as effect; but that, whose effect is the separation of two matters, which maintain one another in a state of solution, is called *decomposition*.

Mechanics handle the action of one matter upon another, by communication of its motion. We have here considered that movent power of matter, which constitutes the material itself. So long as one matter only separates the parts of another, the solution is not yet *absolute*. The solution is absolute, when no part of the solution can be produced, which does not contain in itself parts of the dissolved matter and of the menstruum, in the relation, in which the whole of these specifically different matters were to one another. Therefore two (or more) specifically different matters would, according to an absolute solution, fill one and the same space

PART I.

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uniformly, (consequently not so, that the parts of the one would be beside those of the other). The question is, whether such an absolute solution be cogitable? or rather, if this conception be intelligible? The dissection of the use of understanding, on which rests the conception of matter, as a real in space, expresses the real possibility, i. e. the intelligibility of this conception of absolute solution. The question therefore is only, if this phaenomenon be to be found in nature? It must however be allowed, that when the solution is gone to certain *moleculas* of the dissolved matters, it would still go on farther, if the solvent power of the menstruum continued. Though space be divisible ad infinitum, the completion of this absolute solution, in a determinate time, can still be thought, as every precise time contains an infinite number of infinite small particles of time. Kant represents, in this manner, the possibility of an absolute solution. I'm however inclined to think, that a condition is admitted, in this mode of representation, which is directly opposite to absolute solution, namely, the mere separation of the particles of the dissolved matter by the solvent, which is, however, no *intusfufception* of matter the proper meaning of the conception of absolute solution.

Nothing

Nothing can be objected, according to the dynamical conception of matter, to the real possibility of the free passing of one matter through another, (e. g. of the magnetical), without admitting free passages of the latter thereto.

Finally, concerning the problem, to explain the difference of matters, our *dynamical natural philosophy* can give no other principle of illustration, than the difference of combination of the original powers of expansion and attraction. We call this, however, but a principle of illustration, as we are not yet able to shew these specifically different combinations themselves, and to exhibit them as the principles of those different matters. Another mode of illustration is that of the *mechanical natural philosophy*.

The relation of the absolutely empty interstices to the full, the various figures of the absolutely hard *first corpuscles* (atoms), is here the principle, from which the specific difference of matter is derived. The *atomistic* can, however, shew nothing more, than this ground of illustration. After the dissection of the original use of understanding, on which the conception of a real in space rests, the unintelligibility of the conception of matter, as a something, that fills its space by mere existence, is evident, which is the principle of this corpuscular philosophy.

*Metaphysical Principles of
Mechanics.*

106.

Matter is the moveable, so far as it, as such, has motive power.

Phoronomy had the mere transposition of place in space for its object. Herein consisted the original use of understanding of the category, greatness. Dynamic led us to *original* motive powers of matter; namely to expansive power, which fills space and constitutes the material, and to original attractive power, which sets bounds to the plenitude of the material. These were originally motive powers, which belong to the *essence* of matter. Matter now, as it is, by its motion, cause of the motion of matter, is the object of mechanics. We may say of the original power of expansion, that motion is *distributed* by it, as it is the material itself. But when the material is moved, and by its motion, puts other matter in movement, it thus *communicates* its motion to it, and matter as a power communicating motion is the object of mechanics. It is the original use of understanding in the categories of relation, to which we shall carry back the conception of matter in these mechanics, and this use of understanding will constitute the metaphysical principles of mechanics.

127.

127.

The quantity of matter is the sum of the moveable in a determinate space. This, so far as all its parts can be considered as acting (moving) at the same time in their motion, is called the *mass*, and it is said, that matter acts in mass, when all its parts, which are moved in the same direction, exercise without themselves, *at the same time*, their motive power. A mass of a determinate figure, is called a *body* (in the mechanical signification). *The quantity of motion* (mechanically esteemed) is that, which is esteemed by the quantity of the moved matter and its velocity at the same time; It consists *phoronomically* only in the degree of velocity.

Dynamic led to the material, to that which constitutes matter. Matter, according to this, filled a space by originally expansive power. The greater a space is, which is filled to a precise degree, so much the greater is the quantity of matter (so much the more matter exists). But the quantity of matter of a precise space is also so much the greater, according to the greatness of the degree of plenitude of this space. The relation of the quantity of matter is therefore

composed of the relation of the space, which it fills, and the relation of the degree of this plenitude. So far now as all parts of a matter are moved in one direction and with the same celerity, is the quantity of matter called the mass. So much greater as the quantity of matter is, which is moved with a certain velocity, so much greater is the quantity of its motion. But the quantity of its motion, by the same quantity of matter, is also so much the greater, according as its velocity is greater. The same effect will therefore be produced, when the quantity of matter, which is moved with a certain velocity, is doubled, or when the velocity is doubled and the quantity of matter is left unaltered. The relation of the quantity of movement is therefore composed of the relation of the quantity of matter and of that of its celerity.

128.

The quantity of matter can only be estimated, in comparison with every other, thro' the quantity of motion by given velocity.

The relation of quantity of matters is composed of the relation of the space, which the matter fills, and of that of the degree of this plenitude. If now this degree were the
same

same in all matters, the quantity of a matter would be estimated, relatively to every other, by the relation of their spaces. When however two matters are specifically different, their quantities cannot be any more estimated with one another, by the mere relation of their spaces. Now the relation of the quantity of motion of a matter is composed of that of the quantity of matter and of the relation of the quantity of velocity. If therefore the velocity, in two matters in motion, be posited equal, the quantities of these matters are in the same ratio to one another, as the quantities of their motions. Therefore the quantity of motion, by any certain velocity whatever, is, quite alone, an universally valid measure for the quantity of all material substances.

The quantity of motion of a matter is proportional to the quantity of effect, which the matter produces by its motion. The causality of the cause is doubled, tripled &c. when one assumes the velocity of the body, by unchanged quantity of its matter, doubled, tripled &c.

Is this velocity, however, left unchanged, and, on the contrary, the quantity of matter

doubled? the causality of the cause will just so be twice greater, consequently too the effect by the motion.

129

First law of mechanics. By all alterations of corporeal nature the quantity of matter on the whole remains the same, unincreased and undiminished.

The original power of expansion constitutes the material itself, which fills a space. It is the permanent, which the understanding originally posits, whereon time itself is but first representable. Now the relation of the quantity of matter is a composite, of that of the degree of its plenitude, and of the space, which it occupies, and the quantity of matter is therefore determinable, relatively to the unity, by which it is determined, by the product of the space, which it fills, in the degree of plenitude (when namely the space, which the matter as determinate unity occupies, is $= 1$ and also its density $= 1$, its quantity, when the density of a certain matter is $= 2$, and the space which it occupies $= 3$, is $= 6$). As now the degree of plenitude

tude is in the inverse relation to the space, which the matter occupies, so this product remains ever the same, whether that space be extended or diminished; i. e. the quantity of matter remains unincreased and undiminished, by every variation which happens to it, always the same.

The quantity of matter is the quantity of substances in space. This last consists consequently not in a numerable multitude of monades, and is not otherwise determinable, than by the complex ratio of space, which the matter occupies, and the degree of its plenitude.

130.

Second law of mechanics. All variation of matter has an external cause. (Every body continues in its state of quiescence or motion, in the same direction and with the same velocity, when it is not obliged, by an external cause, to quit this state).

Every material substance always consists again of substances, and there is therefore no absolutely internal designations of matter, which belong to an absolute unity. All designations of matter are relations in space,
and

and matter varies when it makes the transition from one motion to another, from motion to rest, or from rest to motion. These designations, however, never belong to an absolute unity, but always to several substances, and the conception of an absolutely internal principle in matter is without reality. There are therefore no internal principles of determination of variation in matter; but every alteration of it previously posits an external cause.

This property of matter, by which it remains in its state of quiescence or motion, so long as no external cause alters it, is its *inertness*. This is synonymous with the *inanimateness* of matter. All matter is, therefore, as such, inanimate. The *life* of a material substance is an internal principle of its variations, which is indeed conjoined with it, but nevertheless different from it. This now is nothing but the appetite, i. e. representations of alterations of matter, to which the causality belongs to produce them. 'Tis quite suitable to the logical use of understanding, to attribute a something to these representations, called substance; to assert of this, however, that it is permanent, is contrary to the original use of understanding, and there-


therefore a conception without meaning. The internal principle of animated matter is an event, and has, as such, a degree of reality. It can elanguesce even to null, without a substance being thereby annihilated.

131.

Third mechanical law. Action and reaction, in all communication of motion, are always equal one to another.

When it is judged of a matter, that it moves and communicates its motion to another matter, this motion is referred to a given space. The first matter is only, relatively to this space, by its motion, cause, and the motion of the second matter, effect. Were, on the contrary, this relative space referred to another space, and, in this reference, thought as moved in the opposite direction to that matter which communicates the motion, and with the same velocity, the second matter, whose motion, with reference to that given space, was effect, would, by the motion, which belongs to it and to the relative space, be represented quite reversed as cause, and as communicating its motion to the first

first matter. It depends, therefore, entirely upon the relative space, that we think one matter exclusively as cause, and the motion of the other as effect. When we then consider both matters (of which the one is thought, with reference to a relative space, as communicating, but the other as receiving motion) only *relatively to one another*, neither of them can in this reference, be thought exclusively as cause. In this reference of both matters to one another only, both matters are therefore equally great causes of the alteration that is produced, i. e. the quantity of motion must be equal in both matters, consequently in all communication of motion, action and reaction.



When therefore the body B is represented at rest in relative space, A, on the contrary, as moved with the velocity AB and as communicating motion to B; the line AB, when both bodies are only considered relatively to one another, must be divided in the inverse ratio of the masses A and B, so that, when

C

C is this point of division, $AC. A = BC. B$. A, in this reference of the matters to one another alone, is moved with the velocity $AC : B$, on the contrary, together with the relative space, with the velocity and in the opposite direction BC , and both bodies, (in this reference to one another), after the unity of time is elapsed, will be found to be at C in rest, while the relative space will be moved on with the velocity and in the direction BC . When now BC is made $= BD$, both bodies united will, after the percussio, be moved forward with the velocity and in the direction BD in relative space.

It belongs to physics, to represent the result of the communication of motion, when both bodies, or one of them, are elastic.

132.

The three laws of universal mechanics therefore are the law of *self-subsistency*, of *inertness* and the *action and reaction of matter* (*lex substantiae, inertiae et antagonismi*), which laws express nothing but the ori-

original use of understanding in the categories of relation, whereon rests the conception of matter.

*Metaphysical Principles of
Phaenomenology.*

153.

Matter is the moveable, so far as it, as such, can be an object of experience.

This phaenomenology carries back the conception of matter to the categories of modality. Matter is nothing in itself but phaenomenon. We say nothing more in this position, than that the conception of matter rests on the original use of understanding in the categories. As to the categories of modality; the category possibility postulates carrying back the conception of matter to the original use of understanding; the category actuality postulates its conception, as determined by the original use of understanding; finally the category necessity postulates a conception of matter, as determined by conceptions, i. e. a cognition of it from conceptions.

154.

The rectilineal motion of matter with regard to an empirical space is, in distinction to the opposite motion of space, only a *possible* predicate. But this, thought in no relation whatever to matter without it, i. e. as *absolute motion*, is *impossible*.

When a body moves in a straight line, with equal velocity, it is the mere inertness of matter by whose means it continues in this state of motion, which comes into consideration until an external cause alters it. This predicate of motion, rests upon the same original use of understanding, whether it be represented as added to the body in relatively quiet space, or to this relative space moved in an opposite direction and with equal velocity, but the body at rest. It is therefore indifferent which of the two conceptions is chosen, as they represent one and the same object. Both conceptions are not objectively, but only subjectively opposed to one another (alternative). But when abstraction is made from all relative space, the predicate
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of motion, which is added to a body, has no meaning whatever, and this conception is totally divested of signification, as no original use of understanding corresponds to it, i. e. absolute motion is impossible.

135.

The curvilinear motion of matter is, in distinction to the opposite motion of space, an *actual* predicate of it; the opposite motion of a relative space, on the contrary, taken instead of the motion of the body, is no actual motion of the latter, but, if considered as such, a mere illusion.

When a body moves in a curve line, it deviates, in all the points of its orb, from the direction of the straight line. This deviation however is event and previously posits an external cause. But the judgment, in which is said that the body moves, expresses that it is excited by a motive power, and is different from that, which represents the relative space moved by the motive power. These judgments then are objectively and
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not subjectively alone opposed to one another, (disjunctive), and one of them is false, when the other is true. The curvilinear motion of a matter therefore is an actual predicate of it, and cannot be permuted with the motion of relative space.

136.

In every motion of a body, by which it is, with regard to another, moving, an opposite equal motion of the latter is necessary.

When a motive power impels a matter, its motion is *actual*, which conception is immediately taken from the original use of understanding, causality. But the matter must now be considered, which is called cause in empirical space, also only with reference to the matter, whose motion is represented as effected in this space. As both matters are considered in this reference only to one another, the view ceases, that was only valid with respect to an empirical space, by which the one matter was alone represented by its motion as cause. Action and

reaction are, in the communication of motion, equal to one another, in this reference of both matters to one another alone, (distributive). As now the opposite, equal motion of matter moved in empirical space, is inferred from mere conceptions, so it belongs of necessity to it.

SECTION IV.

CRITIC OF PURE, SPECULATIVE REASON.

157.

In the exhibition of the original use of understanding we've shewn the principle, to which every conception, that is entitled to be named theoretical cognition, must be able to be carried back. Cognitions of this sort are called *cognitions of nature* or of *experience*. But there are conceptions, which have the appearance of cognitions, whose totally opposite quality, namely their unintelligibility, can but first be presented to our view, after we've exhibited the principle of the intelligible, intelligibility itself. What now are these conceptions, and what is their source?

138.

A rational cognition is a cognition from conceptions. When the last principle of such a derivation is not the intelligibility, such a procedure is a play of conceptions, and no-

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thing but mere speculation. The conceptions, which we are at present to handle, are conceptions which are inferred, and will therefore be considered as cognitions of reason.

139.

The position: when something is cognised as conditioned, there must be an absolutely last condition too, i. e. an absolute unconditioned, is the principle of these pretended cognitions of reason. We may consider this position as analytical, so far as we remain with mere conceptions. We then lay, in the conception of a conditioned, the designation, that it depends upon an absolute unconditioned. This will be quite different, when we found the conception of the conditioned upon the original use of understanding, and thereby examine the signification of the conception of the dependence of the conditioned upon its condition.

140.

As however that principle is only logical, and perfectly right, when understood from

from the station of mere conceptions, so there arises an illusion, so long as we have not hit the point of original intelligibility, as if the conception, which we infer from this principle, had real, objective validity. We call this a *transcendental illusion*. We shall in the mean time make it our business to resolve it. As the station of mere conceptions is that of the cognition of things in themselves, we may also say, that this transcendental illusion rests on the aspect of our cognition, as a cognition of the things in themselves.

The common quality of all these conceptions, which are inferred from that principle, is, that their objects are not to be found within the sphere of experience. We shall therefore call them transcendental conceptions, or also transcendental ideas of reason.

We in general understand by idea, the conception of a certain maximum, to which we only find the approximation in experience. The conception of holiness, as that moral mind, which is above all temptation, is a practical idea. The

conceptions of pure air, of pure earth, of pure water, are ideas. The conceptions, which we treat, at present, are transcendental ideas, as their pretended validity rests on a transcendental use of the categories (16.).

142.

There are as many methods of rising from the conditioned to the unconditioned, as there are syllogisms of reason.

When one, by a transcendental use of the categories, holds himself assured of the position: when something is given as conditioned, the absolute totality of all conditions, consequently the absolute unconditioned must also be given, (the conception of which must have absolute validity), the three sorts of ratiocinations are thus so many methods of inferring the unconditioned, from that, which, according to the categories, must be thought as conditioned.

There are therefore three sorts of transcendental ideas, to which reason, that does not attend to the original use of understanding, attributes objective validity.

143.

143.

The three syllogisms of reason are the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive. The procedure in all ratiocinations, by which one ascends from the conditioned to the condition, is called a prosyllogism. If one seek the condition from that, which is thought as conditioned, the relation of the condition to the conditioned must be cogitated either in a categorical, a hypothetical, or a disjunctive ratiocination. In the categorical prosyllogism, is inferred from a subject, which is thought as subject in a conditional manner, a subject as its condition and extended even to the unconditioned, a subject, which must be thought as subject in all respects. A given cognition is thought in the hypothetical prosyllogism, as condition'd by a previous position, and concluded on this previous position; extended even to the unconditioned, this infers a previous position, which, in all respects, previously posits nothing further. Finally a cognition, thought as condition'd, is deduced from the complete division and representa-

tion of all the members of a conception, by the prosyllogism of the disjunctive ratiocination. The idea of the unconditioned here is the conception of a division, which leaves nothing further to be divided.

Of the judgment, Caius is mortal, I find the condition in the conception, man, from which I descend by a categorical ratiocination, to the given, conditioned cognition. I consider the judgment, those who continue wicked will be punished, as conditioned, by the previous position, so far as God is just; from which judgment, I come, by a hypothetical ratiocination, to the conditioned cognition. When finally I consider the judgment, a certain triangle is rectangular, as conditioned, I can think the conception of the complete division of triangles in rect- and oblique angular, as the condition, and arrive by a disjunctive ratiocination from this condition to the conditioned.

144.

I think; in all my cogitation, I am the thinking subject. *Rational psychology* concludes, from this as conditioned, given cognition of the reference of thinking to the thinking subject, upon a something, which exists

as

as thinking subject, i. e. upon the soul as substance. The objects of nature stand under conditions of nature, which are again also conditioned. *Rational cosmology* infers absolutely independent conditions from these conditioned objects. *Rational theology* concludes from the thorough preciseness of every object upon the sphere of all possibility, i. e. of all reality, which it then unites in a single being. There are consequently, three transcendental conceptions of reason, as conceptions of the absolute unconditioned, to which reason arrives by the way of its three modes of syllogisms.

145.

When we compare these conceptions with the pure conceptions of understanding, we immediately observe, that, as the latter are directed toward the *understanding* of objects, the determination of the first is to *comprehend* them. We may call the synthetic, objective unity, the production of the original use of understanding in the categories, the *unity of understanding*. We shall on
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the contrary name the production of a syllogism of reason, *unity of reason*. This gives system to cognitions. This unity of reason is effectuated, with regard to all our cognitions, by those three transcendental ideas.

Critic of rational Psychology.

146.

I think, is the sole text of rational psychology, and from which it is alone taken. It is the given from which is inferred the unconditioned. We shall represent these concluded contents of rational psychology, according to the table of the categories:

- 1) The soul is *substance*,
- 2) according to its quality *simple*,
- 3) to the different times, in which it exists, numerically identical, i. e. *unity* (not plurality),
- 4) in the relation to possible objects in space.

This

This substance, as object only of the internal sense, is *immaterial*; as simple substance it is incorruptible. Its identity, as intellectual substance, is its personality. These three collective properties constitute its spirituality. Its relation to objects in space, is the commerce with bodies; the thinking substance is therefore the principle of life in matter, i. e. *soul* (anima), altho', on account of its substantiality, independent of matter itself, i. e. immortal.

147.

These contents of rational psychology are entirely inferred. It is the unconditioned to which one ascends from the conditioned, given, I think, by means of the principle, when something is given as conditioned, the absolute unconditioned must also be given. The following expression, which we shall in future use, must be noticed, when the conception of an object is of that nature, that it escapes us, when, in order to discover its meaning, we examine the original use of understanding, we shall then say, that we have no conception whatever of the object.

To

To have a problematical conception of an object, is, according to this, different from that of having no conception whatever of it. I have a problematical conception of the inhabitants of the moon, as I know of nothing to be said contrary to the real possibility of this conception. But as I cannot establish the conception of the substantiality of my *I*, by the original use of understanding, and therefore cannot attain the real possibility of it, I observe my unintelligibility, and the conception escapes me, i. e. I have then no conception whatever thereof.

148.

The position, the soul is substance, is obtained by the following syllogism of reason.

That, which in all cogitation is always thought as subject, and never as predicate, exists also as subject and is substance.

I, as thinking being, am in all cogitation always the thinking subject.

Therefore I exist as substance.

The major of this ratiocination has two sides, which we must distinguish. If we view it on the side of the conditioned, it explains to us nothing more, than that which takes place in

in all representing, that namely consciousness (I, I think, or I am,) is required for it. Tho' this *I* be named substance, yet the original use of understanding, substantiality, does not for that reason form its basis. Substantiality is the original positing of a permanent real in space, on which all representation of time is first possible. This *I*, or I think, is, on the contrary, nothing but event, of which the conception itself has no meaning, except in the positing of a permanent real in space. But the meaning of the unconditioned is stamped upon this position, as it is to express more than the analytical unity, to which cogitation is referred as predicate, namely an existing, thinking substance, and this conception is devoid of all sense.

The position: the soul is substance, can therefore be allowed to be valid, when nothing more is intended to be expressed thereby, than the logical use of understanding, i. e. the mere analytical unity, by which we represent a thing to ourselves by the adding of certain designations, and that the original use of understanding substantiality, by which
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the *I* would be represented as a permanent subject, is not expressed.

149.

The ratiocination, by which the simplicity of the soul is proved, is the following:

That thing, whose actions can never be considered as the concurrence of many acting things, is *simple*.

Now the thinking *I* is such a thing.

Therefore *I* exist as simple substance.

The major also here expresses nothing farther than the mere representing, that to wit, that, in a variously diffused consciousness, must pass *to one* consciousness. This however is the side of the given, and this judgment, so understood, rests on no conclusion, but is the conception of representing taken from the given. Viewed on the side of the unconditioned, the position represents the conception of a simple existing being, under which the thinking *I* must be subsumpted, and in this view expresses an unintelligibility. Nothing exists as substance, but the permanent in space, which is always complex.

The

The whole force of the proof consists therein, that many representations constitute only thereby *one* thought, that they are united in the absolute unity of the thinking *I*. But the difference is very great between the position: many representations pass to *one*, thereby, that the *I* think, which is dispersed in them, passes to *one* single *I* think, and this: *I* exist as absolute unity, i. e. it is simple substance.

In the syllogism, however, which must lead me from the one to the other, I conclude from something, that I know (from my consciousness) upon something, of which I can form no conception: (upon the *I*, as absolutely simple substance).

The position: *I am simple*, expresses nothing but the unity of consciousness, and this *I* is nothing more than the mere analytical (logical) unity, a something in general, which I fix by adding the, *I* think. The conception of a simple, existing thing (of a simple substance is, on the contrary, a conception, which escapes me, when I wish to carry it to intelligibility, as the original use of understanding of the category, substantiality, is entirely foreign to it. Therefore in the, *cogito ergo sum*, of Descartes, the conclusion is entirely the same with the premiss, so far as one remains on the side of the conditioned and given. Is it, however, considered as
diffe-

different from it, the position: every thing that thinks, exists, requires a proof, and above all things, intelligibility of its assertion.

The whole argument is excogitated, in order thereon to ground the incorruptibility of the human soul. For, in transferring the conception of the permanent from the original use of understanding, substantiality, to the simple substance of the soul, the position: the soul is permanent, is thus maintained. Mendelssohn however observed, that if even its indestructibleness were certain, on account of this simple nature of the soul, which is different from matter, that is always complex, the impossibility of its evanescence is still not to be perspected therefrom. He concluded in the following manner, that the soul could not evanesce, that is, could not suddenly pass to nothing. Did the soul evanesce, the instant of its evanescence must belong equally to its existence and to its nonexistence. The soul would therefore be and also not be in the same instant; but as this is contradictory, this simple substance cannot evanesce. Our answer to this is, that the whole consciousness expresses nothing but an event for the internal sense, which, like every alteration, has a degree, it can augment and decrease ad infinitum. The consciousness can be enfeebled even to Zero, without a substance either beginning or ending. Therefore the

the impossibility of the elanguescence of the soul, which entirely consists in this consciousness, is, according to Mendelssohns argument, by no means proved.

150.
The numerical identity of the soul, i. e. its personality, is proved by the following ratiocination:

That, which cannot be thought but as numerically identic, exists, as one and the same thing.

Now I think myself, as one and the same, in the different times of my existence.

Therefore I exist as numerically identic and am *person*.

'Tis obvious that the consequence also here has two sides. Considered on the side of the given, 'tis an immediately certain position, which only rests on the use of understanding, but is not obtained by a syllogism. For it expresses nothing but the identity of consciousness, which is necessary for all thinking. Viewed, on the contrary, on the side of the unconditional, it maintains that the *I* is identical substance.

The premis is excogitated for this purpose. This now is a synthetic position, which is entirely insignificant, as the original use of understanding in the category substantiality is wanting to it. When matter is in question, the conception of a permanent, and therefore of identical, existing things, has, just by that use of understanding, meaning.

We may therefore be allowed to oppose another play of conceptions to this, by which we have the advantage of discovering the insignificance of the foregoing assertion. We maintain namely, that it is cogitable, that a thinking substance could communicate its consciousness to another thinking substance, (as a moved body communicates its motion by percussion to another matter). The latter substance would now exist with its own consciousness, as well as with that of the first substance, and be equally numerically identic.

151.

The existence is finally proved by the following syllogism:

That, which thinks, exists.

Now I think:

Therefore I exist.

The

The position: I think, is, on the side of the conditional, identical, with that of: I am. For both expressions say nothing more, than the fact of consciousness. But the position: I exist, has the appearance of the unconditional, and therefore, I exist as substance, is intended to be thereby expressed. But it is, in this quality, unintelligible, and this conception of the soul, as an existing substance, when we compare it with the use of understanding, escapes us. If the inference were valid, the existence of the soul would also be *necessary*. The existential position: I am, is, on the contrary, but empirical, as it expresses the: I think, I am, taken from every empirical representation.

The empirical idealism, or the opinion, that the, I exist, is apodictically certain, but the existence of external objects only doubtful, is the consequence of not having properly caught the spirit of all intelligibility, that is, of the categories, so far as they are the original use of intellect. The existence of matter is just as immediately certain, as my own existence, and all representation of time is only possible in the original positing of a permanent in space. The I

um, or the empirical consciousness of my own existence, is therefore only possible to be determined by the existence of things in space. When however the spirit of the category is quitted, this empirical idealism is irrefragable. It inquires after the conjunction of the representation of an existing thing, with this object. The dogmatical philosopher does not even surmise the insignificance of this question, as he has neglected to observe that, which constitutes the sense of a conception. We have opposed to this empirical or material idealism, the transcendental or critical, which entirely consists in the assertion, that the conjunction, which we place in the things, when we attribute greatness, reality, substantiality &c. to objects, rests on an original conjunction of understanding in these categories. A transcendental realism precedes the empirical idealism, and ends in it, when it acts consequentially. The transcendental realism does not observe that original conjunction of understanding, but considers space and time as particular things, to which the conjunction, that we think in them, also belongs in itself. It never takes notice of the original use of understanding in the categories, but has them, merely as designations of things; in view. This cast of mind indispensably leads to empirical idealism. A dualist however is he, who considers the existence of matter, as well

as the existence of thinking beings, as certain. The critical idealist now is an empirical realist, as he considers the existence of matter as immediately certain, and not as concluded. But he likewise is an empirical dualist, as he, by all means, distinguishes the principle of life from matter. He makes this distinction, however, only on the side of the given.

152.

The whole rational psychology then, rests on a *transcendental illusion*, that is, on unintelligibility, which has its ground therein, that we have neglected to hold up its assertions to the original use of understanding. There are three questions, which rational psychology undertakes to answer; that are the sole aim of all its armaments. These are: 1) after the possibility of the commerce of the soul with an organical body, i.e. with the animality of man; 2) after the beginning of this commerce, 3) after its end. With regard to the first, it is the *empirical*, physical influence, for which we here declare ourselves, since it is the decision of common-sense; and as the conception of it is taken from the origi-

noumenon

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nal use of understanding. The transcendental, physical influence, however, is a conception totally without meaning. We in the first merely express the given, namely, that life is foreign to matter in itself, which must always be represented as inanimate (though the conception of mind and state of mind have meaning only in the positing of a permanent in space) and that this internal principle is in causal relation with matter. The transcendental, physical influence on the contrary speaks of the unconditional, and has the simple substance, named soul, in view, and, without discovering the spirit of the category, causality, as an original use of understanding, maintains a causal relation of the heterogenous substances, soul and body, of which it has properly no conception whatever. This same accusation of unintelligibility also reaches the systems of supernatural assistance and of harmonia praestabilita. As to the two other questions, their insignificance is equally obvious with that of the foregoing, so far as they go to the unconditional. No question whatever can have significance,

cation, when it rests on the aspect of the soul as an existing thing.

153. There is, therefore, no rational psychology, like that of a rational extension of the knowledge of material nature. There is only a critic of reason, which sends us back to the given, in discovering to us the unintelligibility and fanaticism of spiritualism, as also the counterintelligibility and desolation of materialism, and which thereby gives us a hint, to direct our attention to that soil, from which the interest in these questions springs. The moral nature of man is this soil. The question, concerning the unintelligibility of our soul, may be answered in a satisfactory manner for all moral interest of mankind.

Critic of rational Cosmology.

154. 'Tis the prosyllogism of the hypothetical mode of inference, by which rational cosmo-

logy is erected. The objects of experience are thought as conditional by the categories, and their conditions are likewise thought as conditional by these conceptions. Here is a series from condition to condition, which rests on the use of understanding in the categories. The totality of all conditions may, however, be thought in a twofold manner. The series itself, whose members are collectively conditional, may be thought as unconditional; or a first member is thought as absolutely unconditional, and that as the absolute condition of all the following members.

But what particularly distinguishes the cosmological ideas from those of rational psychology, is the following. In the latter one concludes from something given (my empirical, determinate consciousness) upon a something (the substance of my I) of which I can form no conception whatever. We shall in future characterize such a *something* by the title of *transcendental object*. It lies, as is commonly said, in the sphere of the *intelligi-*

ligibilis, which is nothing better, than the field of the unintelligible. Of the cosmological ideas, we shall, however, say, that they fall into the territory of the counterintelligible. For reason attains to these ideas, in pursuing the way of the synthesis of understanding. But every condition in this way, and its condition must again be thought as conditional by the same category. The giving out of a first member as absolutely unconditional, therefore, runs *counter* to the original use of understanding. The holding of the series itself to be absolutely unconditional, though every member of it be conditional, is, however, equally *counterintelligible*. An antithetic of speculative reason, into which reason falls without any affected artifice, consequently, presents itself here. For it requires totality of conditions; and as the conceptions of an absolutely unconditional series and of a first member of the series that is absolutely unconditional are contradictorily opposed, there remains nothing more than to choose one of these conceptions, and to reject the other. It may
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however choose which of the two it pleases, its idea is always counterintelligible.

156.

The principle, on which reason supports itself, in giving reality to the cosmological ideas, is: when the conditional is given, the whole sum of conditions, consequently the absolute unconditional is likewise given. We can now explain the cosmological ideas, as categories extended even to the unconditional. In order to represent them completely, we shall use the table of the categories as a clew. But only these categories will give occasion to cosmological ideas, which are of that nature, that, by their means, the condition of the conditional, that is thought by them, must also be thought. 'Tis obvious however, that reason requires totality, but on the side of the conditions (of the series in antecedentia), and not on that of the conditional (of the series in consequentia). Reason remains unconcerned with regard to the latter, whether the series be infinitely continued or bounded.

157.

Every given space previously posits another space, which surrounds it. 'Tis just so with this; it also, as given space, previously posits a surrounding space. There is here therefore a rising from the conditional to the condition, which condition is ever thought by the same category, greatness, and is consequently always again conditional. Reason, that here intrenches upon the understanding, which never attains the unconditional in its synthesis, creates to itself the idea of the absolute unconditional, which accordingly consists either in the conception of bounds of the world, or in that of an infinite world according to space. Every given time previously posits, in this manner, a time which is already elapsed. This was only thereby possible, that a still earlier time had previously passed away. Reason, by means of this synthesis of understanding, here generates to itself the idea of the unconditional, which it posits either in the beginning of the world, or in that of the infinite world according to time. These ideas are the categories.

category *greatness* extended even to the unconditional.

Every reality in space, that is, matter, is a composite, and consists of parts. Each part fills a space and again consists of parts. Reason, which surmounts the intellectual synthesis, creates to itself the idea of the unconditional, and posits it either in the conception of absolutely simple parts, or in the conception of a whole consisting of an infinite multitude of parts. These ideas are the category *reality* extended even to the unconditional.

Every event previously posits a cause. The causality of the cause is again an event, which was only possible by means of a cause. Here is a series proceeding to the unconditional. Reason, which seizes it, thinks it but either as an absolutely first cause, or as infinite series, whose members are collectively conditional, but it itself as absolutely unconditional. These ideas are the category *causality* extended even to the unconditional.

The existence of every event is contingent. It exists but so far as something else exists.

exists. The causality of the cause of variation too exists, however, itself, but as contingent, and previously posits an other existence. Reason here suggests the idea of the unconditional and posites it either in the conception of an absolutely necessary being, or in an infinite and nevertheless totally given series of merely casual existence. These ideas are the category *contingency* extended even to the unconditional.

158.

There are therefore no more than four cosmological ideas, according to the four titles of the categories. 1) The absolute completeness of the *composition* of the given whole of all phaenomena. 2) The absolute completeness of the *division* of a given whole in the phaenomenon. 3) The absolute completeness of the *arising* of a phaenomenon in general. 4) The absolute completeness of the *dependency of the existence* of the variable in the phaenomenon. We shall call the two first ideas, cosmological conceptions, the two last, on the contrary, *transcendent*.

dental conceptions of nature. The first represent the mathematical unconditional of the world both in great and in small; the latter, however, the dynamical unconditional of the world.

159.

The business of the critic is now faithfully to exhibit the antithetic of speculative reason, with regard to its cosmological ideas, and further to shew, that this conflict arises entirely, because the procedure of reason, in its attributing validity to these ideas, is mere speculation, which quits the spirit of the categories, as an original use of understanding; that therefore this whole conflict originates from nothing else, than from the fancy of the cognition of things in themselves.

160.

Thesis of the first antinomy. The world has a beginning in time, and is also bounded according to space.

For at every given now, or instant, all time, which preceded it, is elapsed. I comprehend, therefore, this time in the thought, that

that it is elapsed (no part of it still remains). Consequently this whole elapsed time must be countable, i. e. the world must have a beginning according to time.

When farther I fix a given instant in thought, I thereby embrace the sum of all existing objects in space. As therefore not one, of all these existing things in this instant, originated first, but they all exist, their sum must be countable. The world must consequently be bounded according to space.

Antithesis of the first antinomy. The world has no beginning in time and no bounds in space, but is, as well with regard to time as to space, infinite.

For, posite the world has a beginning, a time has preceded this beginning, wherein the world was not, that is, an empty time. Now time is only so far something as things exist. Time, considered in itself, i. e. the empty time, is nothing. Therefore the world can have no beginning, but is, according to time, infinite.

If

If farther the world were bounded according to space, there would thus be an empty space, which surrounds it. Space, considered in itself, must therefore be something. As now space, in itself, and without relation to objects, is nothing, so the world cannot be bounded, but is infinite according to space.

161.

Thesis of the second antinomy. Every complex substance in the world consists of simple parts, and nothing but the simple, or that which is composed of it exists everywhere.

For, does something exist as complex, let one annul all composition of it in thought. Accordingly the simple must remain, because no complex part remains, otherwise nothing at all would remain; consequently no complex substance would be thought. Therefore nothing but simple beings exist in the world.

Antithesis of the second antinomy. No complex thing in the world consists of simple

simple parts, and there exists nowhere anything simple in it.

For every complex substance exists in space. Every space however consists again of spaces. If therefore a substance should consist of simple parts, this simple must however fill a space. As now this plenitude is the substantial itself, and substance existing for itself is where filled space is, so, as space is complex, the simple that fills the space must be complex, consequently, not simple. Therefore no complex thing in the world consists of simple parts.

162.

Thesis of the third antinomy. The causality, according to laws of nature, is not the only one, from which the phaenomena of the world can be collectively derived. It is still necessary to assume a causality thro' liberty to illustrate them.

For, whatever happens previously posites a cause. As now the causality of the cause is also a thing that has happened, which previously posites a cause, so this law of nature,

PART I.

M

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understood in its unbounded universality, would be in contradiction with itself, as, if there were no first, entirely independent cause, the sum of all that has happened would have no cause. Therefore every series of events must have a first cause, whose causality previously posites no other cause.

Antithesis of the third antinomy. There is no liberty, but every thing in the world happens entirely according to laws of nature.

For, were there a first cause, the causality of it would be an event, which would itself have a beginning. Every event previously posites a cause, and consequently the causality of the first cause previously posites another cause, which determined it; that is to say, this first cause is no absolutely first cause, and there is, therefore, no liberty in the world.

163.

Thesis of the fourth antinomy. Something belongs to the world, which, either as its part, or its cause, is an absolutely necessary being.

For

For the existence of every alteration is but contingent. An alteration takes place, as there was a cause, which determined its existence. The causality of the cause existed again but fortuitously and depended upon another cause. A series of conditions, of which each is again conditional, previously posites something, that is absolutely unconditional. Consequently the contingent existence of every one series of events is a proof, that something or other exists of absolute necessity, whether it be, that the series of alterations itself is this absolutely necessary thing, or that it exists different from this series and as its absolute condition.

Antithesis of the fourth antinomy. There exists no absolutely necessary being in the world.

For, as every member of a series of alterations is contingent, the sum of these members cannot be thought as existing of necessity. But, the positing of a first member of the series, as existing of absolute necessity, contradicts the causal law of nature, according to which the causality of the first cause

again previously posites a cause and its causality. Therefore there is no absolutely necessary being anywhere in the world.

164.

We shall term the assertions of the thesis in all the four antinomies the *dogmatism*, that, on the contrary, on the side of the antithesis the *empiricism* of pure reason. We observe, in the first place, that the quality of our own nature obliges us to take an interest in these problems, but that this interest speaks entirely in favour of dogmatism. For 'tis obvious that the decisions of dogmatism satisfy a certain moral interest. The mind, which is attuned to morality, seeks a firm place, wherein it can posite the aim of its exertions, and quickly discovers that this cannot be found in the perpetual mechanism of nature. The solutions of dogmatism, on the other hand, shew so many firm points, which are suitable to this moral interest. The dogmatism is also favourable to a certain speculative interest. For reason, according to its nature, ascends from the conditional

tional to the condition, and seeks thro' an absolutely last point, which it can attain, to give stability to its cognitions. The decisions of the thesis offer to it this absolutely first condition, whereas the antithesis always desires it to go further. But tho' the empiricism shews itself favourable neither to this moral, nor speculative interest of reason, yet it is by far more favourable to the interest of the understanding. For the understanding in confining itself to the original use of intellect in the categories, does not quit the regressive synthesis from the conditional to the condition, and rejects the conception of an absolutely first condition, as a conception, which is repugnant to the spirit of the category. But it appears that the empiricism only attends to the interest of understanding for a longer while, for it, as well as the dogmatism, quits the synthesis of understanding, in ordering to think the infinite series as the absolute totality of all conditions, by which means it can also be refuted by the proofs of the thesis.

165.

As to the apparent difficulty of the solution of these antinomies, where, as it seems, contradictorily opposed positions are proved with apodictical certainty, the observation will not be unserviceable here, that the quieting of reason, by the answer, that these *objects* of the cosmological ideas are occult, and that it will therefore probably never be accorded to us to attain an information of them suitable to our desire for knowledge, is entirely void. An answer of this sort can only take place, when the question is directed toward an object, which lies within the sphere of the intelligible. The question, whether the moon and other planets have inhabitants? is of this nature; so are further questions concerning the state of the earth in a time where history does not any more reach; concerning the distance of the fixt stars from the sun. But with regard to the enquiry about the objects of transcendental ideas, we have but to examine the fountain, from which these questions spring, in order to receive grounded answers thereto. For these objects
are

are not given objects; they do not lie within the sphere of the intelligible. Rather therefore than complain, that these objects are occult, we must answer, that the questions concerning them are insignificant.

166.

The counterintelligibility of our cosmological ideas, so far as we are of opinion of positing corresponding objects to them, reveals itself to us, when we hold them up to the original use of understanding. It appears in this combination, that every one of these ideas is either too great or too small for this use of understanding. For if it be admitted, that the world is, according to time, infinite, it is thus too great for the synthesis of understanding; for this cannot attain to the eternity which is elapsed. Does one posit, however, that it has a beginning, it is then too small for this same synthesis. For the beginning is an existence, before which a time has preceded, and, faithful to the use of understanding, we must still posit things before the beginning of things.

Does

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If

If it be assumed, that the world is, according to space, unbounded, 'tis thus too great for the empirical synthesis of understanding; which cannot reach it. Does one, on the contrary, say, that it is bounded, 'tis then too small for this synthesis, as, in conformity to this, we must posit space and consequently objects, behind these bounds.

If it be still posited, that matter in space consists of an infinite multitude of parts, this object is thus too great for the use of understanding; for this does not attain the absolutely infinite division. When it is said, on the contrary, that matter consists of a finite number of parts, this object is too small for the use of understanding, since the simple fills a space, and consequently like this, again consists of parts.

When it is said, that every event previously posites an infinite series of events, this object is too great for the use of understanding; for this synthesis does not reach the totality of an infinite series.

Does

Does one however posit, that every event previously posits an absolutely first cause, this object is too small for the use of understanding, as, agreeable to this, the causality of the first cause is again event and previously posits a cause.

When it is finally admitted, that no absolutely necessary being exists, but that every being exists, according to its existence, as conditional, this object is too great for the use of understanding. For this does not reach the absolute totality of conditional existence. On the contrary, the conception of an absolutely necessary being, whether it be the world itself, or something in the world, is too small for the use of understanding, since, in conformity to this, we must consider every condition of the conditional existence, as again conditional.

In all these cases, 'tis said, that the object of the cosmical idea is either too great or too small for the original use of understanding, but not, that this is for that, or that the idea itself is either too great or too small. For a
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conception has but so far reality, as its object lies in the sphere of the intelligible, and, independent of this original use of understanding, it is devoid of all meaning. Therefore 'tis the conception, which must be suitable to the use of understanding, but not this to that.

167.

'Tis obvious that the position: when something is given as conditional, an absolute unconditional is also given, is the foundation of all these cosmological assertions. As this position, when held up to the original use of understanding, proves counterintelligible, so this counterintelligibility also affects those assertions, which rest there on. The apparently contradictory opposition of the dogmatism and empiricism is also herewith resolved into mere nugacity. For these assertions are only so far contradictorily opposed one to another, as the world is looked upon to be a whole of things in themselves, that is, so far as the categories are considered as absolute predicates, and not that they express the original use of understanding itself. When

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we take the critical idealism for our guide, the following are its decisions; *first*, that the world is neither bounded according to space nor time; that 'tis however even as little infinite, since the world is but an object in the empirical regression and not independent of it. *Secondly*, 'tis equally false to say, that the real in space is compounded of simple parts, as that it consists of an infinite number of parts since it is but something in the division, i. e. in the empirical regression and not independent of it. *Thirdly*, both judgments are false, as well when 'tis said, that there is a first cause of every series of events, as when 'tis maintained, that every such series is infinite, since we only understand ourselves in the empirical regression from effect to cause, and have only so far, but not independent of it, object. *Fourthly*, both judgments finally are false, there is a necessary being belonging to the world, and all existence in connection with the world is contingent; since the conception of world has but an object in the synthesis of understanding and not independent of it.

168.
Thereby is confirmed, in an indirect manner, the justness of our exposition of the categories, as an original use of understanding, by which synthetic, objective, unity of consciousness is begotten, that must serve us for an analytical unity of the conception, when we are to understand ourselves in these conceptions, and that the reference of the representation to an object consists entirely in this synthetic, objective unity, and that, our representation has an object, that also (in other words) our cognition is a cognition of the phaenomenon, and not of the things in themselves. This indirect proof is the following dilemma, if the world be in itself an existing whole, it is either finite or infinite. Now the first as well as the last is false. Therefore 'tis likewise false, that the world is in itself an existing whole.

169.
Agreeably to this critical idealism, we observe, that positions, which express something of the empirical regression, are even on that
that

that account valid of the world itself, because the conception of the world has signification only in, and not independent of it. A distinction, with regard to this empirical regression, must be made betwixt that ad indefinitum and that ad infinitum. When I shall say of a regression, that it goes on to infinity, when the species of members, wherever it may go to, remains the same. 'Tis said, on the other hand, that the regression goes but to indefiniteness, when nothing is thereby expressed with regard to these members themselves. The first is valid in the division of a body. For it is given as a whole, i. e. the conception of the whole is taken from the original use of understanding, and the expression: the division goes ad infinitum, says, that we always separate parts in the decomposition, as the conditions of their bounds. When, on the contrary, the subject is of a membered whole, e. g. an organized body, a division can here only be called ad indefinitum, since we cannot say before the division, what members will be found as the last organized (which we judge as productions of art).

But

But we find no reason for remaining with any one member, and to say of it, that it must be absolutely unorganized, but can, on the contrary, think each member, to which the decomposition leads, always again as organized. It must be said of the series of ancestors of those who are living at present, that it goes to infinity, as we cannot determine whether or not a certain couple will conclude it, though we can always admit, that there is a homogeneous of every one member of the series. But concerning the regression in general, as well that in the preceding times as conditions of a given time, as that in the circumambient spaces as conditions of a given space, we say without doubt, that this regression goes to infinity.

Critic of rational Theology.

170.

The prosyllogism of the disjunctive mode of conclusion, leads reason to the idea of a most real being, and the principle, that,
when

when something is given as conditional, an absolute unconditional must also be given, is the principle, by which rational theology seeks to prove the reality of these ideas. Every object is, with regard to all possible determinations, a thoroly determinate thing. This thoro' precision of every existing object is the conditional, which can only be thought by the conception of the collective sphere of all possibility, in all respects as conditional. Therefore the kingdom of all possibilities must exist, in order to be able to think each existing individual, with regard to its thorough preciseness, as conditional.

171.

Reason then transforms the *distributive* unity of the realities of nature, which are taken from experience, into the *collective* unity of a whole of experience, of the sum of all realities. It thereon *hypothesates* this unity, in positing this collective possibility of all things in one single-subject. This very procedure finally necessitates it, even to *personify* its idea, and to think the most
real

real being, at the same time, as intelligence, as first principle and as absolute condition of all possibility.

172.

The conception of the most real being is formed in this manner. He is neither to be posited in space nor in time, he is *omnipresent* and *eternal*, since space and time are restrictive conditions of reality. Every thing that is different from him, can differ from him but by negations. Consequently the ens realissimum is but an *individuum*. As finally all realities can only be thought in the relation of cause and effect, to this being, but not as parts of him, he is *simple*. The object of the theological idea is therefore thought, as *the most real being* (ens realissimum), as *the original being* (ens originarium), who is the source of all realities, as *the supreme being* (ens summum) who is himself derived from no other being, as *omnipresent*, *eternal*, as *simple* and *individual*, and this conception is that of *God* in the transcendental sense.

Juss

173.

The prior position of the existence of all reality seems, without further justification, to be now certain, as it has the appearance of being founded entirely by the inference from the conditional to the absolute unconditional, according to the disjunctive mode of inference. Our experience is nothing more than a progressive cognition of realities, since the precise cognition of that, which a thing is not, requires the cognition of the opposite reality. It is therefore perfectly conformable to the course of reason from the conditional to the absolute unconditional, previously to posit absolute totality of conditions, i. e. *all realities*, an absolute sphere of all possibilities. But the transition from the previous position of all reality to its reunion in one subject, and its designation even as an intelligence, is not so soon to be observed, so much the more, as, in this speculative mounting of the conception of all reality, we soon find, that all conception escapes us, and that we therein express a real unintelligibility. Reason, in order to effectuate this transition,

PART I.

N

has

has excogitated three modes of proof, the ontological; the cosmological, and the physicotheological proof of the existence of God. The first draws an inference from mere conceptions. The second is founded upon an undeterminate experience of any one existence. The third finally infers, from the determinate experience of nature, that answers to the conception of the unity of end, the existence of an intelligent cause which corresponds to it.

174.

The ontological proof of the existence of God concludes from the conception of a most real being, upon the absolutely necessary existence of this being. We must first remember, that the use of the conception of a necessary existence is of that nature here, that this conception even escapes us in it. The nominal explanation of an absolutely necessary being is that, whose nonexistence is impossible, and, in order to illustrate this conception, examples are given. 'Tis, as is said, absolutely necessary, that a triangle has three angles. We have explained the sense

of

of that, which is called absolutely necessary, in transcendental philosophy. According to which, that cognition is named *necessary*, which is a consequence of conceptions, and an existence is so far necessary, as it is cognised from conceptions. Necessity, then, is no predicate of a thing in itself, but only the mere quality of our cognition, relative to the existence of a thing. We understand ourselves by all means after this, in the position, that a triangle has three angles, and that this is of necessity, so far as we subsumpt, and thereby determine, every triangle under the rule, triangle. But as to necessity of existence, there is nowhere any other existence necessary, than that of the causes, whose effects are given, which we bring, and thereby determine, under the universal principle of causality. The willing to cognise the existence of any one thing from mere conceptions, is quite in vain. For, when I judge of a thing: it exists, the conception of the object is fixed by its designations, and existence may be attributed to it or not without any contradiction.

175.

But 'tis maintained, that the conception of the most real being is the only case, where the existence of this being can be cognised from his mere conception. For this conception comprises all realities. As now a nonexistence is a want, and existence the opposite reality, so the existence of the most real being also lies in his conception. The position: the most real being exists not, is then a contradiction. Consequently the existence of this being is cognoscible from mere conceptions and therefore absolutely necessary.

This proof entirely consists in a transcendental use of the categories (16), for we only form the conception of the most real being, by neglecting the original use of understanding in them. 'Tis then no wonder if we cannot understand ourselves in this conception. We do not understand ourselves therein, because we quit the basis of intelligibility. But when we opine that this conception

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tion comprises the existence, we therein express nothing more than the tautology, that an existing being exists. Transcendental philosophy has dissected for us the use of understanding of the category, existence. Accordingly it is the sensation, in which an object must be given to us, in order to be able to say of it, it exists. But when we judge, that a certain object exists of necessity, this is an existence, which is concluded. The chief principle of such a conclusion must however be taken from the original use of understanding, when that, which we obtain by a conclusion, is to have meaning.

The cosmological proof of the existence of God seems to supply the want of the ontological. It is supported on the experience of any one existence, which is thought as casual. It concludes from this upon the absolutely necessary existence of a being, and finally herefrom upon the highest reality of this being. It is thus expressed, when something exists, an absolutely necessary being must

likewise exist. Now I exist, at least, myself. Therefore an absolutely necessary being exists. This can only exist in one manner alone; the predicates, which belong to him appertain to his essence, and cannot be permuted with opposite designations. Therefore this being is thoroughly determined by his conception. But among all conceptions, that of the ens realissimum is alone thoroughly determined. Consequently the absolutely necessary being is he, who comprises all realities in himself.

178.

This cosmological proof has the same fault as the ontological. A transcendental use of the categories is made in both. That existence is only contingent, which is dependent upon causes, that is, the existence of effects, and there is, in consequence of the original use of understanding, causality, no first cause, whose causality is not again event. It is therefore only this *empirical* contingency (41), of which the conclusion upon a condition of a certain existence, but
never

never upon an absolute unconditional, is valid. As to the intellectual contingency, however, the conclusion from it upon a condition of existence has no signification whatsoever. We accordingly observe, that the appeal to experience of any one existence, in this cosmological argument, is not sufficient for proving the intelligibility and validity of the conception of an absolute being, but only serves as a transition, under the illusion of intelligibility, to the sphere of the *intelligibilis*,* and so to the unintelligible. The inference, by which is proved, that the absolutely necessary being is the most real, has even as little an intelligible ground, and, what is the most extraordinary, it previously posits the validity of the ontological proof, to avoid which, the cosmological is however precisely excogitated. For, is it said that the *ens necessarium*, in respect of all his predicates, can but exist in one way alone and therefore must be thoroughly determined by his conception, thus the thorough precise-

* See trans: preface.

ness of every individuum, for any one instant of his existence, is valid. No ground can therefore be had of concluding upon the highest reality of the absolutely necessary being, but when it is already previously posited, that the conception of the most real being contains in itself the predicate of absolute necessity.

179.

The physicotheological proof finally concludes from the experience of a determinate existence, namely of a conjunction of the multifarious in nature, which is suitable to a whole of end, upon a being, who is, through understanding, cause of it. The appeal to experience of this proof is, without doubt, much more energetic, than that of the cosmological argument. The combination of the celestial bodies and their orbits to a systematical whole, the harmony of things, as many objects must be united, in order to preserve a certain thing, particularly the unity of end in organized bodies, irresistibly hurry away those, who have not well pondered

red that, which constitutes intelligibility of their conceptions, to yield to the persuasion, that an intelligent cause of world exists. So far, however, as we trace the causes of these phaenomena, we find them, in consequence of the original use of understanding, always in nature. But the conception of God posites its object without the sphere of the intelligible, in the region of the *intelligibilis* which is quite synonymous with the sphere of the unintelligible. Altho' the unity of end, of dead matter, on which we find it confirmed, appears to us even as foreign and contingent, yet the causes of these combinations must always belong to nature, and the conclusion, from these phaenomena, upon a supreme being, has no intelligible support.

180.

This proof, from the order that is conformable to end of the multifarious in nature, of the existence of God, rests on commutation of the mere thinking according to analogy, with a conclusion according to analogy. Just as the work of bees is called a
work

work of art, because we think it according to analogy with productions of human understanding, so are we justified in thinking the world as the work of an intelligence. We would, however, infer according to analogy, in attributing understanding itself to the bees, and it would be an inference too according to analogy, in positing a being, who is, thro' understanding, cause of the world. We must notice, that, independent of this fault, the physicotheological proof presupposes the validity of the cosmological, and with it, that of the ontological, and there remains nothing more for it, at last, than, by alledging the multifarious conformity to end in nature, to render the mind favourable to those modes of proof. For, when we examine the conclusion, from the conformity to end of a production, upon an intelligent cause of it, which, however, has but meaning within nature, and every conception escapes us, when collective nature itself is derived from an intelligent being without it, this proof can only lead to an architect of the world, who has given the form of art to
mat-

matter, or put the germins of it in matter, but not to a creator of the world, who has produced the substance itself. As, finally, collective nature is not laid open to us, the intelligent cause of world can only be determined, in consequence of this conclusion, as very mighty, very wise, very benign &c. but omnipotency, omniscience, and supreme goodness, cannot be attributed to him. The physicotheological proof is therefore obliged to make a transition to the cosmological. As the natural conformity to end of matter is in itself foreign, and its existence therefore casual, so an absolutely necessary being is inferred, and in order to give hold to this conception, it is sought in the conception of the most real being.

181.

All rational theology therefore is twofold, either transcendental or natural. God is thought in the first only by transcendental conceptions, (as *ens originarium*, *realissimum*, *entium*), but in the second as the supreme intelligence, consequently by a concep-

ception borrowed from the nature of our soul. The first is again twofold, either ontotheology or cosmotheology. The mere transcendental theologian is called *deist*; he who also admits of a natural theology is a *theist*. The deistical conception of God is, immediately for the interest of man, a dead conception. When natural theology is made independent of speculation and to harmonize with intelligibility, it first of all shews itself, in withholding both from anthropomorphism and from counterintelligibility, as a fruitful conception. This natural theology now is either physicotheology or moral theology. The first considered by itself, is equally speculative with transcendental theology, and like this is lost in the unintelligible and bears the character of counterintelligibility in itself. Moral theology, on the contrary, has its foundation in the intelligible ground of the conception of an object to which the morally good-minded man aspires to attain. He must abandon this aim as chimerical, since it reaches far beyond all nature, if he did not refer collective nature to a substratum of
natu-

nature. He thinks this substratum of nature, according to analogy, by predicates borrowed from nature, relative to his moral interest; but, withholden by the transcendental conception of God, presumes not to judge determinatively by these predicates, and consequently not to infer it according to analogy.

Conclusion of the Critic of Speculative Reason.

182.

This critic teaches us, that the transcendent use of the transcendental ideas of reason rests on a transcendental use of the categories. If we quit this, it is early previously to conjecture, that 'tis possible to make a valid and consequently *immanent* use of them. This follows, when we allow the validity of the principle, that the unconditional must be given, when something is given as conditional, not for *constitutive*, determining the objects, but as *regulative*, *guiding* our use of understanding. These ideas, under this

pre-

precaution, will lead the understanding, in its empirical extension, to systematical unity of all its knowledge. We shall illustrate this regulative use of the transcendental ideas, by citing the equally bare regulative use of certain other ideas, not transcendental but belonging to the empirical territory, though annulling one another in a constitutive use.

183.

When we are attentive to the logical use of understanding in experience, by which we think objects by the adding of certain designations, we discover its maxim of seeking these designations, wherein many objects meet. We beget to ourselves universal conceptions under this maxim, whereby we comprehend the objects. 'Tis the idea of the *homogeneity* of objects, which guides the understanding in its empirical use. 'Tis however, on the contrary, the *diversity* of objects too, which forms in idea the basis of this use of understanding. Finally, leads the understanding the idea of *affinity*, by which we conjecture a middle sort, between every two sorts of objects

jects of nature that are adjoining to one another; and seek it in consequence of this idea. Just so, when we find various effects of a substance, we consider them at first as consequences of different causalities. But we soon follow a maxim of reason, in seeking to diminish this number of causalities, and in forming to ourselves the idea of a single causality, of which all those different phaenomena are but different manifestations.

184.

We also make a regulative use of the transcendental ideas, when, by their guidance, we bring unity into the variety of experience. We endeavour, under the idea of absolute unity and substance of the human soul, to derive the various phaenomena of the mind, as far as we can, from few powers. The cosmological ideas, which, constitutively used, annul one another, guide the understanding in a regulative use, in the representation of the absolute totality of conditions of a series of phaenomena, to give its cognitions this greatest possible unity, and yet

yet hinder it, by the representation of the infinity of the series itself, from holding its cognitions to be absolutely bounded by nothing. The idea of an intelligent cause of world is, finally, a principle, under which, by the conception of a whole of end, we bring nature, by whose guidance we extend our knowledge of the mechanism of nature itself. 'Tis even necessary, in organized bodies, to follow this principle, and to think these things as ends.

When, however, we put the constitutive use of these ideas in the place of the regulative, faults necessarily spring therefrom. First the fancy originates, that the access to cognitions of intelligibilis objects is opened in these ideas, as 'tis not taken notice of, that this sphere of intelligibilis things is nothing better, than the field of the unintelligible. But faults arise also therefrom, which have a prejudicial influence on cognitions of experience, and consequently on the interest of understanding,

Indo-

Indolent reason is the first fault; we give this name to the principle, by which the search of nature is held to be completed in considering it as justifiable to enchain nature to intelligibilisf ubstrata.

Perverted reason is the second fault, according to which, designations are forced upon nature, that are held to be authorized by the conceptions of the mundus intelligibilis, without ever having examined nature herself, by the thread of experience.

SECTION V.

THE METHOD, WHICH LEADS TO A
COMPLETE SYSTEM OF PURE
REASON.

186.

We shall here first make known that method, in which reason is speculative, and which is not to be followed, in order to furnish validity to the ideas of reason. We establish hereby a *discipline* of pure reason, which must guard it against speculation. We shall also secondly point out that method, which undoubtedly leads to a certain, though not theoretical, yet practical, validity of these ideas. Accordingly we lay the foundation of a *canon* of pure reason. *The architectonic of pure reason* delineates the system of pure reason as the combination of its parts is determined by the conception of reason itself. *The history of pure reason*, finally, describes that, which has happened in the execution of this system.

The

The Discipline of pure Reason.

187.

When we consider the quality of those cognitions, to which mathematics lead, only from the side, whereby they surmount by far the horizon of common sense, which mere experience supports, mathematics harmonize herein with philosophy. Only this great difference betwixt both must not be neglected, that the first science is in actual unquestionable possession of all its cognitions that transcend common experience; philosophy, on the contrary, but exerts itself always to attain its own, without ever being able to boast of this actual possession. The fault seems therefore to lie in the method of philosophy, and that, if philosophers would follow that of mathematics, they might perhaps accomplish their design just as well as the mathematician.

188.

Transcendental philosophy has already revealed to us the peculiar spirit of the ma-

thematical species of cognition. This issues from the original use of understanding *greatness*, and the geometrical axioms are nothing but conceptions taken from this original use of understanding. The theorems of this science as well as of arithmetic are demonstrated by series of syllogisms; but this sort of cognition, which proceeds according to conceptions, is always accompanied with the original synthesis of the homogeneous. Now the condition of a cognition in general is, that the original use of understanding of the categories serves it as a basis, and we must even therefore say of the transcendental ideas of reason, that they are without particular reality, since this basis of all cognition is wanting to them. 'Tis accordingly evident, that the cause of the sure height, to which mathematics are advanced, and to which they always continue to increase, lies therein, that they only proceed from conception to conception under the guidance of intelligibility (of the original use of understanding). Tho' this high region of cognitions surpasses the unscientific, common sense, it is nevertheless
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the land of the intelligible. But that philosophy cannot imitate it herein, is, because the conceptions, to which it aspires, transcend the sphere of the intelligible.

189.

As mathesis is a science by means of the construction of conceptions, so is philosophy a science out of conceptions. That criterion expresses the character of mathematics, that the synthesis of the homogeneous, the original use of understanding, greatness, accompanies its progression of conceptions. A cognition is however called philosophical, so far as it is from conceptions. The original use of understanding must now secure the signification of the conception. But it is distinguished from common cognition, as well as from mathematical entirely therein, that it is only taken from conceptions. Mathematics therefore may also be explained as the science, which considers the universal in particular, and philosophy as the science, which considers the particular in universal. The mathematical method in philosophy is the

dogmatical. We shall, in order to render this assertion clearer, dissect that method. Mathesis commences with axioms, goes from these to definitions, and so on from theorem to theorem.

190.

Geometrical axioms are immediately certain, and notwithstanding synthetic propositions. But wherein consists, and whereon rests, this immediate certitude? It does not rest on other propositions; otherwise they would be theorems and not immediately certain. They rest however on the primary use of understanding, which is *postulated* in them. Does the philosopher imitate the mathematician therein, by introducing axioms too, in the quality of immediately certain, and yet synthetic, positions? this is quite the dogmatical procedure. For such a position expresses a connection between mere conceptions, and this can never be valid as an immediate certainty. The principles of transcendental judgement, which transcendental philosophy represented, are, by all means, syn-

synthetical. They express, however, the original use of understanding, and are therefore valid only as conceptions of the synthetic, objective unity of consciousness, in the generation of an experience. A *dogma* is a direct synthetic position, of which we may say, that it asserts something of things in themselves, since a connexion is therein placed in the things, and no attention is given, that this objective conjunction is only valid under the condition of the primary synthesis of understanding.

191.

The mathematician gives definitions agreeable to this original use of understanding, greatness. These are the conceptions and rules of the synthesis of understanding, which he has hit upon, consequently nothing further than nomenal explications. He comprises his synthesis of understanding in a rule, and gives it a name. Mathematical definitions, 'tis true, may therefore be faulty with regard to precision, but can never err, as the original, synthetical unity in them stands for the analytical of the conception, and this

synthesis is even expressed by it. Empirical conceptions are of another nature. 'Tis also here the original use of understanding, which generates the original, synthetic, objective unity. So far now as this production of the original use of understanding stands for the analytical unity of the conception, the indication of the designations by which this *something* is fixed, is not yet to be called a definition, as still other designations may or may not be added to this something. When now the complete indication of the designations of a thing is implied by a definition, empirical conceptions cannot be defined, as these designations can never be completely known. An empirical conception therefore requires only an *explication*, i. e. the pointing out of a few designations, in order to fix that analytical unity in others, which our conception requires. But as to a priori given conceptions, such as the conceptions of greatness, reality &c. the conception of virtue, law, equity; transcendental philosophy has shewn with regard to the categories, that they are but so far valid as designations of things, as
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the original use of understanding is contained in them. The rule to be observed in general with respect tho these pure conceptions is, to be very attentive to their use, in order to attain the establishment of the analytical unity of such a conception. If then we distinguish certain designations in them, the indication of these is more correctly named an *exposition*, than a definition, since we can never be sure, according to these essays, of having found all the criteria of the conception. Consequently we see clearly that definitions in mathematics are quite of a different nature from those in philosophy. The geometrician must begin with the definition of his figure, when he is to treat of it's properties, since he gives himself his object by it. In philosophy, on the contrary, the beginning must never be made with a definition, and the conception, which determines the object here, must be examined in its use, before a definition of it dare be attempted. 'Tis therefore a dogmatical procedure, when the philosopher endeavours to imitate the mathematician with regard to definitions.

192.

A *theorem* in mathematics is a mediately certain proposition, which therefore requires a demonstration. This term, demonstration, denotes the peculiar nature of a mathematical proof which, together with the apodictical certainty of the proposition, produces at the same time *evidence*. We have already (29) shewn the various sources of these different properties. A philosophical proof can never pretend to evidence, but, as 'tis only made from conceptions, can produce apodictical certainty alone.

193.

There is therefore no *dogmatical* use of pure reason, which can lead to the reality of its transcendent ideas; and which consists every-where in the application of the categories as absolute predicates, and neglects the original use of understanding, which lies in them and bounds their use. But a *polemical* use of pure reason can, by all means, take place, so far as we understand thereunder the defence of its positions, which are
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in conjunction with the moral interest of man, against dogmatical aberrations. But the station of this defence is then the representation of the aim to which the morally good mind is directed, and those positions express nothing more than the reflexion, in which the virtuous man thinks to reach this aim, which is prefixed to him.

194
It can never be said of the *sceptical* method, that it leads to a complete satisfaction of reason. The sceptic discovers to us the nullity of the dogmatical assertions and of our ignorance. In order however that this may be revealed to us as an unintelligibility, the dissection of the original use of understanding, as the seat of all intelligibility becomes necessary. On account of this ignorance of the transcendental station of cognition, as he cannot discriminate the sphere of the intelligible from that of the unintelligible and counterintelligible, even the very reality of experience will appear doubtful to the sceptic, this was the fate of the celebrated

Hume

Hume himself. Scepticism may therefore be considered as the *censure* of pure reason; it discovers the limits of our knowledge; but 'tis only possible, by a *critic* of pure reason, to discover its bounds.

195.

When the critical station of intelligibility of our conceptions is quitted, one believes to be on the same footing with the transcendental ideas, as with all other conceptions. Now the *hypothesis* is a way, by which we arrive at the insight into the reality of a great many conceptions. Where immediate experience does not lead us to this insight, we have recourse to a hypothesis, which indeed in the beginning is nothing more than mere opinion. We judge *problematically* and examine whether certain phaenomena cannot be illustrated from our adopted grounds. The probability of the hypothesis encreases according to the greatness of the harmony of the phaenomena with the grounds of illustration, and it may become certainty. The dogmatical philosopher, in affairs of pure reason,

reason, holds himself alone entitled to use hypotheses. He does not however notice, that the first requisite of a hypothesis is the intelligibility of his conception, and therefore the real possibility of his object, which must belong to the sphere of the intelligible. In order then to illustrate to ourselves phenomena of nature, it can only be judged problematically under the condition, that the principle of illustration lies too in nature. In affairs of pure reason therefore 'tis in general by no means permitted to judge, and also not problematically.

The Canon of pure Reason.

196.

We have shown that no speculative use of reason can lead us to the reality of those ideas, whose objects lie without the sphere of the intelligible. But the canon of pure reason will prove that a validity of these ideas, rests on the practical use of reason, and what this validity is.

197.

197.

We previously posited here, however, the validity of moral conceptions and of the moral law itself, which are objects belonging to the critic of practical reason. Without therefore taking as yet a nearer view of that, which properly constitutes the moral of a cognition, we shall transpose ourselves to the way of thinking of the morally good-minded man, and contemplate, from this station, the relation of such a way of thinking to our conceptions of reason.

198.

Accordingly we observe, that all rational beings in general, of moral natures, acknowledge the law, and consider themselves independent of external motives of determining them to actions, i. e. as *free* beings. This conception of practical liberty rests upon an *original use of reason*, and in confining ourselves to this, has objective validity, and must be called a practical cognition, as well as every conception, that is founded on the original use of understanding, and which is there-

therefore called a theoretical cognition. Everybody considers himself, first according to his original use of understanding, consequently by a theoretical conception, as a being of nature, and ascribes to himself an empirical character. Each of his actions, according to this empirical character, is event natural, and, as such, link of a chain of nature, and necessarily determined by previous causes. The conception of liberty, in this reference to the empirical character of man, is counterintelligible and without all meaning. Even the same person, however, so far as he is conscious to himself of his moral nature, thinks himself, according to this original use of practical reason, by a practical conception, as a free being, consequently as independent on determinatives of nature, and so ascribes to himself an intelligibilis character. He, in this thought, refers his empirical phaenomenon and the laws of nature, which constitute, as rules, his special, empirical being, to a substratum of nature, for which he otherwise has no conception whatsoever, and of which his moral nature

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ture procures him a conception, that is also immediately taken from this use of practical reason, and has, therefore, like every theoretical conception, which is obtained by the original use of understanding, objective validity.

199.

As now the conception of practical liberty has validity, in the eyes of every moral being, who acknowledges the moral law; so the conceptions of God and immortality have this validity only in the eyes of the moral good-minded, for the aim of his aspirations reaches far beyond this life. He seeks to realize the conception of a best world, in which only he participates felicity, who is worthy of it. The reference of this world to its substratum, which the morally good man thinks by conceptions, that have meaning only relative to the aim to which he aspires, is conjoined with the sense of a well-spent life. Religion consequently is no doctrine, which, as science, is capable of communication and as a system subsisting of itself.

'Tis

'Tis the state, independent of all instruction, of the morally good man, who represents to himself the object, which he aspires to obtain.

200.

All *holding - for - true* is either an opining, believing, or knowing (scire). Opining is but a problematical holding for true, therefore, a holding for true from insufficient grounds. Believing is a holding for true from grounds, which are indeed not objectively, but only for the subject who holds for true, and therefore subjectively, sufficient. Knowing, finally, is an objectively sufficient holding for true. In order to be able to opine something one must at least be assured of its *real* possibility. As now the conceptions of God, and of the soul, as existing permanent substances, do not rest on the original use of understanding in the categories; one cannot even *opine*, that a God is, that the soul is of substantial, permanent, nature. There can as little be a *knowing* of these conceptions, since all objective grounds are

PART I.

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totally

totally wanting here, as no objects are given, (the category of existence is used as absolute predicate in these positions, and this application of the original use of understanding *existence* does not form the basis). *Belief*, however, may be either doctrinal or practical. In point of the first, it equally requires the real possibility of its object, and without this 'tis called *superstition*. The practical (moral) belief is now in general not at all a theoretical holding for true, and even therefore the real possibility of its object is no condition of it. The moral belief in God and immortality of the soul, consists in general in nothing farther, than in the reflexion of the morally good-minded man, who represents to himself the aim of all his moral exertions. He refers nature, in this reflection, to her substratum, and thinks it by moral conceptions, without willing to determine it by them. This holding for true is however only named belief, since it, together with the theoretical belief, rests on subjective grounds. The subjective ground of this moral belief is the morally good mind.

The

The Architectonic of pure Reason.

201.

A whole, whose parts are comprehended by a conception, and their conjunction determined by this conception, is called a *system*. This conception is named the systematical unity. It is but *technical*, when 'tis voluntarily made, and we lay it in nature, in order to observe nature under it's guidance. The more experience is extended, it happens so much the easier, that this technical unity is partly changed, partly quite abandoned, in order to guide the understanding better, by another conception, which is more suitable to the objects. 'Tis therefore the objects, which determine the technical unity, that must conform itself to them. The systematical unity, on the other hand, is *architectonic*, when it determines the objects. This is only thereby possible, by reason that it constitutes the analytic unity of the conception of the objects.

P 2

Thus

Thus the systematical unity, whereby we represent to ourselves classes of things natural in the descriptions of nature, is only *technical*, e. g. that which represents the quadrupeds ordered according to teeth or toes. We anticipate the whole by this conception. The more that is given us of it, so much the more do we correct the systematical unity of our conception thereof, and this system depends upon self-extending experience. The systematical unity in the conception of an organized body is, on the contrary, an *architectonic* unity. This systematical unity is the analytical of the conception. The whole is determined by the conception, and is not anticipated by it. This unity is therefore invariable. As the plant grows, the parts are but unfolded, which, and whose conjunction, are determined by the conception.

202.

The unity of the system of pure reason is *architectonic*. It is determined by its conception. In order to represent this to ourselves, we observe the different sources of our cognitions. Every cognition is either *historical* (*cognitio ex datis*) or *rational* (*cognitio ex principiis*). An objective, rational cognition may

may however be subjective yet only historical. He possesses that in itself rational cognition, merely historically, who has but as much, as has been given to him.

203.

Rational cognition now is either from conceptions, or by construction of conceptions. The first is named *philosophical*, the second *mathematical*. Mathesis, by all means, proceeds according to the position of contradiction, and the theorems of this science are cognitions from principles. But as every one of these propositions is deduced from others, its universality rests on construction alone.

Mathematical cognitions are objectively rational and can unquestionably be in a subject but historical. 'Tis not so easily possible, that mathematics, which are systematically acquired, can be subjectively historical; this may however be the case with a philosophical system. Why so? he, who has acquired a mathematical system, has also mathematized therewith at the same time. But whoever has made himself master of a phi-

lophony, has not yet on that account philosophised therewith. Philosophy must never be learned; but we must learn by it to philosophise.

204.

All philosophy is either cognition from pure reason, or cognition of reason from empirical principles. The first is *pure*, the second *empirical*, philosophy. That, which construction, that is the source of the universality of mathematical cognitions, effectuates in mathematical cognition, must be performed by induction and analogy in empirical philosophy, but which never begets strict universality.

205.

Pure philosophy has no other principles than the faculty of cognition itself. There is however a double aspect of these principles. *Transcendental philosophy*, which contains the system of this original use of understanding, considers these as original use of understanding. But *metaphysic* considers them as conceptions a priori of things. This
science

science is the system of all cognitions as absolutely a priori, and is either *metaphysic of nature* or *metaphysic of morals*. The first is the complex of all cognitions a priori of that which exists; the second is the complex of all moral cognitions a priori, or of all cognitions of that, which ought to exist.

The metaphysic of nature consists of the *ontology* and of the *physiology* of pure reason. The first is the complex of all theoretical conceptions, so far as they are original and a priori, and is either *immanent* or *transcendent*. The immanent physiology now is either the metaphysic of corporeal, or the metaphysic of cogitating, nature. The metaphysic of corporeal nature viewed from the station of a transcendental philosophy, contains the carrying back of the conception of matter to the original use of understanding, and therewith the principles of all rational doctrine of bodies (physics).

The immanent physiology of pure reason exhibits the original use of understanding as the chief principles of all our cognition.

The transcendent physiology exhibits these chief principles as the last grounds of things, and lays them in the things. These last grounds now lie without the territory of collective experience. This transcendent physiology of pure reason consists of rational psychology, which seeks the absolute unconditional of the given, I think; of rational cosmology, which extends the pure conceptions of understanding even to the unconditional, that, so long as their application suits the original use of understanding, represent objects as conditional; and of rational theology, which refers the conception of the sphere of all possibility to an individual being, and represents him as the most real being.

206.

We have already determined the scholastic conception of philosophy. But there is still a mundane conception thereof. According to which, philosophy is the truly moral cast of mind, and the philosopher, or sage, he, who subordinates all ends to that of morality.

The

The History of pure Reason.

207.

Speculative philosophy has, before other efforts of reason, the peculiarity of not being able to bring its conceptions to intelligibility. The speculative philosopher knows not even the place, whereon he stands, so long as he is not well familiarized with that, wherein all intelligibility consists. He however, who will judge of the speculations of others, must be himself a transcendental philosopher. Whoever then thinks of giving a history of speculative reason, and is not at the same time a critical philosopher, will but render unintelligibilities unintelligibly. We only observe here a threefold aspect of the history of pure reason.

1) With regard to the *object* of all cognitions, some philosophers were but *sensual*, others *intellectual philosophers* alone. The first maintained, that actuality is alone in the objects of the senses, and that every thing else is but imagination; the second said, on the other hand, that there is nothing in the senses

senses but illusion, and that the understanding alone cognises the true.

2) As to the *origin* of all cognitions, some philosophers were only *empirics*, others *noologists*. The first maintained, that all cognition is derived entirely from experience, the others, on the contrary, that some cognitions have their source in reason, independent of experience.

3) In point of *method* we distinguish the *natural* from the *scientific*. The *naturalist* maintains, that that must be decided by common sense, which no metaphysic has hitherto been able to decide. The *scientific* method has been till now, either dogmatical or sceptical. The dogmatist never swerves from the station of mere conceptions, and therefore loses himself in unintelligibilities or falls into counterintelligibilities. The sceptic discovers this bad state of the affair, but runs the risk himself of becoming *dogmatist*. Critical philosophy has opened the *critical* road: it represents the original use of understanding in the categories as the principle of all logical

cal use of the same: it is the foundation of all intelligibility and constitutes the real possibility of all our conceptions. Previous to the inquiry, if the transcendental ideas have objects, (refer to objects)? must we have weighed that, which constitutes all reference of our representations to objects viz. the synthetic, objective unity of consciousness, and therefore prior to such a question, another becomes necessary, namely, whether we also understand ourselves in these conceptions?

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART II.

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY
PART II.

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART II.
OF THE FOUNDATION OF ALL
PRACTICAL COGNITION.

SECTION I.
DISSECTION OF THE ORIGINAL USE
OF PRACTICAL REASON.

208.

That, which constitutes a *theoretical* cognition, can but be clearly represented after a transcendental philosophy. A cognition, whose object lies in the sphere of the intelligible, is theoretical. The original use of understanding in the categories must be its basis. The original, synthetic, objective
unity

unity of consciousness constitutes that reference of our representation to an object, which exalts the representation to a theoretical cognition. Nature however is the sphere of the intelligible, and theoretical cognitions, therefore, are synonymous with cognitions natural.

209.

When one understands by a practical cognition that, whose object is possible by a will, the distinction, between theoretical and practical cognitions, is lost. Events of nature would only be distinguished from one another in this discrimination with regard to their causes, and we would thereby say nothing more, than that some events are produced by causality from conceptions, others, on the contrary, by causes, which must be thought as inanimate and destitute of reason. This distinction would not reach the cognition itself.

210.

As every theoretical cognition rests on the original use of understanding in the categoricalo-

tegrities; so an original use of practical reason forms the basis of every practical cognition. This consists in the category, *moral liberty*, i. e. in the original positing of the causality of the will as independent on every determination of nature whatsoever.

When one does not tell a lie, because he is apprehensive it would be discovered, this apprehension determines him to speak the truth. If we view his action on this side, we do not judge it as moral, but only as an event of nature, which was determined by causes natural. My cognition of this event, which belongs to the chain of natural things, is but a theoretical one. But in judging this action as event of nature, I judge, at the same time, that the lie *should* not have been told, even independent of all apprehension, independent of every determinative, that can be assigned, which has influence on the mind. Necessity however is the character of a cognition from conceptions, and 'tis here the conception of moral liberty, under which I subsumpt a precise object. This original use of reason in the category *liberty* is the essence of a practical cognition. It must be named *morally* practical, so far as we understand, by practical cognition in general, conceptions of objects, which are produ-

ced by a will; as a cognition must then be called *technically* practical only, so far as the determinative of the will is thought as belonging to nature. We name this category *moral liberty* an original use of reason, since the conception of an absolutely free will is no conception of understanding (it's object is not to be found in the sphere of the intelligible). It is a conception of reason. Reason, which ascends from the conditional to the unconditional, generates the conception of the absolute unconditional. The original use of practical reason is independent hereof and of all speculation. The conception of liberty, which rests on this, has even therefore signification, whereas the conception of transcendental liberty is counterintelligible.

211.

We *postulate* this original use of practical reason, and thereby assert no position. As the original use of understanding in the categories of nature constitutes the whole understanding itself, the intelligent nature of man; so his moral nature consists wholly in this category, practical liberty.

212.

212.

'Twas our business in transcendental philosophy, to distinguish the categories, as original use of understanding, from their use as conceptions, where they refer as predicates to objects, and these are thereby thought, and this transcendental philosophy taught, that the conjunction, which we lay in the things, rests on an original, intellectual conjunction. 'Tis just so our care at present, to inculcate the distinction, betwixt the original use of practical reason, *liberty*, and the logical use, which is only grounded thereon; where we consider liberty as a designation, and attribute it to man.

213.

Man is called a moral being, so far as we attribute this practical liberty to him, and he thinks himself in this conception, as a being independent on nature and belonging to another (*intelligibilis*) world. Man consequently stands under two conceptions, which have both their objective validity. Conformably to the original use of understand-

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ding in the categories, he himself is a being of nature. Each of his actions is determined as event natural, and accordingly the rule of the manner of action of every man may be collected by observation from experience. This rule constitutes his empirical character. As we can never conclude from events on their *precise* causes, we often err in that, which we ascribe to the empirical character of a man, but never therein, that every man has such a character, which is only not fully manifested to us. Man, however, in conformity to the original use of practical reason, thinks himself as intelligibilis being. He refers all his actions and their whole empirical character, consequently his nature, to a substratum of nature, and in this reference appropriates to himself an intelligibilis character.

214.

The moral law now is the conception which is taken from this original use of practical reason. It is related to this category, liberty, as original use of practical
rea-

reason, in the same manner, as the principles of transcendental judgement to the original use of understanding in the categories of nature. As the synthesis of the conceptions, which the latter express, is but comprehended, because these principles are considered as conceptions of the synthetical, objective unity of consciousness; so the connection of conception in the moral law is only so far perfected, as it is represented as the conception of the original unity of practical reason.

215.

Act in such a manner, that the maxim of thy will can always be at the same time valid as principle of a universal legislation, is the principle of pure practical reason. Nothing but the practical liberty of the will is therein expressed.

216.

A determinative of the will is called *material*, when it is the representation of the pleasure, which the existence of an object produces. The will, so far as it is thought

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as depending upon material determinatives, is *morally bad*. The determinative of a will, so far as it is the moral law itself, is *formal*, and a will, which is actuated by this formal determinative, is *morally good*.

217.

All morality of actions then consists in the disposition of will. Even the same intention, however, has a twofold side. It is, first, event of nature, and stands, in this quality, under the law of causes and effects. When therefore we posit an action, which we judge as morally good, this judgment is totally different from that, whereby it is event of nature and grounded in the empirical character of man. This adoption of the moral law as one's own way of thinking was event of nature, and the complete grounds thereof are to be met with in the preceding time. If however secondly I judge a man as morally good or bad, I refer his whole phaenomenon to an intelligibilis ground, and his moral state is nothing, which had an inception to be. Though
all

all conception of the intelligibilis escapes us and is unintelligible, the liberty of the will nevertheless is a fact of practical reason.

218.

The will, which has adopted the moral law as its maxim, has divested itself of all material determinatives, and herein alone, but not in the quality of actions, consists the moral goodness. The conception, which is thought as the cause of its own proper object, is called *end*. This is either *subjective* or *objective*. It is the first, when the determinative of the will is material, and therefore the representation of pleasure, which the object produces, excites the will. But the end of the will, which is alone determined by the moral law, is objective.

219.

The subjective ends of a will are not otherwise cognoscible, than empirically. I must hold up the object to my sense of pleasure and displeasure, in order to experience, whether it will affect me agreeably or disa-

greeably. But that, which is objective end, is given with the practical liberty of man, that is, with his moral nature, and is a conception immediately resting thereon. This objective end is the *humanity* in the person of every man, and agreeably to this the moral law says: *act in such a manner, that thou considerst humanity, in all thy actions, always as end but never as bare mean.*

220.

This expression of the moral law, together with the preceding, asserts that, which constitutes all the morality of actions, namely the independence of the will upon sensual determinatives. But it shews besides, the object of all moral exertions, which is found in the sensible world. We say, according to this, that actions are but so far to be esteemed morally good, as the mere conception of humanity is the determinative of the will.

221.

When now certain actions are subsumpted under the moral law, and determined as
moral,

moral, they acquire the character of necessity, like every thing cognised from conceptions. This necessity of actions, which are determined as moral, is called *duty*.

222.

The conceptions of moral good and bad have their root in the original use of practical reason. But the objects of these conceptions lie in nature, and rank under conceptions natural, and we may therefore represent the objects of good and bad, by the thread of these conceptions natural, which takes place in the following table.

*Table of the Categories
of Liberty in regard of the Con-
ceptions of Good and Bad.*

1. Of Quantity.

Subjective, according to maxims (opinions of the individual).

Objective, according to principles (precepts).

A priori objective as well as subjective principles of liberty (laws).

2. Of

2. Of Quality.

Practical rules of performing (*praeceptivae*).

Practical rules of forbearing (*prohibitivae*).

Practical rules of exception (*exceptivae*).

3. Of Relation.

On the personality.

On the state of the person.

Reciprocally of one person on the
state of others.

4. Of Modality.

The licit and illicit.

Duty and contrary to duty.

Perfect and imperfect duty.

223.

Though the moral law be a law of liberty, consequently a conception of an object, that is no object of nature, nevertheless the actions, which we judge as moral lie in nature. Accordingly we have to propose a rule, which indeed is not the moral law itself, but
which

which comprehends the moral actions, according to that side entirely, whereby they are events natural. This rule is: *question thyself, if the action, which thou purpolest, when it must happen according to a law of nature, of which thou art thyself a part, can be considered as possible by thy will.*

224.

This rule, which comprises the moral actions according to their quality of nature only, is the mere *type* (the scheme as it were) of the moral-law. Actions, which are conformable to this type of the moral law, have *legality* and are *morally right*. But the judgment of their morality takes place according to the moral law itself, whether, to wit, it be determinative of the will and if the will be independent of every material determinative. Though an action should even bear the character of legality in itself, yet there is still much wanting, in order that it may also be morally good. Actions, on the contrary, may be repugnant to moral rightness,

ness, and nevertheless the intention, from which they sprang, must be judged as morally good. A moral error cleaves here entirely to the judgment and is not to be confounded with a fault of the *heart*, i. e. of the moral cast of mind itself.

225.

The *empiricism* of practical reason consists in holding the type of the moral law for identical with the moral law itself. There is, according to this mode of thinking, no distinction between the legality and morality of actions. 'Tis all one, from what source they spring, it is but necessary for them to possess the legal character, in order to be valid as morally good. When, instead of the formal determinative as principle of morality, a material is posited, nothing but actions of legal quality can arise herefrom, but never morally good actions.

226.

Practical, material determinatives in the principle of morality are:

S u b j e c t i v e

external.

of education (according to Mon- tagne).	of civil government (according to Man- deville).
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internal.

of the physical sense (according to Epicu- rus).	of the moral sense (according to Hut- cheson).
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O b j e c t i v e

internal.

of perfection
(according to Wolf
and the Stoics.)

external.

of the will of God
(according to Crusius
and other theologi-
cal moralists).

227.

When, on the other hand, the applica-
tion of moral conceptions is immediately di-
rected towards the intelligibilis and transcen-
dent,

dent, and no type of the moral law is acknowledged, the *mysticism* of practical reason then consists in such a cast of mind. It permutes that, which only served as *symbol*, with the *scheme*, and puts a theoretical in the place of the practical, objective validity of moral conceptions. The *rationalism* of practical reason is the manner of thinking, which lies betwixt the empiricism and the mysticism, and which has alone signification, when it rests on the original use of practical reason. It consists in the distinction between the moral law and its type, and herewith in that betwixt the morality of actions and their mere legality.

228.

As therefore the conception of liberty has but a practical, and no theoretical, objective validity, as it has only an original use of reason, and no original use of understanding, for a basis; so has the question: *how* the moral law can be determinative of the will, and therefore the will, independent on all determinations of nature, a causality?

no

no meaning. But the question, *what* does the moral law effectuate as sole determinative of the will? is of another nature.

229.

We distinguish between an objective and subjective determinative of the will. The moral law is objectively determinative, so far as man, as moral being, acknowledges its authority. It is subjectively determinative of that will, which has received it as its maxim. A subjective determinative of the will is called a *spring* (elater animi). We do not therefore enquire: how the moral law can be spring of a will, but only: what is the consequence, so far as it is spring?

230.

The human will is affected by sensitive determinatives (inclinations). The moral law can therefore never be thought by men but in the form of an *imperative*. Their actions are always *duties* and the will itself is never a *sacred* will. So far now as the moral law is spring of a will, it confines the inclinations

tions to the condition of the harmony with itself, and excites a *sense* of displeasure. But the consciousness of this adoption of the moral law as maxim of the will, and the depression of the inclinations, awakes a sentiment, which is named *esteem, respect*. This is the true *moral sentiment*, which must not be thought as pathologically (by grounds of nature), but as *morally effectuated*, namely as effect of the practical liberty of man. This moral sentiment itself now becomes spring of the will, and is, since it is no pathological sense, the source of morally good actions. Every other sense, which is occasioned pathologically, is contrary to true morality, and can at most be the source of the legal quality of actions, but never of morally good actions.

231.

Esteem is synonymous with the sense of our own moral worth. That, of which one says, that *'tis only good for a certain purpose*, has a *relative* and subjective value alone; a price may be found, which is equivalent

valent to it. The morally good sentiment on the contrary has an *absolute* value, that is, *worth, dignity*. That will alone is morally good, to which the moral law itself is maxim, consequently nothing could be found in the world, to which it would sacrifice its sentiments. Such a will is *absolutely good*. *Self-conceit* (arrogantia) is found among the inclinations of man, which the conception of *self-love* (philautia) comprises. It consists in the way of thinking, wherein the value of one's person is elsewhere placed, than in the moral sentiment. While the moral law depreciates this imaginary worth, a sense of *humility* arises. This passes to esteem, by means of the consciousness, that this humiliation is even already to be looked upon as a morally good sentiment and work of practical liberty.

232.

Respect and esteem are only applicable to persons and never to things. The latter may be admired but can be neither respected nor esteemed. *Admiration* is a feeling, which

PART II.

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springs

springs from the shock of the mind, that did not expect the greatness of a thing, which it meets with. *Esteem*, on the contrary, is the sentiment, which arises from the conviction of the existence of the true, morally good disposition of a person.

233.

The usual conception of the moral sentiment, whereby it is represented as the sense of happiness, which springs from the consciousness of having acted well, and then as an incentive to virtue, is different from this representation of it. 'Twould, in that manner, be degraded to a pathological sense. He, who is conscious to himself of having acted for this feeling's sake, will even therefore not partake of it, because a sensitive determinative influenced his will. The *self-content* of the well-minded soul is not to be holden for felicity itself, but only the condition, under which, he alone, whose cast of mind is already morally good, can first be happy. The commending of this sense as a peculiar species of felicity, and therewith willing to entice

tice to virtue, is, besides that the consequence thereof can never be morally good sentiment, a quite false representation. For the greater the earnest of this good sentiment is, the more the true, moral worth (total independence on sensible determinatives) is noticed, so much the more will a mind, thus attuned, harbour suspicion of the purity of its own sentiments, and take so much the more care against the mixture of extraneous inducements; which state of mind is surely not that of self-contentment.

SECTION II.

THE RELIGION, WHICH IS FOUNDED
ON THE ORIGINAL USE OF PRACTI-
CAL REASON, OR MORAL
THEOLOGY.

234.

When the morally good man represents to himself the aim of his exertion, he is conscious, that he aspires to attain something, which cannot be reached in nature. Though this conception seems to be devoid of all reality, yet the conception of morality, which occasions it, has sufficient meaning, since it rests upon an original use of reason.

235.

This aim of the morally good man is the order of the moral world. He wills accordingly that he, who has made himself *worthy* of felicity, ought to *participate* of it. The conception of the worthiness of felicity entirely arises from the reflexion upon this aim,

aim, and is an original, practical conception. He is unworthy of felicity, agreeably to this conception, who makes it the chief determinative of his actions. For the principle of the moral bad consists herein, namely, in the dependence of the will on material determinatives. Though the morally good man is influenced by the formal determinative of the moral law alone, the order of the moral world, in which felicity and worthiness of it are in harmony, is nevertheless the object of his will. This conception is identical with that of the *chief good* and with that of the *best world*.

236.

Felicity is not by far the chief good; reason *approves* not of its possession, provided he, who partakes of it, be not worthy of it; but virtue is even as little the chief good; it is indeed the condition, under which the participation of felicity is an object of approbation; the whole object of the morally good will however consists in their conjunction.

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237.

The conception of the chief good is no theoretic, objectively valid conception. This object can never be met with in nature, and the moments of the chief good, altho' this conception unites them, and this union itself rests on the original use of practical reason, have nevertheless a quite different root. Felicity, which is the satisfaction of all our inclinations (as well *extensive*, according to the multifariousness, as *intensive*, according to the degree, and also *protensive*, according to the duration) depends on nature, whose mechanism has no reference to moral good-conduct; the source of the latter, on the contrary, is no object of nature and nothing but independence on all determinations natural.

238.

The morally good-minded man, who can have nothing in view, but the object of an order of the moral world, at which he aims, refers all nature, of which he overlooks but a small part, to a substratum of nature, and in this reference hopes, that the order of the moral

moral world will be brought about through nature, considered as a whole, altho' he should neither meet with it in each of her parts, nor even otherwise than only as incidental phaenomenon.

239.

He believes the immortality of the soul, in reference to a substratum of nature. For the object, at which he aims, is *holiness*, perfect purity of his mind. He knows that this is unattainable in every finite time, and therefore posits the time beyond all bounds, in which it will, by constant approximation, be attained by him.

240.

He hopes too, that nature, contemplated as a whole and in relation to its substratum, is a moral world-order, in which felicity according to worthiness will fall to the lot of every moral being of the world. That is, he believes in *God*, as a moral author of nature, who is benign, holy and just, who is omniscient, in order to know his most hid-

den thoughts and their moral worth, who is omnipotent, by reason that nature may be consistent with the end of a moral world-order, who is omnipresent and eternal, in order that nature, in all places and at all times, may be consonant to the conception of a moral order.

241.

This is by no means a theoretical, but a pure, moral belief. The conceptions, by which God is therein thought, do not determine this Being. They are the mode, in which the virtuous man thinks the reaching of the aim of all his aspirations. *He thinks God according to the analogy* with his own intelligent nature, but *concludes* not, according to analogy, from the latter upon the attributes of God. The true, moral faith is nothing but the confidence of the good-minded man, that he will attain the end, to which his whole exertion is directed.

242.

The difference then is obvious between the theoretical assurance of the truths, that
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there is a God and that the soul is immortal, which were endeavoured to be obtained by speculation, and this moral confidence, which is at present represented. Intelligibility is neglected on the first road, but not on the second. There is therefore no chasm, betwixt the morally good mind and the moral belief, which requires to be filled up, in order to effectuate a transition from the one to the other. The morally good man is of himself the true believer, and needs not first to be led to this belief.

SECTION III.

METHOD OF PRACTICAL REASON.

243.

We understand by the method of practical reason, the manner of procuring an inlet into the human mind for the moral law as a spring. Morally good actions are now by all means such, as must be considered as effects of liberty; but the possibility of an action through liberty can never be explained. The purpose of this doctrine of method can therefore be nothing more, than to shew the causes, that lie in experience, which are proper for procuring influence to the moral law on the maxims of the will, and to elevate it to the chief determinative of the will. We must, in order to think actions as morally good, refer them to a something, which is no object of nature. But these actions (the pure disposition of human will, which is determined by the moral law alone) are events
natu-

natural, and stand under the law of the connexion of causes and effects, and in this respect the rule of the alteration of human mind may, without doubt, be expressed.

244.

The ill consequences of his bad conduct ought, by all means, to be shewn to one of a savage and rude disposition, and when 'tis discovered that the moral sentiment is not entirely stifled in him, the dissatisfaction with himself, which is a consequence of moral transgressions, may also be represented to him as a motive for betaking himself to a good course of life. The will, which follows these external determinatives alone, is not yet the morally good will, but is thereby become more capable of the pure, moral determinative of the moral law itself.

245.

After the force of the inclinations has been broken by external, opposite determinatives, the moral law itself must finally become the sole determinative and maxim of the

the will. This adoption of the moral law as maxim of the will, this alteration of the cast of the human mind, where, independent of external, material determinatives, the formal determinative alone is spring of the will and maintains the sole dominion over it, is, without doubt, natural event, and determined by preceding events. As to the disposition of will, which is independent on external determinatives, it is nothing else than practical liberty itself, and the morally good man excludes himself, by this conception, from the sphere of objects of nature, and thinks himself as belonging to another world which is, as substrate of nature, in relation to it.

246.

There is properly but *one* virtue, and there are, in the true, practical sense, no gradations of morality; but the morally good mind consists entirely in the freedom of the will from material determinatives. This morally good cast of mind is essentially *one*. So far, however, as this disposition, on the other hand, is event of nature, it has, like every
causa-

causality, a degree, above which greater and smaller are possible, and this degree is then greater, so much the greater the power of the inclinations was, which acted upon the will.

247.

The subjection of the will to the moral law produces the *moral sentiment*. This, as a sense, which follows the consciousness of having acted from duty, is *self-contentment*. Tho' this be not felicity itself, but only the condition, under which the good-minded man is alone susceptible of it, it is nevertheless to be considered as moral spring. The culture of this is advantageous to moral goodness and therefore morally necessary.

248.

Though actions from *sympathy* must not be permuted with those from duty, and the morally good cast of mind is nowhere to be posited but in the freedom of the will from sensitive determinatives, yet actions from this fellow-feeling may be considered as moral, and that not as pathological alone,
but

but even as a moral sentiment, when its degree is produced thro' moral zeal, and its cultivation exercised from duty.

249.

The belief in God and in immortality is not superstition, but constitutes religion entirely under the condition, that it rests on a morally good disposition and the state of mind of the virtuous man, who can never lose sight of the aim of a moral world-order. This faith, thus grounded on morality, is again favourable to morality itself. It fortifies the mind, that was disquieted by the aspect of this nature, which does not agree with the conception of a moral world-order, and, animated by this only true religion, the good-minded hopes to obtain the object, which cannot be accomplished by nature, so far as he overlooks it.

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART III.

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF

CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

PART III

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART III.

OF ORIGINAL, REFLECTIVE
JUDGEMENT AS PRINCIPLE OF
CONJUNCTION BETWEEN THE
ORIGINAL, THEORETICAL, AND
ORIGINAL, PRACTICAL,
COGNITIONS.

250.

There are then two cognitions essentially different from one another, namely, theoretical and practical. Philosophy itself accordingly consists of a theoretical, and of a practical, part. The total difference of principles determines the distinction of these cog-

PART III.

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nitions themselves. When therefore a cognition concerns an object, which is possible by a will, and though it expresses the manner in which we can accomplish certain ends, and realize objects, which we either desire actually or could however once desire, such a cognition may still be termed practical; it is nevertheless only a technically practical, and belongs to the theoretical, that is, natural, cognition, but not an original, practical cognition. In order that a cognition may be originally practical, it must rest on the conception of liberty; not however on the conception of transcendental liberty. For this would not be a cognition, but only a transcendent conception resting on the transcendental use of the categories, by which we surmount the sphere of the intelligible. The conception of liberty, which is the ground of cognitions originally practical, is, as already shown, the conception of the original use of practical reason, which consists in the original positing of the causality of the will, as independent on determinations natural.

251.

As the diversity of principles separates these cognitions from one another, where the first constitute the original use of understanding and that which is called theoretical, but the last consist in an original use of reason and are the basis of all practical cognitions, so these principles, considered as conceptions, are also of a quite different species. The conceptions of understanding concern nature. The conception of liberty, on the contrary, concerns an object, which is not in nature. Man thinks himself, by it, as belonging to another sphere of things, in which he is independent on the determinatives of nature.

Therefore the same being thinks himself, first, as being of nature, by conceptions, which express the original use of understanding in the categories; and secondly too as intelligibilis object, by the conception of liberty, which expresses the original use of practical reason, whereby he excludes himself from nature. We can now represent to ourselves the query after the conjunction of

these two conceptions. Wherein consists the transition from the human cogitation by conceptions of nature to that through the conception of liberty?

252.

The better to hit the sense of this question, we recall the cases to mind, where the conception of conjunction between two conceptions, and that, which is transition, from the thinking of an object by a conception to the thinking by another, is immediately clear. If we think an object by two conceptions of nature, e. g. a man by the conceptions, learned and rich; the original use of understanding in the categories is the guide and the principle, according to which we arrive from the one designation, whereby we fix the analytical unity of these conceptions, at the other. When now we consider men as beings of nature, consequently contemplate his disposition of will as event and, according to the law of nature of causality, as necessarily determined, the application of the conception of liberty to him is contrary to the original use

use of understanding and consequently to the real intelligibility of a conception. If therefore liberty be posited in nature, the conception is counterintelligible, without all object, and no conjunction can be found there between dependence of the human will and its self-determination. The liberty of the will, on the contrary, is itself category and original use of reason, and the reference of a disposition of will, that is independent of external determinatives, to men, has, accordingly, by all means, signification. But the conception of this absolute self-determination of the will takes man out of the sphere of nature and refers him to its substrate. The conjunction of this twofold reference of man to nature and to its substratum, rests on an original, transcendental principle, that, as it were, lies in the middle, betwixt the original use of understanding, whereon the conceptions of nature rest, and the original use of reason, whereon rest all conceptions of morality.

253.

We have learned to know the understanding as an original, legislative faculty. These laws are the pure conceptions, under which nature stands. Reason too is an original, legislative faculty. It is the moral law, by which man thinks himself connected to another order of things than nature is, and this law is even therefore a law of reason, as its object (the human will) is thereby thought as free, consequently by a mere conception of reason. Reason is not theoretically (in reference to nature) legislative, and there is nothing but a dialectic of reason, when it is considered as such. Understanding can even as little be considered as practically legislative, and all true morality is annihilated, when the moral law is attempted to be planted in theoretical soil. We find judgement between understanding and reason. The question now appears at first obscure, if this judgement too be originally legislative. It will however be quickly cleared up. We but previously observe that, as all our cognition is either theoretical or practical, an original legislation of
judge-

judgement constitutes no new sort of cognitions, tho' it be possible that the principle of conjunction between theoretical and practical philosophy may be found therein.

254.

Pure logic considers judgement only as a *subsuming* faculty of cognition. It discovers itself hereafter in the bare application of the laws of understanding. Understanding, however, has no other original laws belonging to it, than the pure, intellectual conceptions, whereby it refers in general to nature. But all logical use of understanding consists in thinking and therefore in representing things by the adding of certain designations. Now the categories are but the most universal designations of objects of nature. If these objects therefore are to be adapted to the logical use of understanding, the understanding must in its empirical use arrive at designations, which it can separate and thereby fix the objects. We can easily conceive, that the objects of nature, in point of their predicates, could be thoroughly dif-

ferent from one another. There would then be no universal, empirical conceptions, and for that reason no logical use of understanding. For all that, we would not cease previously to posit that nature, besides the universal laws of the intellectual conceptions, is still subjected to certain, particular rules, and our understanding would never desist from seeking these.

255.

When we consider the understanding as already in possession of certain, particular rules of nature, the business of judgement, relatively to these conceptions, is but subsumptive. Judgement must now be *reflective*, i. e. proceed to discover these particular rules of nature, before it can be subsumptive. Even this business however already takes place under the previous position of a rule, to wit: that nature is ordered suitable to our understanding. This previous position is essential to reflective judgement and to be considered as transcendental principle, i. e. as original use of judgement. Judgement, in it, is *originally legislative*.

256.

256.

Previously to posit, that nature is fixed in certain, particular, natural rules and so adjusted to our understanding, is, however, just as much as to assume, that an understanding has arranged nature in favour of ours. This previous position is, by no means, an objective assertion, consequently no hypothesis. It expresses nothing but a transcendental principle, as the original use of reflective judgement, whereby a logical use of understanding is but first possible. When we proceed thereon to discover particular rules of nature, which is nothing else than the seeking of the designations, whereby we can think and fix the objects of nature, we meet with this original use of reflective judgement and this transcendental, previous position of the harmony of nature with our understanding.

257.

But as this principle in no manner determines the objects, and we can easily conceive, that nature could be such, that we
should

should not understand any thing at all in it, we judge its harmony with our understanding as fortuitous, and imagine to ourselves an understanding, which nature has so regulated in favour of ours, in order that we may be able to orient ourselves therein. This position, understood objectively, would be directly transcendent. But we intend to express nothing more by it, than the original use of reflective judgement. We represent to ourselves something in general, in fixing the analytical unity of consciousness by certain designations. The demand, therefore, immediately lies in the logical use of understanding which refers to nature, that its objects can be thought by certain designations, which can be laid hold of by our understanding. The *conformity-to-end* (*Zweckmässigkeit*) in general is the harmony of an object with the conception of it as end. This is *material*, so far as it is the accord of a multifarious with a conception already agreeable to the particular rules of nature. The conformity to end in an artificial production of human understanding is material.

The

The artist uses the destination of the raw materials, which he knows already, and, suitably to these particular rules of nature, produces a form, which corresponds to his conception. The conformity to end, however, is but *formal*, when it is the harmony of a multifarious with a conception, so far as this conception is a particular law of nature herself.

258.

All conformity to end of nature is either material or formal. We judge the conformities to end in organized productions of nature as material ones; the quality of nature, on the contrary, where she is determined in particular rules and so suited to our understanding, is her formal conformity to end. This formal conformity to end of nature is, then, the principle of reflective judgement. As to the material conformity to end, the judging of many of her productions as ends is also no determinative judgment. This teleological judgment of nature likewise rests on a preceding reflection, in which we sought

sought a conception, in order thereby to be able to think these objects. We refer these things of nature, in this conception, to an understanding, which is cause of them according to conceptions, and thus have we a criterion, whereby we fix these objects; but no designation, by which we are capable of determining the substratum of nature.

259.

'Tis easily seen, after this general view of judgement, as an original, legislative faculty, how the law of reflective judgement can produce a conjunction between the theoretical legislation of understanding and the practical of reason, and so between theoretical and practical cognitions. A reflection precedes all reference of our understanding to nature in a logical use of understanding, whereby we think its objects, and this rests on an original use of judgement. The conception, by which we think this, is that of the formal conformity to end of nature, in which we refer nature to an intelligence without nature. This reference however grounds

no cognition of the substrate of nature. The whole validity of this reference, so far as cognition is thereby founded, concerns the objects of nature. The object of a theoretical cognition is an object of nature; the object of a practical cognition is the liberty of the will, which is no object of nature; The conception of the formal conformity to end of nature now is a conception, lying between both sorts of cognitions, which conjoins them.

260.

Understanding, judgement, and reason, make up the cognoscitive faculty, and we have represented them as original, legislative faculties, in which business consists entirely transcendental philosophy. The cognoscitive faculty, the sense of pleasure and displeasure and the appetitive faculty, are, however, all the mental faculties. The understanding grounds, by the pure intellectual conceptions, all theoretical cognitions; reason determines the will by its conception of liberty. It may therefore be presumed, that

that a conjunction will be found between judgement, as original, legislative faculty, and the sense of pleasure and displeasure.

261.

Pleasure is the state of mind, wherein one is conscious to himself of the compassing of a design. When now we posite an understanding, that is, a faculty of exhibiting objects by conceptions, consequently a logical use of understanding, which is joined to the original use of understanding in the categories, we posite therewith, at the same time, the design, which lies in it, of finding conceptions, in order to be able thereby to cogitate its objects. The discovery of particular rules of nature is, therefore, always accompanied with the sentiment of pleasure.

262.

There may now be objects, of such a nature, that with regard to them, the transition from the original to the logical use of understanding (from intuition to conceptions) is peculiarly easy. The consciousness of this
harmony

harmony of the multifarious with a conception in general is the sentiment of the *beautiful*. The original, intellectual synthesis, on the contrary, cannot, with regard to other objects, so easily make the transition to a conception. A sentiment of displeasure arises, when the understanding is not prompt with the comprehension. Should this unattainableness of the synthetical unity, and herewith of a conception of understanding, occasion a reference of this synthesis to a conception of reason, this state of mind is the sentiment of the *sublime*. The judgment of objects as beautiful and sublime is called *aesthetical*.

263.

The consideration of reflective judgement is therefore divided into two dissections. The first dissects the aesthetical judgment of the sublime and beautiful, and the second the teleological judgment of many objects of nature (to wit the organized), which we cannot think, by any other conception, than by that of ends alone.

264.

264.

The following table will be of use in order to overlook the territory of transcendental philosophy.

<i>Collective faculties of the Mind.</i>	<i>Faculty of Cogni- tion.</i>	<i>Principles a priori.</i>	<i>Application to</i>
Faculty of cognition.	Understanding.	Legality.	Nature.
Sense of pleasure & displeasure.	Judgement.	Conformity- to-end.	Art.
Faculty of appeti- tion.	Reason.	Scope.	Liberty.

SEC.

SECTION I.

OF THE DISSECTION OF THE ORIGINAL USE OF JUDGEMENT.

Dissection of the aesthetical Judgment of the Beautiful and Sublime.

265.

Designations, which belong to an object, are expressed in a judgment of cognition. Now a judgment of cognition can also, 'tis true, by all means, be possible, with regard to a beautiful object. It expresses, however, nothing farther, than the quality of the object, which occasions that we judge it as beautiful. The aesthetical judgment of the beautiful is totally different from such a judgment of cognition. No designation of the object whatsoever is expressed therein, but only the mere complacency, which we have in the contemplation of it.

We shall compare the æsthetical judgment of the beautiful with the judgments: something is agreeable, or good. These can also, by all means, be judgments of cognition. The object is good, that corresponds to the conception, to which it ought to correspond, and the judgment of the agreeable coincides here, with that of the good, as mere, cognoscitive judgments. But the æsthetical judgment of the agreeable is totally different from that of the good. We express in the first, the sense of pleasure which the object begets in us. The sense of the agreeable is therefore independent of all contemplation, the object affects us, and we resign ourselves, as it were, to it. We but begin to judge after we are satiated, which is then only logical, and seek after the properties of the object which affords us delight. The complacency in the good, on the contrary, is *grounded* upon judgment. We have in this a precise conception in view, and the complacency arises from the harmony which is found between the object and

and this conception. It is the complacency in perfection.

267.

The agreeable pleases immediately in the sensation; the good pleases by means of reason by a precise conception. The sense of the agreeable is not founded upon any judgment; the complacency in the good is founded upon judgment. The sentiment of the beautiful is now, on the other hand, a complacency in the judgment itself. The multifarious of the object, which we judge as beautiful, is such, that, in the original use of intellect, the understanding hits upon certain criteria, by which the object can be held fast. The consciousness of this harmony of the multifarious with a conception in general (of the original, synthetic unity with any one analytical) is the sentiment of the beautiful. It is then no *precise* conception, with which the multifarious is judged as harmonizing therein, as in the judgment of the good. It is only the harmony of the multifarious with a conception in general (with any one

conception), which is expressed in a judgment on the beautiful, so far as we still consider it as cognoscitive judgment. But when considered as æsthetical judgment, we express in it the state of mind of this harmony of the original with the logical use of understanding.

268.

Since the beautiful pleases in the judgment itself, since it is not, like the sense of the agreeable, independent of judgment, or, like that of perfection founded upon judgment, and since it is the state of mind of the judgment, the appellation æsthetical judgment may, without danger of being misunderstood, even exclusively be used for the judgment of the beautiful.

The senses do not judge at all, and the term, æsthetical judgment, seems therefore to express an absurdity. The sense of the agreeable too is independent of all judgment, and has no connexion with it; a judgment has indeed preceded the complacence in the good, it is however in itself independent of
judg-

judgment. But the complacence in the beautiful is the sentiment in the judgment itself, and is essentially connected with it. Such a judgment is therefore termed *a pure judgment of taste*.

269.

We shall consider the pure judgment of taste according to the clew of the logical functions of judgments, and first take notice of its quality. The pure judgment of taste is, according to *quality*, *aesthetical*, i. e. a complacency is expressed in it in the judgment itself. This judgment is reflective. The understanding seeks a conception (certain designations), in order to be able to think its object. The consciousness of compassing this design (the harmony of the multifarious with a conception) is entirely the sentiment of the beautiful. This judgment is, therefore, also free from *interest*, and the complacency, that is expressed therein, a disinterested complacency. To have an interest in something, is to desire the existence of the object. That, which is judged

as agreeable, begets desire for the object, that produces this sense. The complacency in the good (in perfection, not in the useful) is indeed also divested of interest, and may, even on that account, (as will be shewn afterward) be united with the sentiment of the beautiful. These sentiments are however totally different one from another, as the first springs up from the harmony, which is found between the object and the determinate conception, to which it ought to correspond, but the latter is the state of mind of the reflection, wherein we proceed upon a conception, and are conscious to ourselves of the harmony with a conception in general. Our language distinguishes also this difference. 'Tis said of the agreeable, *it delights*; of the beautiful, *it pleases*; but of the good, *it is approved*.

270.

Concerning the *quantity* of a pure judgment of taste, it is, like every judgment of experience, particular. The predicate beauty can only be added to the object, which is
given

given in experience and judged as beautiful, and this conception cannot embrace more, than the synthesis of experience reaches. Tho' the judgment of taste be but *objectively particular*, yet it is *subjectively universal*, as well as the judgment of experience. As every judgment of experience lays claim to everybody's assent; so this claim to universal assent is also declared in a pure judgment of taste.

271.

The pure judgment of taste is, by this designation, quite different from the judgment of the agreeable and from that of the good. The judgment on the agreeable is subjectively particular. I must say of that, which I judge as agreeable: it is agreeable *to me*. I say, on the contrary, of that, which I judge as beautiful, the thing is beautiful, and though I declare my own complacency therein, 'tis nevertheless as if I pronounced a cognitive judgment. A pure judgment of taste comes nearer to the judgment of the good, than to that of the agreeable. That,

which is good (perfect) pleases universally. But the good pleases by means of a conception, the beautiful, on the other hand, without all conception and still universally.

272.

I express in the judgment of the agreeable the species of sense, which the object produces in me. But that, which produces the sensation of the agreeable in me, may, by all means, be indifferent, or even disagreeable to another. A cognoscitive judgment, wherein the harmony of the multifarious, with the precise conception of that, which the object ought to be, is expressed, precedes the aesthetical judgment of the good, in which I declare the sentiment of approbation, and is founded upon this judgment of cognition. The subjectively common validity of the aesthetical judgment of the beautiful may now be comprehended. Even this property of the pure judgment of taste can also be inferred from the preceding, that a complacency without interest is expressed therein. For, when I judge of an object perfectly

fectly free from all interest, it is, as if I judged from the station of collective humanity. But all that can be argued from this, is only the impartiality of the assertion, that the object, which is termed beautiful, is judged with complacency. The common validity of this sentiment however depends upon nothing, but that the judgment of the beautiful object is reflective, in which we proceed upon a conception, in order to think the object, and that we are conscious to ourselves therein of the harmony of the multifarious with a conception in general, nay, this consciousness constitutes the very sentiment of beauty. As I pretend therefore that every other person must find the object beautiful, which I judge as beautiful; so there lies in this pretension nothing more, than that the other must be an intelligent being, who, as well as I, makes a transition in his cognitions, from an original to a logical use of understanding, and who (as intelligent being) has the design, in every original use of understanding, of fixing his object by designations, i. e. of thinking it.

273.

We may explain the sentiment of beauty as the state of mind of the free play of our cognoscitive powers (of the original and logical use of understanding). It is no precise conception, which the contemplation of the beautiful has for object, and which renders it a serious occupation. That, according to quantity, therefore, is beautiful, which pleases universally without conception.

274.

We observe, as to the *relation* of a pure judgment of taste, that beauty is no predicate, that belongs to the object, which we judge as beautiful. 'Tis our own feeling in the contemplation of the object, which we express therein. The object itself is also not given as the cause of this feeling; otherwise the object must be named agreeable, but not beautiful. No other relation is expressed in a pure judgment of taste, than that of the cognoscitive powers one to another, which are found in the state that is conformable to the production of a cognition. It is therefore

fore a *subjective*, but not an objective, *conformity to end* which is expressed therein; which subjective conformity to end, is only formal, i. e. a conformity to end without any end whether subjective or objective.

275.

The objective conformity to end of a thing is the harmony of the multifarious with the precise conception of that, which the thing ought to be. Consequently this cannot be judged but by reference of the multifarious to an end. This objective conformity to end is now either the *utility* or *perfection* of a thing. The utility is the harmony of the multifarious with a subjective end, and the judgment of the useful is here so little identical with that of the beautiful, that the first is rather detrimental to the latter. The complacency in utility is united with interest, and not, like the beautiful, a free complacency. He only judges the useful with complacency, who desires this end. Perfection, on the contrary, is the harmony of a multifarious with an end, without

out regarding at all, that it is end to the judging subject. There is indeed a complacency in perfection, which, like that in the beautiful, may as well be universally presumed, as it also is without interest.

276.

Certain philosophers, on account of this harmony of the complacency in perfection with that in beauty, have explained beauty as a perfection, which is thought in a confused (sensitive) manner. The difference, according to this, between beauty and perfection, would only be subjectively valid, and of the same sort, as the difference between the conception of right and wrong, among men, who cannot point out its designations, and this same conception, as a representation, which is thought distinctly. The perfection, however, of a thing, without conception of that, which it ought to be, is a nonentity. As now the judgment of the beauty of a thing has no reference whatever to the conception of it; so is there a great difference between the perfection and beauty of a thing.

277.

277.

But since the complacency in perfection, as well as that in beauty, is free from interest and universally valid, a union of beauty with the perfection of a thing is possible. There is therefore a twofold beauty, the *free* (*pulchritudo vaga*) and the *adherent* only (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). The judgment of the first previously posits no conception of what the object ought to be, that of the second posits such a conception previously.

Flowers are free beauties. Many birds (the parrot, the colibri) would be judged by one, as free beauties, who has yet no fixed conception of them. The drawings *a la greque*, the foliage on frames, or on paper hangings &c. signify of themselves nothing, they represent nothing, no object under a precise conception, and are vague beauties. But the beauty of a man (of a man, woman, or child), the beauty of a horse, of a building, (as church, palace, arsenal, or temple), previously posits a conception of the end, which determines, what the thing should be, and is therefore only adherent beauty.

278.

278.

The judgment on the perfection of a thing limits that on its beauty. In the first is thought what the thing ought to be. There an object can please as free beauty, which, in reference to the end, to which it ought to correspond, displeases. It may be explained from this how, notwithstanding the judgment of the beautiful lays claim to the approbation of everybody, a contest, between the judges of the beauty of an object, is nevertheless possible. The one neglects the end, and has but the free beauty of the object in view; the other, on the contrary, considers the perfection of the object, and cannot, under this condition, find the object beautiful. Though the conception of adherent beauty has meaning; yet would that of an adherent perfection be totally insignificant.

279.

It follows of course, from the nature of the judgment of the beautiful, that there can be no objective rules of taste, that is, no conceptions, which represent that, which is beautiful.

tiful. For beauty is no quality of the object; but only the sentiment of the harmony of the multifarious of it with a conception in general. Tho' there can be no objective rules of taste, subjective ones are, however, possible. These are called *models* of taste. The unanimity, as far as possible, of all ages and nations, in the judgment of beautiful exhibitions, is an empirical, altho' not sufficiently certain, criterion, that these are models. Whoever imitates them and succeeds therein, shews only address, but taste, only so far, as he can judge of this exhibition, and even of the taste of others. He therefore, who judges of every model itself, discovers, that, independent of every empirical exhibition, he is conscious to himself of a maximum, nay, of aspiring to produce it, by which he is even capable of judging of every production whatsoever. The representation of a certain greatest, which we can never bring forth itself, but only approximations of it, is named an *idea*; and the object of the idea an *ideal*. Such a prototype of taste, or however at least the aspiring to produce it,
is

is to be found in every one, who judges of beautiful objects with taste.

280.

But we observe, in the first place, that, that beauty, which is susceptible of an ideal, is not the vague, but only the adherent beauty. The first is not capable of a comparison. Of a flower, of a piece of furniture, of a fine prospect, I but say: these objects are beautiful. But the beauty of a man or woman may have degrees; because a precise conception of what the object ought to be, forms the basis of the æsthetical judgment, wherein we hold it up to that prototype, which is found in ourselves. Even indeed when we have a conception of what the object should be, but when this conception is not precise enough, its beauty is still not susceptible of an ideal. A beautiful mansion, a beautiful tree, or a beautiful garden, is almost judged as free beauty, since the end of these objects is not sufficiently determined by their conception.

281.

281.

Among all beings in the world, man is the only one, of whom the conception of that, which he ought to be, is thoroughly determined. Consequently man too, among all objects in the world, is (alone) susceptible of an ideal of beauty.

282.

The *aesthetical normal idea* belongs in the *first* place hereto. 'Tis the scheme, which lies, as it were, before nature in the bringing forth of man, and which she probably never fully reaches in any one individual. This scheme, however, lies nowhere, but in the imagination of the judger, and we are conscious to ourselves of it at least in the judgment of a beautiful man as a standard. Its corresponding object does not please by its beauty, but by its perfection. We judge of the exhibition, in so far, but only scholastically. But the question is, how we attain to this standard, as it is nowhere empirically given, and as every empirical exhibition is, on the contrary, subordinate to it. The fol-

lowing answer to this will, in all probability, be satisfactory. This normal idea is, possibly, the middle image of all figures of the same species, that the judger has seen, so that, when he has perhaps seen a thousand men, the arithmetical mean of their sizes, is the size, which the ideal of a beautiful man requires. The phanfy probably creates in the same manner for this middle stature, a middle-sized head, for this a middle-sized nose &c. This normal idea is but the exactness in the exhibition of the species. 'Tis thus with the judgment of another animal, provided the conception of it be sufficiently determined, and a normal idea undoubtedly serves in this manner as a foundation for the judgment of a beautiful horse, a dog, or a bull &c. But it follows too from this, that the Chinese, the Negro, the European, must each have his own normal ideal of a beautiful man.

283.

The *idea of reason*, however, belongs *secondly* to the ideal of a beautiful man. The expression of moral sentiments, though

it

it can indeed only be taken from experience, is, however, properly that, which gives character to a beautiful exhibition. The correctness of such an ideal of beauty is proved thereby, that it allows no allurement of sense to mix with the complacency in its object, and still permits to take a great interest therein, from which 'tis also obvious, that the judgment according to such a standard is not a mere judgment of taste. But in order to judge of beautiful exhibitions, according to an ideal, great force of imagination is required, and even a soul accustomed to be governed by moral ideas.

284.

As the complacency in the beautiful fully admits of being united with that in perfection, so the agreeable, on the contrary, when it is associated with the beautiful, is hurtful to the judgment of the latter. Are *charms* allowed the access to beauty? it must only be with a view of drawing the attention to the beautiful form. Ornaments (*parerga*), which do not belong internally but externally to

the representation of the object, in order to augment the complacency of taste, effectuate this, however, only by their form, like frames of pictures, drapery on statues, or colonnades in palaces. But does the ornament not consist in the beautiful form itself, is it, like gilt frames, only used for the purpose of procuring applause to the picture by its splendour? it is then named *finery* (Schmuck), and is prejudicial to real beauty.

285.

All form of objects of the senses (of the external, as well as immediately of the internal too) is either *figure* or *play*, in the latter case, either play of figures (in space, mimics and dance); or mere play of sensations (in time). The *charm* of colours, or the agreeable sound of instruments, may be added, but the *drawing* in the first and the *composition* in the last constitute the proper object of the pure judgment of taste.

286.

Beauty is therefore the form of the conformity to end of an object, so far as it is

is perceived in it without representation of an end.

287.

Every one requires, in point of *modality* of the judgment of the beautiful, that that, which he finds beautiful, shall also be judged as beautiful by others. I only think of the agreeable, that it is *possible*, that that, which is agreeable to me, is also agreeable to others. Of the beautiful, however, I say, that every one *must* find that beautiful, which I judge so. As such a judgment is now only æsthetical, and no determination of the object, but only a mere feeling is expressed, the necessity of a judgment of taste is not objective, i. e. there is no universal conception here, under which the object that is judged is subsumpted, and the reference of a predicate to it determined from conceptions.

288.

Nécessity, which is nothing, but the property of a cognition, that is determined from conceptions, is, however, always expressed

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in the judgment of a beautiful object. This necessity is not objective, but only subjective, that is, he, who judges an object as beautiful, presupposes too the same sense of the beautiful in others. 'Tis this conception of *common sense* (*sensus communis æstheticus*) which stamps necessity on its judgment. It is the same subjective necessity, that is thought in every judgment of experience. The synthetic, objective unity of consciousness is thought in it as necessary, because we presuppose the original use of understanding in other men. We express, 'tis true, in a judgment of taste, no objective determination of the object. But 'tis the state of mind, in which we are conscious to ourselves of the harmony of the multifarious with a conception in general; that we express therein, and we presuppose the same in others, because we consider them as intelligent beings.

289.

That, which is cognised without conception as object of a *necessary* complacency, is, therefore, according to modality, *beautiful*.

290.

290. The complacency in the sublime harmonizes therein with that in the beautiful, that both are complacencies only in the contemplation of an object. It is therefore by no means a sentiment, which is begotten by affection of the object itself, like the sense of the agreeable, and it is even as little identical with the complacency in the harmony of an object with its end. No *precise* conception forms the foundation of the judgment on the sublime. The judgment, to which this complacency is knit, can then only be, as in the contemplation of the beautiful, merely reflective, but not determinative, and this sentiment is likewise only the state of mind, wherein we proceed upon a conception, in order to think the object, and are conscious to ourselves of its harmony with a conception in general.

291. The results of the analysis of the judgment of the beautiful may therefore be extended to the judgment of the sublime. There

is a subjective universality in the judgment, by which we pronounce an object sublime. As the object itself doth not affect us, and produce a sense of pleasure, such a judgment expresses a disinterested complacency. It is further a conformity to end without an end, which is therein expressed, and finally the complacency in the sublime is thought as necessary, altho' without conception.

292.

Notwithstanding the judgment of the sublime coincides in all these points, with that of the beautiful, differences are nevertheless easily to be remarked between both. Concerning the claim to the assent of everybody, which adheres to both judgments, it seems, that it is expressed with greater security in the judgment of the beautiful, than in that of the sublime. The object, that is named sublime, can be named nothing less than beautiful. It is either formless or grilly, but not beautiful. The following distinction however leads us to the dissection of this judgment itself. An object can only so far be judged

judged as beautiful, as it is bounded; an object, on the contrary, is only so far sublime, as it is unbounded, at least so far as it determines the power of representation to engage in an unboundedness. The complacency in the judgment of the beautiful adheres therefore to the quality, in that of the sublime, on the other hand, to the quantity, of the object.

293.

The *dissection* of the judgment of the sublime takes place in the following manner. The consciousness of the unattainableness of the synthetic unity of understanding arises from the original synthesis, wherein the understanding proceeds upon a conception, in order to think the object. This state of mind is a sense of displeasure. This sense of displeasure passes to a positive sense, and to a complacency, by bringing about an idea of reason, as a conception, wherein we think the absolute totality of conditions, which the understanding does not reach in its regression.

294.

294.

In the same manner, then, as a multifarious, in the judgment of the beautiful, is referred to any one (undetermined which) conception of understanding, and the consciousness of the agreement of the multifarious with a conception in general, properly constitutes the sentiment of the beautiful, so the multifarious, in the judgment of the sublime, is referred to such a conception (undetermined which), and this agreement felt in the complacency, which this judgment expresses. As now all reference of representation to an object and all objective validity consist in the unity of understanding, the object, which is judged as beautiful, is, in justice, named beautiful. But with regard to the judgment of the sublime, it is properly the mind of the judger, which feels itself elevated; the object itself is unjustly named sublime, as this sentiment but arises after the mind has quitted the given, and beholds an idea, whose object can never be given.

295.

295. From these dissections of the judgments of the beautiful and sublime, a property of the contemplation of the sublime may still be understood, which is not to be found in that of the beautiful. The contemplation of the beautiful is *calm*, that of the sublime, on the contrary, is connected with *movement* of the mind. This movement is called *emotion*, and consists in a retardment of the vital power, and thereupon sudden effusion of it, which follows so much the stronger. The first is a sentiment of displeasure, and is the consciousness of the unattainableness of the unity of understanding; the second is a sentiment of pleasure, and identical with the consciousness of the reference of the object to an idea of reason.

296. In confining ourselves to the designation, which makes the difference betwixt the contemplation of the sublime and that of the beautiful, the division of the *sublime* into the *mathematical* and *dynamical*, presents it-
self

self to our view. Is the object considered as greatness, and doth the sentiment of the sublime arise, because the understanding cannot comprehend the object in this synthesis? the object is *mathematically sublime*; it is *dynamically sublime*, when it is represented as a might, and the sentiment of the sublime arises from the representation of its superiority to every finite power, which we would oppose to it.

The mathematical Sublime.

297.

The judgments: something is great, and something is a greatness, are different from one another. Nothing is said in the last, but that a certain object ranks under the use of understanding in the synthesis of the homogeneous, (is a quantum); but we mean by the first a precise greatness as measure, in reference to which we name something *simply great*, when it exceeds this measure, and *simply small*, when it falls short of it. This mea-

measure of objects of the same sort is their middle size. There is a middle, human stature, and this is the arithmetical mean of sizes of this sort, which one has seen. Though the judgment, something is simply great, is without doubt founded on a scale, yet it is no mathematical, determinative, but only a mere reflective, judgment. 'Tis by no means therein thought, *how great* the object is, but only the procedure of the understanding expressed, which proceeds upon the conception of quantity in its original synthesis, in order to think the object.

298.

That, wherein an object is named *absolutely great*, is, however, quite different from these judgments. That object is absolutely, to all intents and purposes, great, for which we have to look for no adequate scale without, but only in, it. It is a greatness, which is but equal to itself. The object, which we judge as *mathematically sublime*, is always of this sort.

299.

299. The *apprehension* of the real is conjoined with the original synthesis of the homogeneal, by which we arrive at the conception of the magnitude of an empirical, given object. This apprehension proceeds too with the synthesis itself. But the *comprehension* (*comprehensio aesthetica*) is still required, in order to attain the synthetic unity. The apprehension goes on easily, whatever the magnitude of the object may be; but the comprehension becomes always the more difficult, the farther the apprehension advances. The more this proceeds to the following parts, so much the fainter is the consciousness of the parts, which were earlier apprehended. There is now a greatest of comprehension, when namely the apprehension reaches that place, where this consciousness of the parts, that were first apprehended, begins entirely to extinguish. The state of mind of this extinction is a sense of displeasure. When now, in this state, the mind listens to the voice of reason, which requires totality of conditions to every conditional,
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and, in the reference of nature to her substratum, produces this; it feels itself exalted, and this state of mind is that of the sentiment of the sublime. We see clearly from this, that the true sublimity must only be sought in the judgers mind, but not in the objects of nature.

300.

The logical estimation of greatness, by means of number, can never awake a sentiment of the sublime, except only so far, as the aesthetical comprehension of the unity produces it. But otherwise the unity may have the size of a rood, of a mountain, of the diameter of the earth &c., here is there, when the logical estimation by number is on the carpet, no greatest for the phantasy. But when the imagination reaches the maximum in the aesthetical comprehension, whereby the mind retires into itself, until it extracts from itself the conception of absolute totality, this turn of mind is analogous to that, in which man thinks himself as moral being, and is properly identical with the moral senti-

sentiment. In the idea of the unconditional, which the mind seizes in the contemplation of the sublime, it refers nature, and itself, as part of it, to a substratum of nature, which reflection is exactly the same with that, wherein man thinks himself as moral, and his will independent on the determinatives of nature.

301.

One sees, however, from this, that examples of the true sublime are but to be taken from nature, or that, when they are objects of art, they are only to far to be judged as sublime, as they are held to be productions of nature. But even productions of nature are not judged as sublime, so far as a precise conception of that, which they ought to be, forms the ground of their judgment. Judgement, in the contemplation of the sublime, as well as in that of the beautiful, is reflective and not determinative. If a precise conception ground the judgment, the object is called *monstrous*; when by its bulk it annihilates the end, which constitutes its

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conception; but the mere exhibition of a conception, which is almost too great for an exhibition, is called *colossean*.

302.

That is therefore sublime, of which even the possibility of being thought, proves a faculty of the mind, which surpasses every scale of the senses. For it is the state of mind of reflexion, wherein we depart from nature and look outward to its substrate, and it is properly the sentiment of respect for the humanity within us, which, after a certain subreption, we exchange for respect for the object.

The dynamical Sublime.

303.

Might (potentia) is a faculty, which is superior to great obstacles. This very might is called *power* (potestas), when it is also superior to the resistance of that, which even might possesses. Nature contemplated in the

aesthetical judgment as might, that has no power over us, is *dynamically sublime*.

304.

The dynamical sublime is in the same reference to the appetitive faculty, in which the mathematical sublime is to the cognoscitive. The object, which we judge as dynamically sublime, is represented as *terrific*. In the representation of this, we look for a conception, by which we can think its might. In this reflection, wherein we compare the resisting of the object with our empirical faculty, the consciousness of the superiority of might of the object, to all our exertion to resist it, is a sense of displeasure. This makes a transition to a complacency and particularly to the sentiment of esteem for the humanity in us, so far as we call forth the thought of our moral destination, wherein we think ourselves as independent of all nature.

305.

The being terrified at an object, is not, however, the same with representing it to

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one's self as *terrific*. The virtuous is not afraid of God, as, conscious to himself of the purity of his mind, he is under no apprehension of becoming the object of his anger; but he thinks him as dreadful, because, when he puts this case, he considers all faculty of resisting the power of God as infinitely too small. Whoever is afraid of an object is not in the state of mind of judging it as sublime, he but thinks of means to escape the danger; he alone finds himself therein, who enters into the reflection upon the irresistible potency of his object; when he compares it with all his empirical faculty, and, quitting this representation of the given, directs his eye toward the moral character of humanity, wherein he feels himself independent on nature, and, when the maintaining of his moral maxims is at stake, superiour to all her violence, and not to be humiliated by her, should he even be obliged to sink under the danger.

306.

Therefore, in order to judge an object dynamically sublime, it is not necessary to

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find

find one's self in danger of being hit by it; but the mere contemplation of the might of the object, which surpasses all our physical faculty, is sufficient for that purpose, and 'tis properly not the object before us, but the humanity within us, which we judge as sublime. Finding one's self however in danger, and, from the consciousness of one's moral dignity, nevertheless not being afraid, is so much the more sublime, as this consciousness carries earnest with it, and a man, in this situation, is even judged as sublime, because he is an object of esteem, and calls forth in us the representation of that, which every one can be, and ought to be.

307.

It seems repugnant to this dissection of the dynamical sublime, that, when we are accustomed to represent God discovering himself in anger, the thought of finding one's self independent of his potency, seems to be temerity and folly. But it must also be observed, that, notwithstanding prostration, adoration by hanging down the head, with

with gestures and voice full of anguish, is that procedure, which most nations have adopted, yet this conduct denotes nothing but mean sollicitation of favour (superstition), and is no object of sublimity. Self-humiliation, on the contrary, and that dejection, which springs from the consciousness of the impurity of one's own mind, by comparison with the sanctity, which the moral law commands, is already an object of esteem and even to be judged as sublime. When the destructive violence of nature gives occasion to the morally good man, to reflect on his moral quality, and he is more apprehensive of its impurity, than of the danger, which hangs over his head, and when, in the reflexion on his relation to the supreme Being, he only considers this his moral quality, his state of mind is then the true religious way of thinking, and even an object of being judged as sublime.

308.

We have remarked with regard to the judgment of the beautiful, that, in such a judgment, we are conscious to ourselves of

the same subjective necessity, which we express in every judgment of experience. But 'tis obvious, in the judgment of the sublime, that we are not so sure of the acquiescence of every other person, as in the judgment of the beautiful. The reason of which is, that the sentiment of the sublime requires a moral turn and a certain culture of mind, and that we must presuppose these in those, who are to coincide with us in these judgments. As we reproach him with want of taste, who is not unanimous in the judgment of a beautiful object; so, we attribute a want of *sensibility* to him, who remains unmoved by that, of which we say, it is sublime. 'Twas therefore the conception of an (aesthetical) common sense, under the presupposition of which, the judgment of the beautiful expressed necessity, and it is the conception of the moral sentiment, which we presuppose in others, when we are conscious to ourselves of a subjective necessity in judgments of the sublime.

Deter-

Determinations of the Conceptions of the Beautiful and Sublime under the guidance of the transcendental Exposition of the æsthetical Judgment.

309.

As we do not at all assert in the judgment, an object is beautiful, that the object itself affects us immediately, and produces a sense of pleasure, but only the mere complacency in its contemplation under no precise conception, which complacency is but the temper of mind, wherein we are conscious to ourselves of the harmony of the multifarious with a conception in general; so this judgment is free from all interest. When an interest is conjoined with this judgment, it can only be associated with it, and must have a different cause from this free complacency.

310.

There is first an *empirical* interest in the beautiful. The instinct to society can be considered as a propensity, inherent in human

nature. As it is not indifferent to one, whether he be judged by others, as a man of understanding, or not, so it is also not the same to one, whether another judge of him, that he has taste, or not. 'Tis quite indifferent to us, how others judge of our susceptibility of the agreeable. But to refuse one the possession of taste, is equal to that of depriving him of a part of his humanity. As it is interesting in society, to shew understanding, so is it interesting too to display aesthetical faculty of judgment. The possession of beautiful objects themselves can be only interesting in society, because we prove our taste in the choice of them.

311.

But there is also secondly an *intellectual* interest in the beautiful. This consists in the value, which we put upon the beautiful object, because it is beauty of nature. As the thought, that the beautiful object is production of nature, is joined with the reflection, in which we adopt it as formally conformable to end (we find ourselves in the consciousness of the harmony of the multifarious with a

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conception in general), so the reflective judgement quits the given, and proceeds upon a substratum of nature. It refers the given multifarious and nature in general, to such a conception, i. e. to an idea. This reference is a moral turn of mind. The morally good man seeks, in his moral aspirations, reality for his conception of nature, which is suitable to the moral worth of mankind, and he finds, in this reflection extended to a conception of the supersensitive, to which the judgment of a beauty of nature invites him, a sort of confirmation of his expectations, which are built upon his own morality. A sentiment arises accordingly, which is no more the pure complacency in the beautiful, but the moral sentiment, which also continues but so long, as the object is considered to be beauty of nature. Does one find himself deceived, in discovering, that the object, which was received as nature, is but a work of art, all this intellectual interest in it disappears in a moment, and the complacency, which sprang from this reflection, often makes a transition to a displacency.

312.

'Tis erroneous to consider a person's cultivated taste as a criterion of a morally good cast of mind. Experience of virtuosi of taste, who, notwithstanding all cultivation of it, are vain and governed by sensuality, teach the contrary; and it is over and above obvious, that a morally good way of thinking can as little be inferred from a high culture of taste, as from a high degree of theoretical faculty of cognition. But having an intellectual interest in beauty merely because it is beauty of nature, always betrays a good soul, and at least a great disposition to a moral cast of mind, particularly when this interest is become habitual. Even therefrom, that this intellectual interest is a moral sentiment, can the esteem be accounted for, which we feel for the man, in whom we find it, and that we consider the way of thinking of those, as ignoble, who have no sentiment for beautiful nature.

313.

With regard to the *allurements*, which are so copiously diffused in nature, and which belong

belong either to the modifications of light (in colouring), or of sound (in tones), it must in general be observed, that perhaps the complacency in a mere tone and in a mere colour may too be a sentiment of the beautiful, and that this is probably the case, when tone and colour are called *pure*. When one thinks of the relations of the oscillations of air in tones, and assumes, that even such relations are in the impulsions of aether, by which the eye is affected, one is inclined to conjecture, that the complacency in these objects is a complacency in the contemplation. Nature seems, in these sensations, to address us in a language, which has a higher meaning.

314.

Art is distinguished from *nature*, like doing (*facere*) from acting in general (*agere*), and the production of the first as *work* (*opus*) from the latter as *effect* (*effectus*). *Art*, as human address is also secondly distinguished from *science* (to can from to know (*scire*)) as technic from theory. Art, according to this, is not yet named that, which

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one can, as soon as one knows it; but only that is named art, which one cannot as yet, altho' one knows it. *Art* is thirdly distinguished from *handicraft*; the first is called *free*, the other may be called *mercenary art*. Art is here considered as a *play*, that is, as an occupation, which pleases of itself. The occupation in a handicraft, on the contrary, does not please of itself, but only by that, which it produces. But it already lies in the conception of art, that there must be some constraint even in all liberal arts.

3.5.

There is no science of the beautiful, but only a *critic*; also no fine science, but only fine art. It would need to be proved in a science of the beautiful, what beautiful is. As now the judgment of the beautiful is only reflective, and the complacency, which is expressed therein entirely adheres to this judgment, as also the judgment of the beautiful is no judgment of cognition, but only of taste, so, that which is beautiful can never be cognised by conceptions. Much science,
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however is required, in all justice, for the fine arts. For fine art consists in the beautiful exhibition of the object of a precise conception. The artist, who wishes to exhibit his object beautifully, must therefore be intimately acquainted with this conception, since it can only be judged as beautiful, under the condition, that his object is what it ought to be. But the critic of the beautiful belongs either to science or to art. In the first case it is a part of a transcendental philosophy, and the dissection of the judgment of the beautiful alone constitutes it, in the second case it gives in examples rules of beautiful exhibitions, that is models, which cannot even be brought to conceptions. A science, which, as such, must be fine, is an absurdity. The agreeable, is opposed to the fine, as aenhetical art; the occupation of the first pleases immediately in the sensation; but that of the second in the reflexion.

3.6.

Fine art, as *art*, has the production of objects of precise conceptions for its aim;
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but, as fine art, its exhibitions must be beautiful. Now the judgment, something is beautiful, never expresses any thing but the formal conformity to end, that is, the state of the cognitive powers, which is requisitely conformable to end for a cognition, and thus the turn of mind, in which the harmony of the multifarious with a conception in general is felt. Though the production of the fine art corresponds to the precise conception, to which it ought to correspond, it must nevertheless be able to be apprehended, as if no such conception lay as a foundation to its exhibition. That, therefore, which can be judged as beauty of art, must have the appearance, as if it were a production of nature, as, vice versa, beauty of nature must seem to be a work of art. A production of art, however, appears as nature, when all punctualness is found therein, i. e. that the object is, what it ought to be, but without punctiliousness, that is, without shewing a trace, that the rule waved before the artist and fettered the powers of his mind.

As 'tis impossible to resolve the beauty of a thing by conceptions, and to render that, which is called beautiful, by criteria, so it can also never be taught, how one is to undertake giving beautiful exhibitions to his conceptions. The artist, who brings forth a beautiful production, is even not able to point out the rule, according to which he proceeded, and whereby he imprinted beauty on his work. It follows from this, that the source of beautiful exhibitions must lie within himself. *Genius* is the word, by which we denote this originality of the artist. *Genius* is the talent (gift of nature), which gives the rule to art. As the talent, as innate, productive faculty of the artist, belongs to nature, it may be termed thus: *genius* (ingenium) is the inborn disposition of mind, by which nature gives the rule to art. The production of the artist, as a work of art, is, by all means, founded on a rule. But so far as it is a production of *fine* art, this rule cannot at all be communicated by conceptions. Therefore *originality* is the first property

perty of a genius; his productions must further be *exemplary*, i. e. *models*, that is to say, only to serve him as a rule, who himself possesses a similar natural talent, which is thereby awaked. Thirdly genius itself cannot describe, how it accomplishes its production, but, like nature, gives the rule. Finally, nature does not give the rule to science, by genius, but to art alone, and this too, only so far as it is fine art.

318.

Here have we determined an acception to the word, genius, totally different from that, which is commonly given it, when the cognitive faculty is in question. We only intend by this to prevent confusion in the conceptions, and to hinder, that that may not also be required, in scientifical things, which is presupposed in him, who creates a beautiful work, namely, that he is not even conscious to himself of the rule according to which he proceeds, and whereby only commutation of conceptions was the cause of granting the estimation, which is devoted to
genius,

genius, according to this æsthetical meaning, to him too, who is not able to assign the ground, either to himself or to others, of what he propounds in sciences. We can but look upon talents in sciences as different in degree. Though a man of superior understanding was required to discover the principles of natural philosophy, yet he is capable of pointing out every step, which he went, from the elements of geometry even to its most sublime truths, and one of the meanest capacity is therefore able to follow him therein. The talent for the fine art is, on the contrary, of such a nature, that he, who possesses it, cannot explain to himself, how he attained his beautiful exhibition, because beauty cannot be represented by means of conceptions,

319.

'Tis obvious, from what has been above said, that there is a great difference between *genius* and *taste*. Taste is only a judicative, but genius a productive faculty. In order the better to determine this difference, we shall compare beauty of nature

PART III.

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and beauty of art together. The first requires but judgment, consequently taste; the second must be produced, and its possibility requires genius. Of the beauty of nature may be said: it is a *beautiful thing*; of the beauty of art however: it is a *beautiful representation* of a thing. The beauty of art is a production of art, and, as such, a precise conception of what the thing ought to be, lays the foundation of its judgment; therefore 'tis always the perfection of the thing, which is attended to in this judgment. As beauty of art, the object of the precise conception is represented beautifully, and hereto is required genius. But no precise conception founds the judgment of beauty of nature. Is this the case e. g. in the judgment, that is a beautiful woman? such a judgment is no longer a pure judgment of taste. We do not consider nature therein, as nature, but only as art, and attribute ends to it, which it has exhibited beautifully. The fine art has that preference to nature, that it can exhibit objects beautifully, which would be ugly or displeasing in nature.

320.

It must be remarked, that genius is not required for the production of every beauty of art, and that many of these betray nothing more than taste and no genius. When an artist has formed his taste, by many examples of nature and art, he often finds at last, after many tedious essays, that form, which gives satisfaction to his own taste. This is not, as it were, an affair of inspiration, or a free soaring of the powers of mind, but a slow and very laborious emendation, in order that it may be suitable to the thoughts, and yet not disadvantageous to the liberty in the play of the cognoscitive faculty.

321.

When now merely having taste is not identical with being a genius and accordingly many beauties of art are generated merely by the taste, but not by the genius of the artist, the question is, what that is, in a beauty of art, which must be considered as production of genius? It is that, which is denoted by the word *spirit*. Spirit is the expression

of æsthetical ideas. We understand by æsthetical ideas sensitive representations, which occasion much thought and engage the mind to seek an idea of reason. They are named *attributes*. They do not serve, like the logical attributes, for the representation of the object, to which they are added; they are accessory representations, and awake the mind to think much, yet without the possibility of a conception being found which corresponds to these thoughts. 'Tis properly the art of poetry, among the fine arts, in which the faculty of æsthetical ideas can shew itself the most, and it has that advantage over others, that it can also invertedly use ideas of reason as attributes for the exhibition of sensible objects. This last can however but take place so far, as the idea of reason is thought in relation to nature, and thus is the representation of the sensitive nevertheless properly used as attribute. Genius consequently consists in the happy faculty of discovering ideas for a given conception, and to hit the expression for these, by which the thereby occasioned subjective turn of mind

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as concomitancy of a conception, may be communicated to others.

322.

Understanding, imagination, taste, and spirit, are therefore requisite to a fine art. In the first place he, who intends to produce a work of fine art, must have a precise conception of that, to which his exhibition must correspond, and to this understanding is requisite. He must secondly be able to find an exhibition for this conception; and imagination belongs thereto. But the work of art, that is produced by these faculties, is only a beauty of art under the condition, that its judgment is not disturbed by this precise conception; and a consciousness of the harmony of the multifarious with a conception in general, beside that, still takes place. This conjunction of understanding with imagination constitutes taste, and this must be the discipline of genius, as the faculty of the exhibition of æsthetical ideas; the artist, by means of the last, gives spirit to his work; but taste, like judgement in ge-

neral, limits him, in order that he may not extravagate.

323.

Beauty, whether of nature or of art, is *expression* of æsthetical ideas. A precise conception of what the object ought to be is the basis of the beauty of art, and it must be an exhibition of æsthetical ideas, which occasion much thought, without the possibility, however, that an adequate conception can be found for these thoughts. Beauty of nature is, without such a conception, *expression* of æsthetical ideas. The mind, by contemplation of beauty natural, is put on a reflection, in which it proceeds upon a conception of the substratum of nature. If we wish now to class the fine arts, it seems that no better principle can be chosen to that end, than the analogy of art with the mode of expression, which men use in speaking, in order not only to communicate their thoughts, but their sensations, to one another. This consists in *word*, *gesture*, and *tone* (articulation, gesticulation, and modu-

modulation). The conjunction of these three modes of expression alone constitutes the complete communication of the speaker.

324.

There is therefore only three species of fine arts: the *speaking*, the *imaging* and the art of the *play of sensations*. 1) The speaking arts are *oratory* and *poetry*. *Oratory* is the art of performing an office of understanding, as a free play of imagination; *poetry*, to execute a free play of imagination as an affair of understanding. 2) The *imaging arts* are either these of the *truth*, or of the *illusion, of the senses*. The first is named *plastic*, the second *painting*. *Statuary* and *architecture* belong to plastic. The art of painting may be divided into that of the beautiful *picture* of nature and that of the beautifully *placing together* of her *productions*, i. e. *painting* properly so called and *pleasure-gardening*. 3) The arts of the *beautiful play of sensations* are those of *dying* and *music*.

*Representation and Solution of
the Antinomy of Taste.*

325.

When one departs from the station of intelligibility of our conceptions, which guides us in the dissection of a pure judgment of taste, one falls in with an antinomy, which cannot be solved but by transcendental philosophy. This antinomy consists in the following positions, which seemingly annul one another:

Thesis: the judgment of taste is not founded on conceptions; for, otherwise one could *dispute* thereon (decide by proofs).

Antithesis: the judgment of taste is founded on conceptions; for, otherwise one could not even *contest* thereon (lay claim to the necessary unanimity of others with this judgment).

326.

The thesis says, that beauty is no designation of an object, otherwise every object must be confined to this conception, and thereby be able to be cognised, whether it
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be beautiful or not, i. e. one must be able to *prove*, that something is beautiful or not. Accordingly one could *dispute* thereon, that is, those, who are of different opinions, in the judgment of an object, as beautiful, must, by an appeal to a universal principle, be able to agree, which is however impossible. The antithesis says, on the other hand, that beauty must, by all means, be a predicate of things, otherwise no *contest* would even be possible between those, who disagree in the judgment of an object as beautiful. The disagreement in judging is called a mere contest, so long as it consists in the mutual assertion of opposite judgments, and the contesting parties do not intend to carry back their assertions to a principle of union.

327.
The transcendental dissection of the pure judgment of taste gives the true solution of this antinomy. For the judgment of taste according to this, is no judgment of cognition. But as the consciousness of the harmony of the multifarious, with a conception in general, is therein expressed, 'tis the fitness

ness of an object for a cognition, which it expresses, from which the justness of the thesis, as well as of the antithesis, is obvious. These positions form an antinomy only from the station of the cognition of things in themselves. When we quit this, in discovering the original use of understanding in the categories, 'tis obvious, that the harmony of this original use of understanding with the logical, in the generation of a cognition by a judgment, that something is beautiful, is expressed, and consequently it may, by all means, be contested, but never decided by conceptions, that an object is beautiful.

328.

The principle of exposition of a pure judgment of taste is therefore either the *empiricism* or the *rationalism*. All judgment of the beautiful is denied according to the first, and the agreeable put in the place of the beautiful. The rationalism however is either the *realism* or *idealism* of the conformity to end of nature. As now a judgment of taste is no judgment of cognition, and beauty no designation of the object, so can the
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the realism be posited nowhere, but in the exposition, that nature has intentionally disseminated beauties, for the purpose of affording pleasure to humankind. But this exposition would neither concern nor disaffect the judgment of the beautiful itself. The beautiful, according to this, may still be considered as identical with the agreeable. With regard to the exposition in itself, it is, so far as 'tis received as determinative, transcendent, and therefore unintelligible. For though the beautiful images in the kingdom of organized nature argue much in favour of this realism of the conformity to end of nature, and endeavour to attune our judgment thereto, that an end directed to the delighting of our aesthetical judgement, is its foundation, yet the determinative judgement dare never deviate from this, that the complete grounds of these images lie in nature herself. Did one wish however to find in this exposition, the cause of the claim, which this judgment lays to the assent of every other person, it would follow, that we learned from nature that, which is beautiful, altho',
quite

quite reversed, every one takes the rule of this judgment from himself. The dissection of this judgment itself, on the contrary, is the exposition of the judgment of taste, which the idealism of the conformity to end hits.

329.

In the production of the synthetic, objective, unity of consciousness, we shew that our conceptions refer to objects, and are not void. This takes place with respect to empirical conceptions, by means of *examples*. We must take notice, with regard to the pure conceptions of understanding, that these are properly conceptions of that synthetical unity itself, and we must consider them as transcendental schemes, in order to be conscious to ourselves of their objective validity. This exhibition of the reality of a conception is the same as laying an intuition, as it were, under the conception. As to the conceptions of reason, something impossible is required, when it is desired, that their objective validity (their synthetical unity, consequently as theoretical cognitions) shall be shewn.

shewn. The *intuitive mode of representation* (hypotypose, exhibition) is, however, twofold, either *schematical* or *symbolical*. The first takes place, when the synthetical unity, which we call forth therein, is the true analytical unity of our conception. The mode of representation, on the contrary, is symbolical, when the synthetic unity, which we beget therein, is not properly that, to which our conception refers, but only when designations, which we extract from this synthetic unity, are also found in our conception.

330.

The symbolical mode of representation is therefore not identical with *characterisms*. These are marks of conceptions by accompanying sensible signs, that have nothing at all in themselves of the conceptions, which they denote, and which only serve, according to the law of association of imagination, to call these conceptions to mind. In the symbolical mode of representation, we represent to ourselves an object in an intuition, which, by no means, belongs to the conception

tion of it, wherein however, we find a rule of the synthetic unity, which also lies in our conception. Ideas too are susceptible of the symbolical mode of representation. So is every manner of representing God to ourselves merely symbolical. If we separate all that, which is symbolical therefrom, the dead, in all respects totally sterile, deistical, conception of God, only remains for us, as, when we take the bare symbolical mode of representation for schematical, our conception of God becomes anthropomorphistical.

331.

The beautiful is a symbol of the moral good. This symbolical mode of representation is, over and above, the reason, why we esteem ourselves and others in the complacency in the beautiful. The idea of the moral good is symbolically exhibited in the complacency in the beautiful. We shall take notice of the principal designations of the moral good, which are found too in the judgment of the beautiful, and, at the same time, also their difference. 1) The beautiful

ful pleases *immediately*, and not by means of a charm of the senses. The moral good also in the same manner; this, however, in the conception, that, on the other hand, in the mere reflection. 2) It pleases without all interest. No interest also (like that in utility) lays the foundation of the complacency in the moral good; but an interest ensues this complacency. 3) The liberty of imagination with the legality of understanding is expressed in the judgment of the beautiful; the liberty of the will as its harmony with the legislation of reason is thought in the conception of the moral good. 4) The subjective principle of the judgment of the beautiful is represented as *universally*, i. e. for every body, (for every being, in whom an original and logical use of understanding are to be met with), valid, but knowable by no universal conception; the objective principle of morality is likewise represented as *universally*, i. e. by all subjects, (of rational, moral nature) at the same time also for all actions of the subject, and thereby through a universal conception, knowable. On account
of

of this symbolical mode of representation, in which we represent to ourselves the moral good in the beautiful, we often give names to beautiful objects of nature or art, which appear to be founded on a moral judgment.

Of the Doctrine of Method of Taste.

332.

As there is no science of the beautiful, there can also be no doctrine of method, that can shew the way, which ought to be adopted therein. There is only a *fine art* and a *manner* for it, but no *method*. The propaedeutic to every fine art seems to lie in the culture of the mental powers, by the previous knowledge of those studies called philological. But since taste, as has been already shewn, is a faculty of judgment of rendering moral ideas sensible, the true preparative to the foundation of taste, is the development of moral ideas and the cultivation of moral sentiment.

SECTION II.

OF THE DISSECTION OF REFLECTIVE
JUDGEMENT.*Dissection of teleological Judgment.*

333.

That nature is suited to our understanding, and constituted in such a manner, that the mind can think its objects by firm designations and distinguish them from one another, is a transcendental, previous position of reflective judgement, by means of which principle (the formal conformity - to - end of nature) we can have the design in general of seeking cognition. But that nature, over and above, exposes objects to view, which we cannot but think as objective and conformable to end, i. e. whose real possibility we cannot represent to ourselves but by the previous position of a causality according to conceptions of an intelligent cause of it, is something, which is by no means clear, of

PART III.

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itself,

itself, and from a bare transcendental dissection of our faculty of cognition. Such a principle is quite foreign to the conception of nature, which we hereby denote, that we name this conformity to end of productions of nature, contingent, so long as we do not assume a causality according to conceptions, by which we mean, that nature could have formed herself otherwise in a thousandfold manner, without directly hitting such a unity of end, and that, without assuming a cause, which acts according to ends, it would be just as much, as to say, that such productions had no cause. A principle of this nature can, however, for this same reason, never be *constitutive*, but is a mere principle of reflective judgement. It is only in this last form object of our transcendental philosophy.

334.

We have (257.) distinguished the formal from the material conformity to end of nature. The first was the harmony of a multifarious with a conception as end, in as much

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as it is a particular law of nature itself, and we have there shewn of the æsthetical judgment of a beauty of nature, that a subjectively formal conformity to end of nature is only expressed in it. We shall, at present, give an example of an objective conformity-to-end of nature, which however is likewise only formal, in order to be able more easily to represent that, which is to be judged as material conformity to end. The properties of the circular line are of such a nature, that we can use them for the solution of innumerable problems. As these properties now are by no means thought in the conception of such a figure, but the judgments, wherein we attribute them to it, are synthetical, so the figure acquires the appearance of a material conformity to end, namely, that these properties have been intentionally placed in it, for our use. Though this conformity to end is objective, yet is it only formal. Those designations are peculiar rules of nature herself, and not predicates laid in the geometrical figure, conformably to such rules of nature.

335.

As to the material conformity to end of nature, there is as well an external, as an internal of this sort. Real conformity to end can, in general, but be found, where a relation of cause to effect takes place, and we can only represent to ourselves the legality in the cause of it by the notion of a causality according to conceptions. The objects, which we consider as means to other productions, we judge externally (relatively) conformable to end. This conformity to end is the utility and suitability to man and every other creature. In those beings of nature, which we judge as productions of art, we find, however, the internal conformity to end. With respect to which, it cannot be asked: whereto they exist? While the contemplation remains with the object itself, and does not turn therefrom to view other objects, which are possible by it, it is judged as end.

336.

The relative conformity to end, in reference to that thing, which we judge as conform-

formable to end, is considered as but contingent. The thing exists not on its own account, but only, that something else may exist, to which it serves as mean. In order now that this judgment may acquire stability, there must, in such a series of things of nature, whereof the one serves as mean to the following, be a last member of which it can be judged, that it exists on its own account. But this is impossible so long as our contemplation remains with nature. If we hold man to be this last member, 'tis however necessary, according to the enquiry which is once begun, to attend to nature and to notice that even man himself has but the rank of a bare mean. If we observe, over and above, that men very often make a foolish use of the things of nature, this consideration destroys even every aspect of the relative conformity to end. What is chiefly to be remark'd herein however is, that the catching of the links of such a chain of nature is but mere mechanism of nature. But where this is, there is too necessity of nature, which immediately destroys all reference of

unity of end to these objects, that are considered as subject to this natural mechanism.

337.

In order to find internal conformity to end in a thing, it must be judged as a production of art. The harmony of the multifarious with a conception obliges us to ascribe this conception as end to the causality of its cause. If one judged of a regular figure, which he found in the sand, that it originated without a previous conception of its cause, this would be, as if one explained it as an event, which presupposes no cause. But the judging of a production of nature as production of art, seems in itself contradictory.

338.

Productions of nature, which we judge as productions of art at the same time, are named *ends natural*. Both these designations will appear united in those objects, whose multifarious, in the relation of cause and effect, is such to one another, that every part exists with dispositions, that find dis-
posi-

positions in other parts, which correspond to them. Every organized being of nature is thus constituted, and in a threefold respect; namely, the procreation of its like, the growth of the individual, and its nourishment. 'Tis therefore possible here to separate the conception of that, which the thing ought to be, and to think the production as having originated thro' a causality, which acted according to this conception, that is, as end. This will, however, always be judged as production of nature, since it must be contemplated as *a self-organizing thing*, i. e. as matter, in which these powers are inherent.

339.

One must be able to say of a natural production, which can at the same time be judged as end of nature, that it is in relation to itself mutually as cause and effect. Though the conception of the thing be thought as the cause of it, the causality of producing itself must nevertheless lie in the thing. The organized being is distinguished,

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by

by the conjunction of both criteria, on the one hand, from mere works of art, and on the other, from bare productions of nature. Every part (organ) in a being of nature, which can be judged as end of nature, must be thought as existing on account of the other, and as producing the other parts too. The first criterion constitutes the thing, production of art, and it harmonizes still so far with every other production of art, for instance, a watch, in which each wheel exists on account of the motion of the others. The second criterion, however, makes it a production of nature, and it is of a quite different nature from that of a watch, in which no wheel produces the other, nor does it beget other watches, nor repair itself when out of order. By far too little is therefore said of nature and her faculty in organized productions, when she is named an analogon of art. She is with more precision thought as analogon of life, altho' life itself is a sort of organization, and therefore no exposition of it is thereby given.

349.

The rule, then, under which every being of nature, as organized, is subsumpted, is, *an organized production of nature is that, in which all is end and reciprocally mean too.* When we question ourselves whence we have received this rule, we easily perceive, that 'tis not from experience. Experience leads us, 'tis true, to beings of this sort, but not to their intelligent cause. This rule however expresses the sole, internal criterion, by which we distinguish this peculiar sort of things of nature, from others (the unorganized). It is therefore no objective, but only a subjective, principle, i. e. a maxim of our reflective judgement.

341.

Of the great difference between the external and internal conformity to end of nature, we have already taken notice. The existence of a thing, according to the first, is judged as end of nature, and the thing as existing on account of other things. As, however, the final end of nature itself and
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also the point, which concludes each of these series of cause and effect, never can be given, so the judgment of external conformity to end has properly no support. But after organized nature has lead the teleological judgment to the internal conformity to end, the aspect of nature in general opens then to our view as a great organized whole, which ranks under the same principle of internal conformity to end of nature, that there is nothing in it in vain and to no end, but that all is mean and also mutually end. The certain, internal conformity to end of organized beings of nature makes us already attentive to a substratum of nature, to which, we accordingly refer nature in general, even in her bare mechanism, which is otherwise no object of a teleological judgment.

342.

There is nothing so much to be recommended, with respect to sciences, as a thorough knowledge of their principles. When the principles of a science are internal, they are named *domestic*. Are they, on the contrary, borro-

borrowed from other sciences? they are then called *extraneous* (lemmata). Though a science be founded on lemmata, yet is this not inimical to its internal stability, provided these have somewhere a firm place, which is pointed out. But when these principles are so circumstanced, that in order to know their ground, one is referred back from one, which is superstructed on them, to another, but from this again to the first, in this manner both sciences are deficient in internal support. The principle of conformity to end of nature is in this situation, when it is introduced as constitutive in natural philosophy. This refers the enquirer to theology, which science ought to give farther information concerning the ground of the conception of an intelligent cause of world, and this theology vaunts, however, to have obtained the reality of the conception of God from mere contemplation of nature. The conception of ends natural can, therefore, by no means, be admitted as constitutive principle in natural philosophy. It belongs but as regulative principle, as maxim of
judge-

judgement, to physical theology, which is even no science (no aggregate of knowledge, of conceptions, whereby we determine objects), but only the bare and necessary mode of reflecting on a certain class of objects, in order to attain, by it, determining conceptions of them.

*Representation and Solution of
the Antinomy of teleological
Judgement.*

343.

When the principle of the judgment of organized bodies, which is but a maxim of reflective judgement, is permuted with a principle that determines these objects, it contradicts a rule of understanding, which, as such, is without doubt constitutive. According to this arises an antinomy, which cannot otherwise be resolved, than by putting back that principle to its true place and holding it a principle of mere reflexion. This antinomy consists in the following opposite positions;

Every

Every generation of material things is possible according to mechanical laws alone:

Some generations of material things are not possible according to mechanical laws alone.

344.

The first position is a constitutive rule of understanding, and an objective principle, of which there can be no exception. With respect to organized beings, according to this rule, one may justly say, that the complete causes of their generation, of their growth, and of their nourishment, (in all which, matter reveals itself as organized), lie nowhere but in matter itself. That matter takes foreign substances into itself and in that manner organizes itself, is but a chymical process, which, so far as we follow the first principles of organization, always takes place in such a manner, that it agrees with the conception of internal conformity to end. How far soever therefore we discover nature and mount to the earlier causes of organized things of nature, we still remain always in nature,

nature, which says nothing else, than that we find phaenomena, which (according to the law of intellect) rest upon a chymical affinity of matter, but which is always to be considered as a branch of a universal trunk, from whose root, however far the empirical regression may reach, we always remain equally distant. Even on this account is the second position of no validity as constitutive, but only as regulative, principle and necessary maxim of reflective judgement, with reference to organized beings of nature. For, causes of these phaenomena, how remote soever they may lie, always rank under the conception of organization. True to that law of understanding, we abstract for ourselves the rules of organization from nature, for instance, what soil is best suited to this or that plant, the means, by which we can multiply it, or meliorate its fruit, we learn to know the instinct of animals, in order to use them for ourselves, we abstract rules of health of the human body, with a view of preserving it in this state. The constitutive conception of nature is the ground
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of this procedure, and 'tis the mechanism of nature, which we represent to ourselves in those rules, altho' the procedure, according to these rules, takes place only under the guidance of the second rule as a maxim. We turn organized nature to our own purposes, as a self-organizing matter, however, whose business we cannot otherwise think than by the conception of end.

345.

'Tis easily to be remark'd, that the dogmatical use of the categories is the ground of the above antinomy of teleological judgment. Nobody doubts that nature exposes productions to our view, which harmonize with the conception of unity of end. The question is, however, whether this technic of nature be *intentional*. Whatever way the question may be decided, the decision is always dogmatical, and an assertion of the cognition of things in themselves, so long as the transcendental station of this judgment is mistaken. The assertion, that every technic of nature is *undesign'd*, is the *idealism* of the

con-

conformity-to-end; that, on the contrary, that some of it are *designed*, is the *realism* of the conformity-to-end of nature.

346.

The idealism of the conformity-to-end is either that of *casualty* or of *fatality*. The first system (the Epicureism) maintains, that, by the mere mechanism of matter, the materials or stuff, which formed the first organized things, met with one another, and that, by this *rencontre*, a plant sprang up here, and there an animal, which maintain themselves ever since as genera, agreeably to this mechanism. The casualty, therefore, directly annihilates the conception of organization, and explains the internal conformity-to-end of nature in organized productions of nature, as formal only (like that in crystals). The organization of a natural thing exactly consists therein, that it, in its own generation, is in relation to itself as cause and effect. Casualty is therefore counterintelligible, consequently absurd.

347.

The *fatalism* of the conformity-to-end (Spinozism) explains all conformity-to-end of nature as accidents, that inhere in the first being of nature, to whom alone belongs subsistency. In this manner it puts necessity in the place of the contingency of these forms. Of this system we may say, that it is in itself unintelligible. Spinoza's conception of the first principle of nature rests on a transcendental use of the category, substantiality. While we enquire about that conception, whereby we can comprehend the conformity-to-end of many forms of nature, this system gives for answer, that these phaenomena are necessary, which indeed amounts to no answer at all.

348.

The *realism* of the conformity-to-end of nature is either physical or hyperphysical, and accordingly either counterintelligible or unintelligible. In the first case it is the *hylozoism*, which attributes *life* to matter itself; in the second it is the *theism*, which deduces the conformity-to-end of

PART III.

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nature,

nature, from the first Cause of the universe as an original, living, intelligent Being. Is matter itself, according to hylozoism, represented as living? the assertion is quite counterintelligible, since matter, as such, is inanimate (iners). Is however, in order to illustrate the conformity-to-end by matter, a living principle only thought in conjunction with it? a circle is thereby described in explaining, as life itself is a species of organization. The exposition of *theism* is, on the other hand, unintelligible, as it wishes to derive the conformity-to-end of nature from an intellect out of nature, which transition is foreign to the empirical synthesis of understanding, that, as far as it goes, always remains in nature.

349.

In all these systems reigns the dogmatical method, which looks away from the original use of understanding in the categories, and considers them as absolute predicates of objects. According to the critical idealism, we allow of no deviation from nature, and maintain,

tain, that, as far as our researches of the principles of organization extend, we can take our grounds of explication of these phaenomena nowhere but from nature. But, even agreeable to this critical station, we affirm, that the discovered principles of explication themselves must always be considered as already organized, as generated according to ends, consequently never as absolute principles of explication of organization itself. All that remains of this for reason to do, is the reference of collective nature to her substratum, to which this organization, that continues the same course with the mechanism of nature herself, may be in relation. Grounds of explication of the phaenomena must however lie in nature, and this thought of a substratum of nature cannot be esteemed as a principle, from which the possibility of an organized production of nature can be comprehended.

350.

Grounds of exposition of events in nature can but be obtained from nature. 'Tis enti-

A A 2

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rely the contemplation of the mechanism in organized productions of nature, which can lead us to grounds of exposition of these phaenomena. We follow this principle in tracing nature in her more early productions, with a view perhaps of discovering that the conformity-to-end, in them, was not yet so great, as she is found to confirm in her later productions. The arising of certain varieties, as the principle for certain variations in the power of generation is finally received, admits of the presumption, that the mechanism of organized beings may, by all means, be more unfolded. But how simple soever the principles may be, which we should discover, and how much soever they might explain, we could never pass by the principle of conformity-to-end, but would be obliged to lay the self-organizing power of nature in these principles.

351.

All, then, which we can arrive at, in this perquisition of the grounds of exposition of organized beings, is the mere use of the mechanism

chanism of nature, a principle quite different from all mechanism of nature (of organization), and it is, with reference to organized beings, absolutely necessary to subordinate the mechanism of nature to this teleological principle. When one hereby quits the critical station, and the aspect of the teleological principle from the station of reflective judgment, there remains nothing but a constitutive union of both principles.

352.

This union of the teleological principle with the mechanism of nature may be thought in a twofold manner. According to *occasionalism*, the sovereign, intelligent cause of world, agreeably to his idea, would, by occasion of each copulation, give the organical formation to the matter which mixes in it. According to *præstabilism*, however, this intelligent being would but have placed in certain, primitive productions the disposition to organize themselves, consequently that too, by means of coition, to perpetuate themselves.

A A 3

353.

353.

Occasionalism annihilates all nature, and with it every use of understanding. Praestabilism may however be twofold. It considers every organical being begotten by its fellow creature as either the *eduction*, or the *production* of the latter. The system of generations, as mere educations, is called that of the *individual praeformation*, or also *the theory of evolution*; that of generations as productions is named the system of *epigenesis*, and may likewise be called the system of *generic praeformation*. All organical beings, according to the first system, are preformed from the first beginning, and the procreation is the mere office of giving the first nutriment to the preformed embryo, and of putting the powers placed in it, and till then not used, in activity. The defenders of this doctrine wished to grant more to nature, than takes place, according to occasionalism. They destroy nature, however, as well as this system, even in the assertion of such a praeformation from the first beginning, which they deprive nature of and ascribe

ascribe to her intelligent cause. The system of epigenesis is the most congenial to the understanding. For it maintains but a generical praeformation; therefore only dispositions placed in nature, from the first beginning, of organizing herself, but not praeformed embryos. The principle, which this system expresses, accords with the laws of the use of understanding and of nature too, as long as it is considered as principle of reflecting judgement, and is but in the quality of a constitutive principle counterintelligible.

Of the Scope of Nature.

354.

An organized being is judged by us as end of nature, and this judgment does not depend upon the inquiry, whereto such a being exists, and if it be to be held for scope itself, or only as mean to an ultimate end of nature? That the contemplation of nature cannot lead to a scope of nature, i. e. to a

being, who must be judged by us, according to a constitutive principle, as final end, is self-obvious. The question now can only be, whether this conception of a scope of nature be not just as certain a conception for reflective judgement, as is that of an end of nature in general?

355.

'Tis now clear of itself, that beings capable to be judged by us as scopes of nature, must be organized, since only these can be judged as ends of nature, and 'tis, with regard to these things, absolutely necessary to conceive a principle, which is different from the mechanism of nature and which uses this mechanism for itself. Objects of the mere mechanism of nature (unorganized beings) have nothing in themselves, which could oblige us to cogitate them as ends. Only so far as plants and animals are judged as ends of nature, is the existence of unorganized matter, which is necessary for the existence of the organized, judged as conformable to end.

356.

356.

Among all organized creatures on earth, man is the sole, who is capable to think on a conception of ends, and himself as end. He is the only being, who can have the design of using nature as mean for his own purposes. Therefore man is the sole organized being, who, for the same reason, by which he must be judged as end of nature, may too be judged as her scope.

357.

The possibility of this judgment depends upon the aims, which men have in view. Man has inclinations, and their gratification depends on nature. Is he a slave to his inclinations? he is, in this dependence on nature, incapable of ends, and in this quality can, by no means, be thought as ultimate end of nature. Were the gratification of his inclinations thought as final end of nature, this would not be possible, as this aspect is entirely that of the mechanism of nature, not to mention, that reason, which distinguishes him from other beings of nature, removes him

him farther from, than it brings him near to, this aim, and that he himself changes his idea of happiness every instant, insomuch that nature, notwithstanding all her eagerness to treat him as a favourite, could not accomplish this.

358.

'Tis therefore only the fitness for all ends, that makes it possible to think man as scope of nature. This is however called *culture*, and is twofold, culture of address and culture of discipline. The first consists in the faculty of attaining the ends, which one has proposed to himself, consequently in a subjective condition, under which a rational being can in general propose ends to himself. But the culture of discipline has the superiority, and consists in the independence on sensual determinatives, consequently in moral liberty. It is not yet address, which justifies the looking upon man as ultimate end. Has he, by means of this, made artificial wants to himself? he is, so far as he allows himself to be determined by them, subordinate to the mechanism of nature, and has thereby renoun-

renounced that, which allowed him to be thought as scope of nature.

359.

But when we take a view of the human species, in order to see how they exert themselves upon the whole to reach this aim, namely, to be scope of the creation; we remark, that, with reference to the culture of address, this cannot well be obtained among mankind, but by the inequality of rank. Violence, injustice, and oppression, on the one hand, and luxury, on the other, are powerful obstacles, which oppose the culture of discipline. The exchange of the coarse sensual enjoyment for the delight, which arts and sciences produce, is, however, advantageous to moral cultivation, as they habituate to a complacency without sensual interest, and thus render more susceptible of a moral turn of mind. Even war itself, though it directly gives an instance, that those, who wage it from motives of avarice and ambition, are very far remote from the designation of a scope of the creation, is nevertheless

less likewise a mean to bring the human kind nearer to moral cultivation. Accordingly we have a reference of nature to her substratum in thought. As well this contemplation, as the reflection upon an organized body, and that upon our own moral nature occasions this reference. But, as to the point of reference, it cannot be thought otherwise, than by a symbolical mode of representation.

360.

That, then, which justifies man in thinking himself ultimate end of the creation, is not that fide, according to which he is member of nature, but that, according to which, he, in the consciousness of the moral law, thinks himself independent of nature. This station gives firmness and stability to the thought of an intelligent cause of world. If we turn our contemplation toward nature, there is nothing to be found there, which justifies its being thought as scope. Man himself, when we think him, like every organized being, as end of nature, is, according to this, however, but a member of nature, and
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the contemplation, which remains with nature, will never lead to an intelligent Author of it. But the conformity-to-end, which is found in organized beings, leads reflexion to pursue the enquiry, what is to be thought as scope of the creation? It makes the mind attentive to a substratum of nature, and the question about the scope of the creation follows of course. When one is of opinion that this question may be answered theoretically, there arises a physico-theology, which is nothing but a physical teleology misunderstood. Ethicotheology, on the contrary, is founded on the consciousness of morally good sentiments. The virtuous man considers himself, in this consciousness, as ultimate end, and expects that nature will harmonize herewith. For this purpose he refers collective nature to a substratum of nature, and thereby, gives full scope for the thought, that nature, in her progression to the whole, will correspond to the moral worth of mankind, though this harmony should even not be found in her parts.

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART IV.

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY
PART IV.

THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART IV.

MORE ELABORATE DISCUSSION OF
MORAL RELIGION.

*Representation of the Christian
Religion as a moral One.*

361.

The category *moral liberty* has been already represented as a moral principle or disposition (*Anlage*) in man (as an original positing of the causality of the will as independent on every determination natural, i. e. independent of every material determinative of the will). But the difference betwixt this moral nature or disposition and the

PART IV.

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morally

morally good will is very great. That will, which is free from sensitive determinatives, is alone morally good.

All moral religion, however, consists in the reflection of the virtuous man on nature, wherein he expects, she will correspond to the moral worth of mankind, which expectation cannot be grounded but on the conception of nature as a whole, and consequently of her reference to a moral Author of world. The conception of this is indeed transcendent, in the same manner as is the conception of the intellect, which, as author of organized beings, we have in thought in the judgment of them. But as the conception of the thing, which harmonizes and develops itself conformably to the unity of end, has meaning; so also has meaning the expectation of the virtuous, who promises himself, from nature, contemplated as a whole, that, which the part he inhabits affords not.

362.

From this arises an aspect of revealed religion, so called, as a moral religion. Its
phae-

phaenomenon in the world is an event of nature and as such completely determined by causes natural. Every alteration, which the establishment of Christianity has occasioned, is thus circumstanced.

So far, however, as we already refer nature in general to a moral Author of nature, we shall also therewith comprehend this phaenomenon, so conformable to the moral destination of man, in this reference. As the generation, the growth, the nutrition of the plant, is event of nature, and notwithstanding we can by no means do without the conception of a cause according to ends (as a principle, quite different from the mechanism of nature, which even uses this mechanism) in order but to think the plant as organized being, and thus distinguish it from other things by a criterion; so may the Evangel too, though its phaenomenon is but event of nature, nevertheless be referred to a principle different from it, which has the producing of moral order in nature for end.

563.

Thus have we exhibited a conception of revelation, which no doubt has meaning, tho' but a moral and not a theoretical. We shall now represent it more at large in this form. Man is, first, on account of his moral nature or disposition, a moral being and cogitable as such by a conception, whereby we separate him from nature. He is, however, at the same time, secondly, an object of nature. Notwithstanding all that moral principle of man, experience teaches us to know him as morally bad, that is, as a being, who subsists not independent on sensual determinatives, but who oft discovers himself as a slave to his inclinations. We shall therefore represent, as a position of experience, that a *bad principle* is to be found in man (or in human kind) beside that *good* of the moral disposition itself. If it be right that every one, by the earliest manifestations of his consciousness, makes his inclinations the highest principle of his actions, the morality of mankind (as object of experience) can but commence with a *conflict of the bad*
prin-

principle with the good that dwells by it. Now the *victory* of the good principle in man over the bad is that, which constitutes the morally good quality in him. But tho' the morally good man, as necessitous being, still remains always exposed to be governed by the bad principle, yet *the dominion of the good principle over the bad in mankind in general* is for every one a foundation to fortify in a morally good way of thinking and also for its duration. That now the Christian religion, as a stable proof that the good principle has struck root in mankind in general, is likewise to be considered as a testimony of the dominion of the good principle over the bad, will be evinced in the sequel.

Of the Dwelling of the bad Principle by the good, or on the radical Evil in human Nature.

364.

The position, man is *by nature good*, or he is *by nature bad*, seems to contain a

contradiction, and we shall therefore represent its sense more clearly. When the moral quality, and not the moral disposition or nature of man, is in question, one thinks of that, which is to be imputed to him, whereof the mere possibility is but thought in the conception of his moral disposition. This moral quality, which man himself therefore originally gives himself, is meant, when it is judged, that he is good or that he is bad. To be by nature good, or by nature bad, would now be contradictory, if under nature by understood the ground of its quality, that is quite foreign to the person himself and found without him. But when we say either the one or the other of man, it is but with a view to point out, that, as the last ground of the moral quality of mankind is entirely hid from us, he, with the first manifestations of his consciousness, appears to us as either morally good or morally bad. This last ground of his moral quality, by virtue of his moral nature or disposition (of his personality) lies not less however entirely in him, and this quality must not be the less imputed to him.

him. But the expression of the innate, moral character of man must be understood as the mere incomprehensibility of the first ground of the moral quality. Therefore, the position, man is by nature good, or bad, or, his moral character is innate, says nothing more nor less, than that the first principle of the adoption of legal or illegal maxims is inscrutable for us, and man himself, should he trace this ground even to his earliest youth, would not be capable to discover it.

365.

But though the signification of the expression, man is by nature good, or bad, is shewn, yet it may still be inquired, if the position, man is by nature *either* good *or* bad, be a proper disjunctive position. This question can only be answered, when it is compared with the principle of all moral conceptions. As a morally good cast of mind is totally different from that which consists in the intention of making the bare legality of actions the highest maxim of the will, so can but one of them be of validity, man has

either made, or not made, this mere legality the highest maxim of his will, and can also be but one of them, either morally good, or morally bad. If consequently we hold up to the transcendental station of all moral judgment, as well the position, man is by nature neither good, nor bad, as that, man is by nature both, at the same time, (in some points good, in others bad), it is obvious that all practical import is wanting to both. As those, who are inclined to that severe manner of thinking, the exclusion of a third, namely, the position, man is either good or bad, are called *rigorists*, so may their antipodes be named *latitudinarians*; these are therefore either latitudinarians of neutrality, and may be called *indifferents*; or of coalition, and may be named *syncretists*.

366.

Before the tribunal of practical reason, that is, man, according to his intelligibilis character, thought by a conception, whereby we lift him out of nature, is, therefore, by nature, either good or bad. This conception

ception allows no mean, because man is not thereby thought as object of experience, but by a mere idea, which has no theoretical signification. If however we contemplate in man his empirical character, i. e. himself as object of experience, he appears to us as a being affected by inclinations, which intrude upon him as first determinatives of his will. He can now, under this conception, easily be thought as in some points good and, at the same time, in others bad, as the moral cast of mind, that is, the independence of the will on material determinatives, in man in experience, necessarily has a degree, and he consequently can become morally better, than he is at each instant. Both positions, man is by nature bad and good at the same time, and, man is by nature neither good nor bad, are valid with mankind as objects of experience. The first says, that every one, from his earliest youth, finds himself in a certain, sometimes greater, sometimes smaller, degree of receptibility of a morally good way of thinking; but the second, that the moral state and imputableness

bleness of man, is something which arose in him.

367.

Man is, first, an *animal*, secondly, a *rational being*, thirdly, *capable of imputation*, i. e. a *moral being*. So far as he is the last, (person), does he possess the receptibility of respect for the moral law, as of itself sufficient spring of the arbitrament. The personality itself can but be thought as disposition to proper worth. It is the possibility to be either morally good, or morally bad. Only of the two first dispositions (animality and humanity) can it be said, that vice may be grafted on them; not of the last, as this but contains the possibility of being wicked. The disposition to animality in man is threefold, *first* to self-preservation, *secondly* to the propagation of the species, *thirdly* to intercourse with other men, i. e. the instinct for society. These dispositions are in themselves not bad, but moral bad may be grafted on them, when to wit man, by virtue of his personality, makes these instincts the highest determini-

terminatives of his will. The vices so arising are called the vices of the rudeness of nature, and in their highest deviation from the end of nature, they are named *brutal vices: gluttony, voluptuousness, and savage licentiousness*. The disposition to humanity itself is likewise not bad. In it lies the inclination to procure to one's self a worth in the eyes of others. Is this inclination itself, however, highest determinative of the will? man thus loses as much proper worth, as he believes to gain in the opinion of others. The vices grounded on this inclination are named vices of culture, and, in the highest degree of their depravity, *diabolical vices*.

368.

Tho' vices may thus be grafted on the disposition in man to animality and humanity, yet these themselves are not morally bad. Should we however find in mankind a principle for the bad, namely a principle to make the gratification of the inclinations the highest maxim of the will, already so early as the first manifestations of consciousness, such

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a principle must be named a *propensity* to bad, which, altho' it lies in the human nature itself, is nevertheless different from a disposition. A disposition (*Anlage*) of man is thought as belonging to his being, and this is to be named neither morally good, nor bad. But though that propensity to bad is represented as inborn in man, yet must he not the less be thought as capable of imputation, since this inborn denotes but the unintelligibility of this principle. This unintelligibility is nothing else, than what lies in the conception of man as a moral being in general, wherein we remove him from nature (the complex of all that is intelligible consequently comprehensible) and think him as the absolutely first cause of the maxims of his will. A propensity to bad is therefore *deed*, and not to be commuted with a physical propensity, that is, with a mere disposition in the human nature, or with an inclination grounded thereon. This natural propensity to good or to bad in the human nature, is that, which is named the *good or bad heart*.

369.

We are mean while speaking of the bad heart, or the propensity to the bad, as it can be object of experience, and it may as such present itself in three different steps. *First*, it may reveal itself as *fragility* of human nature, that is, as weakness in the following of adopted maxims; *secondly*, as *impurity* or *improbability*, that is, as propensity to the mixing of immoral with the moral springs, in so much that not as it ought to be, the mere respect for the law, but, and that perhaps in all cases, still other springs are necessary, in order to determine the will to legal actions; *thirdly*, as *vitiosity*, *pravity*, or *corruption*, of the human heart, that is, as propensity to the adoption of bad maxims. In the last consists the highest degree of the natural propensity to bad, after which this is a principle of overthrowing moral maxims and so the destruction of respect for the law. But however legal a man's actions always may be, he is but a man of good morals, and not a morally good man, so long as the mere moral law is not the sole determinative of his will.

370.

370.

The propensity to bad (the radical evil) in human nature, has not its ground in the sensitive faculty of mankind. These, namely, the inclinations by which man is affected, can but be thought as the touchstone of the degree of the moral cast of mind (as it reveals itself in experience), which however subsists of itself independent of such trials, that serve no other purpose, than to the empirical assurance of the proper moral strength. It happens that men already believe themselves morally good, since the opportunity has only been wanting to commit illegal actions, and since outward circumstances have protected them against the springing up of certain inclinations, (which is however not their doing), because they have not the true point of morality in view, but only put the mere legality of actions in the place of the morality, therefore they often believe to be morally better than others, when they have but more fortunately escaped the bad consequences of their actions.

371.

371.

The natural propensity in man to the bad consists just as little in the maxim, to perform illegal actions, merely because they are illegal. Herein consists the conception of wickedness that renders the subject a diabolical being, which conception is not applicable to man. Man, however, altho' he agnises the authority of the moral law, and is but herein (in the category, moral liberty,) a moral being, is too, at the same time, a sensitive being, under the influence of inclinations, and all moral bad in him consists entirely therein, that he gives his inclinations the preference to the regard for the moral law. The propensity in human nature to the bad is therefore to be named only a *perverfity*, but not depravity of the heart. But that fuch a principle of destruction of the maxims and subordination of the esteem for the moral law to the fpring of the inclinations is to be found in human nature, experience convinces us. If we take a view of men who ftill live in a rude ftate of nature, or of a people in a cultivated, or of the relation of nations

nations to one another, as these live in a constant state of war, and harbour not even the intention of quitting it, the propensity in man to the bad thus reveals itself, inasmuch that we must hold it to belong to the character of his species, and therefore innate in him, though he is not on that account less demerited or blameworthy.

372.

All experience however can but teach that man is *bad*, that is, that he has adopted the occasional deviation from the good as his maxim. But as to the principle of his perversity, the propensity to the bad, which is inborn in him, we name it inborn, in order to shew that no experience can teach us its origin, but that it is to us incomprehensible. Here must the origin of time be well distinguished from the rational origin of the moral bad in man. In the inquiry after the first, I remain in the sphere of the intelligible, and there seek the cause of every action which lies in the preceding time, and every action of man (his adoption of every maxim) is determined.

terminated by previous causes. But the conception of morality elevates the subject from the sphere of nature, and but only in this elevation is he thought as a person and as a being capable of imputation. Here now consists the rational origin of the bad, in a causality, which, as event, previously posits no other, the original deed, and is independent on every cause natural. This rational origin of the moral bad is therefore totally inexplicable, and that, because it lies not in the sphere of the explicable (of nature). The rational origin and how the bad came into the world, are, then, inexplicable, and only so far as it is an object in the world (object of experience, phaenomenon,) does it stand as event under the law of causality. The bible signifies that inexplicableness in an allegorical narration of the fall of our first parents, in making their seducer a spirit, whose origin and the bad in him lie not in nature. But as to the propagation of the evil by inheritance, this notion is absurd, as in it the conception of morality, which is the proper deed of each person, is directly annulled.

573.

Therefore, that man is by nature bad and that even in the best men is to be found the bad principle, the maxim, the occasional overthrowing of all maxims, namely, the subordination of respect for the moral law to the springs of the sensitive faculty, may be considered as a position resting on experience. But as the rational origin of the moral bad cannot be comprehended, notwithstanding it must of necessity be thought, since only in this conception man in general is cogitated as a moral being, so is too the rational origin of the moral good (the return to it, or its reestablishment in man) equally inexplicable. Only the phaenomenon of this alteration of mind can as object of experience be explicable. This return from the bad to the good is a revolution of the mode of thinking according to the rational origin, but it is, according to the origin of time, a gradual progression to the better. In the conception of the first, and so of man as a moral being, it lies, however, that this revolution must be his own work. Though the

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conception of man as a being obnoxious to inclinations, and in his depravation as governed by these sensitive springs, could furnish the conception of a supernatural assistance, in order to recover the original disposition to the good, yet the rational origin of this revolution of the way of thinking of man, whereby he is to be thought as worthy of a supernatural assistance, must be posited nowhere but in himself.

Of the Conflict of the good Principle with the bad, for the Dominion over Mankind.

374.

That man, now, has inclinations, therein consists not the moral bad of his nature, and the stoic was in the wrong when he maintained, that the moral good in man consisted in the combatting of his inclinations. The enemy of the good lies nearer to man, namely, in his own person, but the inclinations, on the contrary, belong not originally to

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himself

himself (they are not his work). The moral bad in man consists not in the inclinations, but in the adoption of the maxim; to subordinate the regard for the moral law to the spring of the inclinations. From the extirpation of the moral bad, which is proper deed and to be imputed to man, begins the moral good in man (so as he cognises himself in experience,) who, how early soever he may direct his attention to his moral state, always finds that the moral bad has already taken place in him.

375.

Though the bad principle has struck root in every man, and he always first cognises himself as bad, yet he is capable of this cognition only in virtue of his moral disposition; this comprises the possibility of the good principle, which man, therefore, so long as he continues conscious of it, can never lose. Of this good principle the scripture gives an idea personified; this, humanity in its moral perfection, it is alone, on whose account the world can be thought as
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end of the creation of the divine will. This man alone acceptable to God 'was in him from the beginning'. This idea lies in the essence of God and its object is in so far not created, but his only begotten son; 'the word (the Fiat!) by which all things were made; and without which was not any thing made, that was made'.

376.

The idea of moral perfection lies in every human soul and rests on the moral principle (moral liberty) in man. Since we cannot comprehend its origin (we, in this conception, separate man from nature) we may say that this prototype is descended from heaven, and so far as he, though holy and therefore obnoxious to no suffering, takes this upon himself in the fullest measure, in order to forward the *welfare* of mankind, who, never free from demerit, are unworthy of this union of the prototype with them, is it named a humiliation of the Son of God.

377.

He only, who is firm in the *practical belief in this Son of God*, that is, who is conscious to himself, that he would be able, like this prototype, to give a similar proof of a morally good mind, to support the greatest suffering, when the good of mankind required it, and that he would steadfastly resist the greatest temptations; but only such a person, I say, dare hold himself to be an object not unworthy of the divine complacency.

378.

With regard to the reality of this idea of the Son of God, it already lies in the conception of the moral nature of man, and every one, who, by virtue of the moral liberty in him, agnises himself as moral being, is at the same time conscious to be able to produce in himself the moral worth, which that idea requires of him. But whoever exacts still more from an example of this idea in experience, than he sees, to whom the innocent, and, so much as one can observe, meritorious conduct of a person, is not yet sufficient, but desires

fires miracles in order to find himself adequate to this idea, he shews his unbelief in the Son of God, i. e. in virtue, and thereby proves the distance of his own moral worth from that which is represented to him by this idea. It is however not to be conceived what, in a practical view, should render it necessary to find more in such an example, than a man created naturally, even under the supposition that he had, by means of a revolution, produced an infinitely great good among mankind; the supernaturalness of his descent, on the contrary, and so his absolute impossibility to sin, might be a hinderance to the force, which this prototype would have as example for imitation.

579.

Difficulties however arise concerning the reality of this idea of a Son of God; namely, concerning its appropriation, wherein its whole practical morality consists, which must be solved. The idea requires *holiness*, that is, perfect harmony of the maxims of our will with the ideal of the moral good. ('Be

ye therefore holy, even as your Father which is in heaven is holy'.) However the moral quality of man, who always sets out from the bad, from which to holiness the distance is infinite, is defective in every finite time. How can man now ever confidently believe to attain that prototype, which is set before him? The answer to this is: as to man's *deed* as phaenomenon, it will constantly discover itself as a progression from worse to better. This constant progression itself however rests on a principle, which consists in the pure sentiment of the heart and is the germe of all good in the phaenomenon. On account of this sentiment, provided it have the command and be pure in man, he may expect, in whatever instant his existence may be broken off, to be still, in general, acceptable to God.

380.

A second difficulty presenting itself concerning the reality of the idea of the Son of God is the following. What is it that assures man of the permanency of his good mind, which we hold to be in him the principle of
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the constant progress to the good? One could indeed address those, apprehensive on this head: 'The spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God', i. e. whoever possesses such a pure mind as is required, is of himself already certain, that he can never fall so low as to be once more in love with the bad. But, as man deceives himself in nothing so willingly, as in that, which concerns the good opinion of himself, so it seems more advantageous 'to work out his salvation with fear and trembling'. However without a trust in one's self and confidence in the constancy of one's good intentions, a permanency in the same continuance would scarcely be possible. The solution of this difficulty can be no other, than the following. Nothing but the previous duration of the good principle that is received in the mind, can assure man of its permanency in the subsequent time. He may accordingly hope that, as the force of this mind encreases in the progress, he in all probability will never entirely fall back into the bad. He, on the contrary, who is conscious to himself

himself never to have been thoroughly attached to the good, must be apprehensive that the bad is always rooted in his mind, and that, were his days still prolonged, he would not for all that make it better. Herein consists the objective validity of the conception of a blessed or not blessed eternity, a dogma, on the other hand, of the finity or infinity of the punishments of hell, would transcend all our cognition and herewith too all intelligibility.

381.

A third difficulty concerning the practical validity of the idea of the prototype of the moral good is the following. How pure soever the good intention of a person may always be, and how constant soever he may have been therein, still he set out from bad, and this demerit is not possible to be effaced by him. Because he has adopted good sentiments, he has not discharged the debts of his former course of life, and since these must be thought as the most personal of any, they cannot be considered as transmissible, or that another can acquit them in his stead. The
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question now is, in what state of man the punishment for his transgressions (the expression of the divine displeasure with him) can be thought executed? So far as he has adopted good sentiments, he is a new man and therefore an object of divine complacency. How can the execution of his punishment, so far as it was not done before his amendment, be now thought? The solution is as follows. In the state of the alteration of mind itself, wherein he quits the old, and becomes a new, man, in the deposing of the inclinations from their sovereignty, and establishment of the respect for the moral law in it, must the discharging of the debt and so the satisfaction of the divine justice be placed. Though therefore the new man, as object of experience, be just the same, who, formerly as old man, lived in the bad sentiment, he is nevertheless, in the eye of the divine Judge, after the alteration of mind, a man agreeable to God and consequently another man. As such, that is, in the mind of the Son of God, or, when we personify this idea, this person even bears for him (for another, the old man)

man) as *substitute* the guilt of the sinner, gives satisfaction through suffering and death to the highest justice as *Redeemer*, and occasions as *advocate*, that 'you may hope to appear before your Judge as justified', only that, (in this mode of representation,) that suffering, which the new man, in departing from the *old*, must continually undertake in life, is exhibited by the representative of humanity, as once for all suffered death. The imputation of this merit however never happens but out of *grace*, since we have no title, that that, which but always consists with us in merely *becoming* (namely, to be a man acceptable to God,) shall be so imputed to us, as if we already were in the full possession of it.

382.

We have here exposed the conception of justification, and so exhibited its practical validity. But the question still is, whether this exposition can have any practical use, and what this can be? As it there falls out, that he, who will appropriate this imputation to himself, must already find himself in
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the state of morally good intention, so no positive use can be made of it for amendment. Moreover, as the consciousness of the good intention, so far as it has already proved itself to be genuine and constant by a long continuance, brings about of itself the quiet of being a man acceptable to God, so it cannot also be thought as mean of producing this quiet. A negative use of it may however be thought. For this insight into the conception of justification, must convince every one, that nothing in the world can be put in the place of a good mind and in the alteration of the way of thinking, in order to make him in the eye of God a man agreeable to Him.

383.

Though the bad principle was once in the world, it was nevertheless taken care, that it should never completely obtain the dominion over the human species. In order not entirely to lose the claim which the good principle had upon man, it was necessary that there, should be a people, by whom the good prin-

principle was honoured, and so, as it were, its remembrance preserved. Finally however there appeared a man of this nation, who expounded, according to its internal contents, what was hitherto but outwardly known and honoured of it. By his own proper life he gave an example of the dominion of the good principle over men and of the inward veneration of it, which consists in its admission into the mind. The dominion of the bad principle was now hereby exposed to danger; it exerted, therefore, all its energy to resist the good principle and that morally good man, who had adopted it himself; it excited every persecution against him, every suffering, which only the well-minded sensibly feel, calumny of the pure intention of his doctrines, and pursued him even to the most ignominious death, without however being able, by means of this assault upon his steadfastness and openness of heart in doctrine and example for the welfare of the most profligate and unworthy, in the smallest degree to effectuate any thing against him.

384.

However the dominion of the bad principle is not therewith banished from the earth, but still continues. The possibility of quitting it however is become visible by that example. This consists in nothing but in the practical belief in the Son of God, that is, in the revolution of the maxims of the way of thinking. We see that if we in this manner divest the mode of representation of the bible of the phaenomenon of the Son of God on earth, of its mystical veil, its sense remains valid for the whole world and at all times, which sense therein consists, that there is absolutely no salvation for man, but in the most intimate admission of genuine, moral principles into his mind. To conclude, an endeavour, like the present, to seek in the scriptures, that sense, which harmonises with the *most sacred*, what reason teaches, cannot be considered as permitted only, but must rather be held to be duty, and one has but to bring to mind what the *wise* teacher said to his disciples of some one, who went his own way, whereby he at last must reach the very same aim,

aim, 'forbid him not: for he, that is not against us, is on our part'.

385.

This present exposition of the contents of the Christian religion and its exhibition as a moral religion are very different indeed from that, by which it itself, its propagation, and the phaenomenon and events of the hero of its narrative, are pretended to be miracles; has the last exposition this issue, that the moral aspect of this religion is thereby lost, which takes place, when the precepts of the moral law are not deduced from the principle of moral liberty, but from the will of God, that is delivered over to mankind in the bible, and hereby, notwithstanding all moral exactitude of actions, they are nevertheless deprived of all morality, and is the Son of God holden to be him, who has atoned for the transgressions of mankind, and if it be opined, that the *theoretical* belief in him can redeem men from demerit? Then is it duty earnestly to oppose this exposition: that it however in itself and the conception

ception of a miracle in general fall into the unintelligible, is, after the dissection of that which constitutes all intelligibility, easily hit. The sole practically valid representation of a miracle is the reference of the entire, to mankind so beneficent, phaenomenon of the moral religion of the Gospel, to a substratum of nature. But this phaenomenon itself, notwithstanding all this reference, remains event natural and ranks under intelligible laws of nature.

*The Victory of the good Principle
over the bad, and the Foundation
of a Kingdom of God upon
Earth.*

386.

All that man in this life can gain over the bad principle, is, *deliverance from its dominion*. Of his constancy in the service of the good principle the continuance in the good intention of his former life can now well assure him. But he never can become completely certain of it. Danger for his morality

however springs out of the relation only, wherein he is to other men, and it is not even necessary that these should be presupposed as already sunk into bad and as seducing examples; it is enough that they exist, that they surround him, and that they are men, in order to corrupt one another mutually in their moral dispositions and render one another bad. No other means therefore can be thought of to operate against this depravation resulting from the combination of men among one another, than a union of them instituted for the opposite end. Such a conjunction of men under mere laws of virtue, for the end of obtaining the good principle to reign among them, is named an *ethical one*, and so far as these laws are public, an *ethical, civil society*, or an *ethical commonwealth*.

387.

A *political state* is that relation of men to one another, so far as they stand in common under *public laws of right* (which are collectively coercive). An *ethical, civil state* is that, where they are united under such, free
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from constraint, i. e. mere *laws of virtue*. To the first is the *juridical*, to the second the *ethical, state of nature* opposed. In both, every person is his own judge, and there exists no public authority possessing might, which, according to laws, determines in a valid manner what, in occurring cases, every one's duty is, and brings that into universal practice.

588.

In a political commonwealth already subsisting the citizens can however find themselves in the ethical state of nature and still have hit upon no union according to mere laws of virtue. So much follows from the conception of an ethical commonwealth, that the political cannot force its citizens to enter into that state. The ethical, however, is still therein distinguished from the political, commonwealth, that the juridical civil state, according to the laws constituting it, may be very different, but the ethical civil state, since the laws that constitute it are laws of virtue, can be one only,

consequently the conception of it, as an ideal, comprehends in itself the whole human race.

389.

The juridical state of nature is a state of war of every one against every one, that is, the state, wherein, as everybody is his own judge, the liberty of every one is constantly in danger to be infringed, and it is therefore duty to go out of that state of nature as soon as possible. Just so likewise is the ethical state of nature that, wherein men mutually corrupt one another morally, and the duty arises equally therefrom to quit this state and to enter into an ethical commonwealth. This duty is of the peculiar sort, that it is not to other men, but a duty which the human species has to itself. It is therefore a duty to contribute to effectuate a whole, (to produce the chief good), which however we cannot know, whether it, as such, be in our own power. It can consequently be accomplished under the idea only of a moral Author of nature and under the conception that

that the progress of nature will by degrees reach this aim.

§ 390.

In a juridical civil state, the people themselves must be thought as legislators. The end of every civil constitution is directed towards the mere legality of actions, namely, towards their harmony with the liberty of every one, according to a universal law. As an ethical commonwealth has the morality of actions for object, so the people themselves cannot be thought as lawgivers. Even as little can the laws of the ethical commonwealth be considered as arbitrary laws of a sovereign. As now, in regard of its observance, it concerns the sentiment only, the legislator must be thought as searcher of hearts. Consequently the conception of an ethical commonwealth is founded on the idea of God, whose commandments express the moral law, who therefore requires the good-intent, and allows the participation of felicity to every one conformably to his worth. An ethical commonwealth then is

possible to be thought as *a people of God* merely.

391.

An ethical commonwealth under the divine, moral legislation is a *church*, which, so far as it is no object of possible experience, is called the invisible church (a mere idea of the union of all the virtuous under the divine, immediate but moral government of world, as it serves as prototype for every one to be founded by man). The *visible* is the actual union of men in a whole, that harmonizes with that ideal. The true (visible) church is that, which represents the (moral) kingdom of God upon earth. The requisites consequently the criteria too of the real church are the following:

1^{mo}. Its *universality* consequently numerical *unity*, to which it must contain the disposition in itself, that, namely, tho' divided into accidental opinions and disunited, it is nevertheless, in respect of the essential design, erected on such principles, that must necessarily lead it to universal union in one church, (therefore no division into sects).

2^{do}.

2^{do}. Its *quality*, i. e. the *purity*, the union under no other than moral springs. (Purified from the imbecility of superstition and the frenzy of fanaticism).

3^{io}. The *relation* under the principle of liberty as well the internal relation of its members to one another, as likewise the external of the church, to political might, both as in a free state (therefore neither *hierarchy*, nor *illuminatism*, a species of *democracy* thro' peculiar inspirations, which may be different according to every one's different fancy).

4^{to}. According to *modality*, the *immutability* of its constitution, with the reserve however according to time and circumstances, to alter the casual arrangements only concerning its *constitution*, to which too it must contain the sure principles a priori in itself (in the idea of its end).

Therefore under original laws, like a code, published together for precept, not arbitrary symbols, which, since authenticity is wanting to them, are contingent, exposed to contradiction, and variable).

592.

An ethical commonwealth, therefore, as church, i. e. considered as *representative* of a kingdom of God, has properly, according to its principles, no constitution similar to the political. This is in it neither *monarchical* (under a Pope or Patriarch) nor *aristocratical* (under Bishops and Prelates) nor *democratical* (as sectarian *Illuminés*)*. It might best of all be compared to that of a family, under a common, altho' invisible, moral Father, so far as his holy Son, who knows his will, and at the same time is in consanguinity with all its members, therein represented him, that he makes his will bet-

* 'Tis only in a free nation, such as ours, that *imposture* has no privilege; and that neither the credit of a court, the power of a nobility, nor the awfulness of a church can give her protection, or hinder her from being arraign'd in every shape and appearance. — Let but the search go freely on, and the right measure of every thing will soon be found.

Shaftesbury's Ch.

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ter known to these, who therefore honor the Father in him, and thus enter with one another into a voluntary, universal, and lasting union of hearts.

393.

Though it is duty in men to quit the ethical state of nature, and to enter into an ethical commonwealth, yet, when one contemplates men as they are exhibited to us in experience, no other mode of grounding a visible church can well be thought of, than that men have held certain rules to be immediate statutes of the divine will. Such a belief, which we, in order to distinguish it from the pure moral belief, shall call *church-belief*, must precede in order to furnish a visible point of union for the institution of an ethical commonwealth. As long as this was *church-belief* and not yet moral belief, so long was its religion a *worship*, and not moral religion: That, however, tho' very different from the latter, yet perhaps necessary in order to ground the last and a true church, could be obtained by nothing so well

well as by a *holy writ*, which comprises those statutes considered as divine.

394.

As much now as moral religion is propagated among mankind, so much is the consideration of the church-belief diminished; when the rules of the latter, which are holden to be the oracles of the divine will, are of such a nature, that they are not hurtful to moral religion, nay, when these pretended, divine commandments lead precisely to moral religion, and the end of a certain revelation is visibly that, to make all belief in it superfluous, then is this holy writ, which aims at the annihilation of the (theoretical) belief in its divine nature, a certain criterion of its divinity, namely, of the possibility of the reference of this holy writ, as a phaenomenon natural, to a moral Author of nature.

395.

In the proportion that moral religion is developed in the class of men, who are united with one another in a certain church-belief

lief, in the same proportion too does this pure religion-belief become the expounder of the church-belief and of the sacred writ on which it is built. The historical faith 'is dead, being alone', i. e. by itself considered as confession, it contains nothing, leads also to nothing, which has a moral worth for us. The merit of the divine, who labours to find the sense of a passage of scripture and the meaning of its Author, may thereby, as satisfaction of a desire for knowledge, always preserve his value; to those, whose moral belief has still further occasion for the veil, inasmuch that they require that their pure rational belief shall also be found in the scriptures, that learned exposition will likewise have a moral value, in tending to establish the good sentiment in them.

396.

The church-belief is by its nature a particular a belief; it is founded in history, and is a belief in events, which must be in conjunction with the supersensual; accordingly this belief can but first be valid for those, to whom

whom the history is arrived, and who secondly observe not the leap in the unintelligible, consequently its void. The pure, rational belief, on the contrary, which is grounded on nothing but the consciousness of morally good sentiments, is a universal belief. So far now as a certain church-belief has in itself the principle, finally to resolve itself into the moral belief, the church that adheres to it may indeed always be called the true church; it will however still be a *polemical* church, as its faith, as church-faith, is a particular one, and yet never ceases to lay claim to universality, with the prospect notwithstanding finally to germinate in the immutable and all-uniting, *triumphing* church.

397.

The faith of every person, who possesses the moral receptibility (worthiness) of being eternally happy, is named the *saving*-faith. It is therefore, notwithstanding all church-faith in a subject, nevertheless the moral faith, that, far from every belief in traditions, is the state of mind of the virtuous, who,

who, in the consciousness of his good way of thinking, refers nature to her moral Author. The saving-faith contains two conditions of his hope of salvation: the one in regard of what he himself cannot do, namely, justly (before a divine judge) to undo his actions already performed, the other in respect of what he himself can and ought to do, to wit, to conduct himself in a new life conformably to his duty. The first belief is that in a satisfaction (acquitting his debts, redemption, reconciliation with God), the second is the belief to be able, in a farther course of life, to become acceptable to God. Both points make up but *one* faith, and this conjunction cannot otherwise be thought, than that he, who, in place of the springs of the inclinations, has made the moral law the highest maxim of his will, who, in the consciousness of the good intendment reigning in him, holds himself assured to be a man agreeable to God. This assurance comprises that of reconciliation, (of the laying aside of the old man, which is a penitence for the transgression in the person of the new man).

398.

Does one neglect this moral side of the saving-belief, and is it held to be but a doctrinal? it then contains the following antinomy: In order to be able to form the resolution, to leave off the bad, and, from all presumptions grounded on preceding experience, that he will always fall back again into it, in order not to be discouraged, it is necessary for man to hold himself assured of the blotting out of his guilt already incurred. But, of whatever nature such an atonement may be, he can however appropriate it to himself under no other condition, than so far as he has already adopted good sentiments, consequently so far only as he is already a good man.

399.

Here are not therefore two principles different in themselves, from which opposite roads are to be taken to begin either the one or the other, but only one and the same practical idea, from which we set out, first, so far as it represents the archetype as to be found

found in God, and proceeding from him, secondly, so far as it represents it as to be found in us, and both, so far as it represents it as the rule of our life; the antinomy is therefore but apparent; since it considers just the same practical idea, but taken in a different reference, thro' a misunderstanding, as two different principles.

400.

Of the good principle can but first be said, that its dominion is grounded on earth, when anywhere on it the principle for an ethical commonwealth obtains. That now the Gospel, tho' its veil is a church-faith, nevertheless embraces moral religion, and that the whole disposition of this church-faith aims at resolving itself into the moral and pure, rational belief, is beyond a doubt. When however we examine history concerning the origin of this foundation of the kingdom of God upon earth, we find that though Judaism was the occasion of the religion of reason that is expressed in the Evangel, yet this was not at all contained in it,
Judaism

Judaism was by no means a religious constitution; God is represented in it but as governor of the world, who pretends to the outward obedience only of his orders, but directs not his attention toward the moral sentiments of his subjects. This is obvious, *first*, because all commands of Judaism are of such a nature, that a political constitution can also consist thereof and injoin them as coercive laws, as they concern outward actions only; *secondly*, that all consequences of the fulfilling and transgressing of these commandments, every reward and punishment, were but confined to such, which could be distributed to everybody in this world, and even these not according to ethical conceptions, as both affected also the descendants, who bore no practical part in those deeds or misdeeds, which, in a political constitution, may, by all means, be a prudential mean, to procure obedience, but, in an ethical, would be contrary to all equity. Judaism *thirdly* has so little succeeded in constituting an epoch appertaining to the state of the *universal church*, or even, in its time, this uni-

universal church itself, that it rather excluded the whole human race from its community, as a separate people, chosen by God, which bore enmity to all other nations, and, therefore, was holden in aversion by every one. Hereby is it also not to be over-rated, that this people admitted but one God, as universal sovereign of the world, not to be represented by any visible image: For it is to be found among most other nations, that their doctrine of belief proceeded also thereon and but became suspected of polytheism, thro' the *worshipping* of certain inferior deities subordinate to that mighty one. For a God, who willeth the keeping of such commandments only, to which no amended, moral sentiment is at all required, is, however, not that moral being, of whose conception we stand in need for a religion: This would rather take place from a belief in many such mighty invisible beings, if a people thought these in such a manner, that they, notwithstanding the difference of their departments, were nevertheless all unanimous therein, that they would think him worthy of their

complacency, who attached himself with all his heart to virtue, than if the belief were only devoted to one single being, but who made the main work a mechanical business.

401.

When now by an ethical commonwealth that church-union only is to be understood, which contains in itself the principle of working out the moral belief, its beginning and the first origin of that church, which in our days, on account of this principle proceeding on religion of reason, is named the true church, must not be placed earlier than the phaenomenon of Christianity. Its first teachers explained this phaenomenon and the events that it brought about as the fulfilling of the prophecies contained in Judaism, whereby their design was evidently to introduce a pure, moral religion, instead of an old worship, to which the people were but too much accustomed, without however directly shocking their prejudices. The successive abolition of the bodily signs, which served entirely to separate that nation from others,

others, leaves room to judge, that the new belief, not bound to the statutes of the ancients, nay, not to any statutes, must have contained a religion valid for the world and not for a single nation.

402

The founders of Christianity used the church-faith, which prevailed in their times, to the purpose of introducing the true, moral religion; this use was indeed already in itself an augmentation of the church-faith; They farther appealed to certain events, named miracles, which drew the attention of the Jews, in order thereby that men might so much the more easily be made attentive to the moral contents, that lay hid under this veil. But whatever may be the state of these miracles, or of the origin of their narrative, the plan of providence, proceeding on moral religion, cannot be mistaken therein, although the Jewish nation were governed by a learned people who took no notice at all, thro' several centuries, either of the phaenomenon of Christianity, or of the miracles

which grounded it. But it must become much easier for every subsequent time to lay aside this veil of true religion, belonging to the church-faith, which was necessary, in order, in the infancy of humanity, not to lose this jewel, and to lead mankind to the pure belief of reason itself.

403.

Unquestionably, the present time, in the whole hitherto known church-history, is the best, of which may be said, that the church-belief inclines more in it, than in any preceding, towards the pure belief of reason. For *first* among all true reverers of religion in every country of our quarter of the globe it is become a principle to neither attack the book itself, which, according to its historical part, contains a mere church-faith, altho' it has moral religion in view, nor enfeeble its worth by petulant assaults, but to use it further as a foundation of church-education, yet so as not to obtrude the belief therein upon any one as necessary to salvation. *Secondly*, the principle prevails always more
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and more, to distinguish the church-faith of the scriptures, which may be constantly controverted, from the pure moral one, which is exalted above all controversy, and to refer totally to the last the beatific power, which was formerly ascribed to the first.

404.

Finally, the kingdom of heaven is represented by the Gospel not only in its approach, but in its entrance, and so must be considered, as a symbolical representation tending to the greater animation of hope and of the courage and aspiration to it, the prophecy of the completion of the great change of world, in the picture of a visible kingdom of God upon earth (under the government of his substitute and vicegerent descending again) and of felicity, which, after the separation and expulsion of the rebels, who once more attempt their resistance, will be enjoyed here upon earth under him.

*Of Worship and spurious Worship,
under the Dominion of the good
Principle, or of Religion
and Priestdom.**

405.

The union of men in the pure religion rational, without all statute laws, is the *invisible church*. Its conception is a mere idea, to which every *visible church*, under statute laws, ought to aspire. This idea accordingly excludes all church-service. Only does the visible church, which is built upon a church-faith, comprise a church-service, and but in it are there ecclesiastics or church-ministers. That however lies in this conception of an ecclesiastic, that the

* *Priestdom* (if the trans:† may be allowed to coin this term, since *priestcraft*, which comes the nearest of any word in English to *Pfaffenthum* in German, is not comprehensive enough in this sense,) is, in general, the usurped dominion of the clergy over the minds, by their assuming the consequence to be in the exclusive possession of the means of grace.

church-

church-faith and the ecclesiastics, as its administrators, shall strive to render all church-faith useless and to resolve it into the pure belief of reason. But when the servants of a church do not observe this, and on the contrary even interpret the aspiring to this aim as condemnable, then is the church-service of which they are apprehensive a mere spurious service, whereby they themselves effectuate the end of a church as an ethical commonwealth.

406.

From the origin of a religion may be totally abstracted, when one judges of its fitness or unfitness to be a universal religion for mankind. In this respect however all religion is either the *natural* or a *learned religion*: Of the first every one may be convinced by his own reason: But the second requires erudition, by which he, who wishes to be convinced of it, must be led: Accordingly, natural religion only is capable of universal communication.

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407.

407.

Every *revealed* religion is also a learned religion. For, as we live remote from the time of its origin, literature is required in order to transpose ourselves to that time. But a revealed religion may likewise be, at the same time, the natural religion nevertheless: It is so, when its doctrines are of such a nature, that reason could also have hit upon it of itself, and conviction of its veracity is to be obtained only from reason and not by means of learning from revelation. A revelation of this nature would have this merit with the human species, that it would have founded an ethical commonwealth earlier, than it would have been without its appearance. Suppose now, that a certain religion of this sort existed under the title of a revealed one, the conception of its supernatural origin would indeed always remain unintelligible for us. However it would nevertheless have the character of truth and the fitness for a universal religion of man, when nothing of its essence is lost, suppose too, that the history of its origin

origin should likewise be lost or called in question, which would then take place, when, according to its internal quality, the belief in its supernatural origin is to be considered as something quite contingent. We shall be able to explain this conception of revealed religion, so far as it is, at the same time, the natural, by an example. We will represent the Christian religion, first as natural, and then secondly as revealed, religion, and confine ourselves in this to the New Testament as fountain of the Christian doctrine of faith.

408.

If now we find, that the founder of the Christian religion has taught the pure religion of reason, conceivable by everybody, in spite of a burdensome church-faith, which aimed not at all at moral religion, and at that time was universal, and that he has added certain statutes, which, tho' they even contain forms and observances, nevertheless serve as means to bring about a church grounded on those principles, we cannot,
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notwithstanding the contingency and arbitrariness of his ordinances aiming at this, refuse the name of the true, universal church to the last, and to himself the authority to summon mankind to unite in the same, without even wishing to augment the belief by new, oppressive ordinances, or to make those, first hit by him, peculiarly sacred and by themselves as obligatory points of religion:

409.

First, he willeth, that not the observance of outward, civil, or statutory church-duties, but only the pure, moral sentiment of heart can make men acceptable to God (Matth. V. 20—48); that sins in thought are considered before God equal to the deed (v. 28) and in general holiness is the aim to which they must aspire (v. 48) that e. g. to hate in the heart is as much as to kill, (v. 22), that an injustice committed to the neighbour be bonified by satisfaction to himself only not by religious actions (v. 24), and in point of veracity, the oath, the civil mean of extortion, is derogatory to the respect for truth

truth itself (v. 34—37); — that the natural but bad propensity of the human heart must be entirely converted; the sweet sense of revenge must make a transition to tolerance (v. 39, 40) and the hatred of his enemies to beneficence (v. 44): Thus, sayeth he, is his intention to fulfil entirely the Jewish law (v. 17) whereby however evidently not scripture-learning, but pure, rational religion must be its interpreter; for, understood according to the letter, it permits directly the opposite to all this: Moreover, he doth not forget the misconstruction of the law under the denominations of strait gate and narrow way, which men allow themselves, in order to pass by their true, moral duty, and hold themselves indemnified for it by the performing of church-duty (VII, 13): Of these pure sentiments he requires, however, that they shall prove themselves by *works* (v. 16) and deprives them of their delusive hope, who are of opinion to supply their want by the invocation and extolling of the highest lawgiver in the person of his minister and to obtain favour by means of flatteries

teries (v. 21): Of these works he willeth, that they shall be executed for the sake of example, for imitation, publicly (v. 16) and with a cheerful mind, not as actions exacted in a servile manner (VI. 16) and that thus from a small beginning of communication and propagation of such sentiments, like to a grain of mustard-seed in a good field or a ferment of the good, religion would augment thro' internal power by degrees to a kingdom of God (XIII, 31, 32, 33): Finally, he compriseth all duties 1^{mo}, in an *universal* rule (which contains in itself as well the inward as the external, moral relation of man) sciz: discharge thy duty from no other spring, than from immediate estimation of its value, i. e. love God (the legislator of all duties) above all, 2^{do}, in a *particular* rule, viz: which concerns the outward relation to other men as universal duty, love every one as thyself, i. e. promote their well-being out of immediate, not from selfish springs derived, benevolence, which commandments are not only laws of virtue, but precepts of *sanctity*, to which we ought to aspire, in regard of which,
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however, the mere aspiring to is named virtue: To those therefore who are of opinion quite passively, with arms a-croſs, to expect this moral good, as a celestial gift from above, doth he refuse all hope thereto. Whoever leaves the natural disposition to good, which lies in the human nature (as a talent committed to his charge) unemployed, in indolent confidence that a higher moral influence will otherwise supply the moral quality and perfection that is wanting to him, him doth he threaten, that even the good, which he from natural disposition might have done, on account of this neglect, shall stand him in no stead (XXV, 29):

410.

As to the very natural expectation of a lot conformable to the moral conduct of man in regard of felicity, chiefly by so many sacrifices of the latter, which must have been made on account of the first, he promiseth (V, 11, 12) reward of a future world for that; but, according to difference of sentiments in this conduct, to those, who discharged

ged their duty *for the sake of reward* (or of releasing from a merited punishment), in another manner, than to the better men, who performed it only for its own sake: He, whom self-interest, the God of this world, governs, is, when he, without renouncing it, only refines it thro' reason and extends it beyond the narrow bounds of the present, represented as such a one (Luc. XVI, 3—9), who cheats that master of his through himself, and gains sacrifices from him in behalf of duty: For, when he conceives the thought, that he must once, perhaps soon, leave the world, that he cannot take with him to the other of what he possessed in this, thus he resolves to deduct from his account, what he, or his master, self-interest, had to demand here lawfully from indigent men, and, as it were, to procure bills for himself in return, payable in another world; whereby he indeed proceeds more *prudentially* than *morally*; as to the springs of such beneficent actions, but conformably to the moral law nevertheless, at least according to the letter, and may hope, that he will be recompensed
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for this hereafter: When one compares with this, what is said of the beneficence to the poor from bare motives of duty (Matth. XXV, 35 -- 40) where the sovereign judge of the world declares those, who give assistance to such as suffer want, without ever conceiving a thought, that such a thing even deserves a reward, and that they thereby oblige heaven, as it were, to a remuneration, just because they did it without consideration of reward, to be the proper elect for his kingdom; thus it is obvious that the teacher of the Gospel, when he speaks of the rewards in the world to come, did not thereby intend to constitute them springs of actions, but only (as soul-exalting representations of the completion of the divine goodness and wisdom in conducting the human species) object of the purest veneration and of the greatest moral complacency for a reason judging the destination of mankind upon the whole.

411.

Here now is a complete religion, which may be conceivably and convincingly represented

sented to all men by their own reason, that farther by an example, whose possibility and even necessity to be archetype of imitation for us (as much as men are capable of it,) is made intuitive, without either the truth of that doctrine or the authority and the dignity of the teacher having need of any other attestation whatever (to which learning or miracles, that are not every one's affairs, would be required). When therein occur appeals to older (mosaic) legislation and typical representation, these are not made with a view to confirm the truth of the said doctrine itself, but only to serve as introduction among those, who adhere entirely and blindly to what is ancient, which, among men, whose heads, filled with statute - articles of creed, are almost become unsusceptible of the religion of reason, must always be much more difficult, than if they had been brought to the reason of uninstructed but uncorrupted men. For which reason it ought not to surprise any one, if he should find a propounding, which is conformable to the prejudices of old, enigmatical for the present times and
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in need of a careful exposition; although it everywhere betrays a doctrine of religion, and at the same time often expressly points out the way to it, which must, without any expence of learning, be intelligible and convincing to everybody.

412.

From that place, however, where the Christian religion contains positions, which lie not, like the former, in reason itself and can be unfolded out of it, it is a *learned* religion. For if it were granted; that, through miracles and actions, these tenets, in the eyes of the cotemporaries of the founders of Christianity and also of the ignorant, immediately obtained valid authenticity; in our days, however, its sense, as well as its actual descent from the founder of the religion, cannot otherwise be shewn so well as by means of learning. When now these doctrines of religion too, on whose account the Christian religion is a *learned* one, and called *christian faith*, are given out for necessary articles of belief, this must not be so understood, as if the tenets of belief were the highest principle, on which the moral religion

ligion, that is contained in the christian religion, must be built. The universal religion of reason must invertedly be the chief principle, wherewith, in the christian religion, the beginning is to be made, and the necessity of the adoption of the articles of faith peculiar to it must lie in moral religion only, to which to lead mankind and likewise to make it conceivable to the illiterate they must be suitable.

413.

If however the matter be reversed and the statute-belief allowed to precede, then is the church-service converted into a spurious one. Such a church has not properly servants (*ministri*), but high officers (*officiales*), who wish to be holden the sole, whose vocation it is to expound the holy writ, after they have, by degrees, stripped the pure religion of reason of the dignity due to it to be its chief interpreter and have ordered scripture-learning only to be used in behoof of the church-faith.

414.

When now the statutes, that are but in behalf of a church to be admitted as divine, and

and which belike according to their nature are only to be confined to one people, are ascribed to the essence of religion, and when the observance of these, relatively to religion, quite casual ordinances are represented as necessary to obtain the favour of the supreme Being, herein consists the *fancy of religion*. The fancy of religion, like every fancy, consists in the commutation of what is but mean, with its end, and likewise therein, that we attribute to that, which is but mean, the value of the end. All fancy of religion rests on the following principle: by all, which we do but merely with a view of pleasing the Deity, (when it is not just directly repugnant to morality, altho' it does not even contribute the smallest thereto), we prove our obsequiousness to God as obedient, and for that reason agreeable, subjects and therefore serve God too (in potentia).

415.

The principle of moral religion, in contradistinction to the fancy of religion, is, that man can be agreeable to the supreme Being thro' nothing but a morally good mind. Though no person is able to give proof of a

perfectly pure and holy mind, yet no revelation can assure more, than that God, in some manner or other, totally-unknown to mankind, will supply this want of proper righteousness, *provided*, however, that man renders himself worthy of this supernatural grace. Therefore, in the good mind must even the acceptance of such tender'd means of grace consist. When, however, one departs from this maxim, superstition has no bounds, since there are an infinite number of arbitrary actions, which men may resolve upon, in order to do the will of the Deity.

416.

Whoever opines, thro' actions, which in themselves contain no moral worth at all, immediately to obtain the complacency of God, and by means of which to be able to produce natural events suitably to his wishes, has the fancy, through quite natural means, to produce a supernatural effect. Essays of this sort are commonly called *sorcery*, which however, (as it conveys the accessory conception of an intercourse with the bad principle, whereas that essay may be thought as undertaken out of misunderstanding

ding with a good, moral design) we shall exchange for the known expression, *the making of fetiches*. Of every species of superstition is that, for conscientious men, the most troublesome, of the belief, that is made a duty, which, since it rests on historical grounds, or is also in itself unintelligible, cannot be altogether universally convincing, and is, therefore, a more heavy load, than all other injoin'd observances, of which it is sufficient that one but attends to them, in order to be congruous to a regulated, ecclesiastical being, without lying under the necessity of either inwardly or outwardly making profession of faith, that one holds them to be an ordinance *founded by God*. For by this the conscience is peculiarly burdened.

417.

Priestdom consists in the constitution of a church, wherein governs a fetiche-cult, which is always to be met with, where statute-commands, rules of faith, and observances, but not principles of morality, make up its foundation and essence. Tho' the ordinances, to which obedient submission is made a duty, be ever so few, yet that is a fetiche-

belief, whereby the multitude are governed and robbed of their moral liberty.

418.

Conscience is the judgement which passes sentence on the moral rightness of an action. Conscience errs when the judgment on the legality of an action swerves from truth. When now the statute - belief of a church constitutes certain actions duty, there can be no doubt that the bare moral judgement has not to decide the moral rightness of such an action, required by the church - faith, and that therefore conscience, in matters of belief, must be its own guide. For, as to an action thus enjoined, no person can be apodictically certain that God has commanded it, and beside, such a pretended commandment cannot stamp the character of moral rightness on any action; since the rule of all moral judgment is nowhere to be found, but in practical reason.

— Truth, virtue, and happiness are the absolute ends of humanity, to which at last refers all philosophic reflection.



ADVERTISEMENT.

The Metaphysic of Morals (which divides itself into the Doctrines of the metaphysical Principles of Law and of Virtue) by *Emmanuel Kant*, shall soon make its appearance in an english dress in two small volumes, it will no doubt be acceptable to those in general, who shall have previously penetrated into the recesses of transcendental philosophy, and more especially to our philosophic lawyers, who are not satisfied with barely citing the reports, and do not thereby imagine to have exhausted the source of all juridical knowledge, but are on the contrary convinced, that *first principles* must be drawn from a still higher and purer fountain. These three volumes will contain a whole or system of critical principles; but though the translator is conscious of having rendered, to the utmost of his abilities, the true sense and spirit of this philosophy, inasmuch that this publication may be justly considered as the master-key to all Kant's critical writings; yet it, by no means, precludes the absolute necessity of the study of these standard works themselves, in their own native language, by all who seriously wish to become critical philosophers; and as the learned author of *Antient Metaphysics* says, 'but, as I do not write to flatter vanity and indolence, I must be forgiven to tell them, that, if they are not Greek scholars, nor will
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take the trouble to become such, they ought to give over thoughts of philosophy;' and now, the translator of this small volume of modern metaphysic dares to assert, that, if they are not German scholars, nor will take the trouble to become such, they ought to give over thoughts of philosophy critical at least.

As Mr. Nitsch teaches this philosophy in London, the tran: has taken some pains to inform himself of his abilities, and is happy to be able to say, that Mr. Nitsch is acknowledged, not only by several of the most distinguished Professors in Königsberg, where he studied and was afterwards a lecturer, but by his eminent master Kant himself, to have a very comprehensive knowledge both of Mathematics and of Critical Philosophy; therefore, the learned and those who have a desire to acquire solid learning should not neglect to avail themselves of his stay in London, in order, by his assistance, to be initiated in the new mode of representation in transcendental philosophy, or what we, in the language of the schools, call, the *Deduction of the Categories*. As the tran: has no personal acquaintance whatever with Mr. N, this encomium cannot be suspected of partiality; his sole aim is really nothing, but that of earnestly desiring to promulgate this philosophy, which he knows to be so sublime and salutary.



